Una estrategia no sancionadora para mejorar el cumplimiento fiscal: Análisis del comportamiento de contribuyentes ante avisos sobre comprobantes con riesgo de no deducibilidad
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Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Acceso al texto completo solo para la Comunidad PUCP
Resumen
La presente tesis evalúa el impacto de una estrategia no sancionadora aplicada por la
Administración Tributaria del Perú, consistente en el envío de mensajes electrónicos a
contribuyentes de renta de tercera categoría, advirtiendo sobre la declaración de gastos
en base a facturas con riesgo de ilegalidad. A través de un modelo teórico basado en la
maximización de beneficios y costos de ocultamiento, se plantea que la respuesta al
aviso varía según el tamaño del contribuyente. Utilizando un enfoque econométrico
doble —modelo logit y modelo de Cox— se analizan más de 100 mil contribuyentes
intervenidos entre 2023 y 2024. Los resultados muestran que los grandes contribuyentes
(PRICOS) tienen 24 puntos porcentuales más de probabilidad de registrar las facturas
observadas frente a los medianos y pequeños (MEPECOS). Asimismo, el análisis de
supervivencia revela que los PRICOS presentan una menor resistencia temporal al
registro, en tanto que los MEPECOS tienen una curva de supervivencia más alta y
sostenida. En el modelo de Cox, los PRICOS presentan un riesgo instantáneo de
registro 2.09 veces mayor que los MEPECOS. Estas diferencias son estadísticamente
significativas. Se concluye que los avisos tienen un efecto disuasivo mayor en los
contribuyentes de menor tamaño, quienes no están sujetos regularmente a auditorías,
lo que valida el uso de medidas preventivas segmentadas como herramientas efectivas
de cumplimiento fiscal.
This thesis evaluates the impact of a non-punitive strategy implemented by the Peruvian Tax Administration, consisting of sending electronic messages to third-category income taxpayers, warning them about the declaration of expenses based on invoices with a risk of illegality. Based on a theoretical model grounded in the maximization of the benefits and costs of concealment, it is proposed that the taxpayer’s response to the message varies according to their size. Using a dual econometric approach—logit model and Cox proportional hazards model—more than 100,000 taxpayers intervened between 2023 and 2024 are analyzed. The results show that large taxpayers (PRICOS) are 24 percentage points more likely to register the observed invoices compared to medium and small taxpayers (MEPECOS). Likewise, the survival analysis reveals that PRICOS exhibit lower temporal resistance to registration, whereas MEPECOS present a higher and more sustained survival curve. In the Cox model, PRICOS show a hazard ratio of 2.09 for invoice registration compared to MEPECOS. These differences are statistically significant. It is concluded that the messages have a stronger deterrent effect on smaller taxpayers, who are not regularly subject to audits, which supports the use of segmented preventive measures as effective tools for tax compliance.
This thesis evaluates the impact of a non-punitive strategy implemented by the Peruvian Tax Administration, consisting of sending electronic messages to third-category income taxpayers, warning them about the declaration of expenses based on invoices with a risk of illegality. Based on a theoretical model grounded in the maximization of the benefits and costs of concealment, it is proposed that the taxpayer’s response to the message varies according to their size. Using a dual econometric approach—logit model and Cox proportional hazards model—more than 100,000 taxpayers intervened between 2023 and 2024 are analyzed. The results show that large taxpayers (PRICOS) are 24 percentage points more likely to register the observed invoices compared to medium and small taxpayers (MEPECOS). Likewise, the survival analysis reveals that PRICOS exhibit lower temporal resistance to registration, whereas MEPECOS present a higher and more sustained survival curve. In the Cox model, PRICOS show a hazard ratio of 2.09 for invoice registration compared to MEPECOS. These differences are statistically significant. It is concluded that the messages have a stronger deterrent effect on smaller taxpayers, who are not regularly subject to audits, which supports the use of segmented preventive measures as effective tools for tax compliance.
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Modelos econométricos--Perú, Evasión de impuestos--Perú, Recaudación de impuestos--Perú, Administración tributaria--Procedimientos--Perú