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dc.contributor.advisorOrihuela Paredes, José Carloses_ES
dc.contributor.authorGuerrero Amezaga, Maria Elenaes_ES
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-26T23:57:30Zes_ES
dc.date.available2019-08-26T23:57:30Zes_ES
dc.date.created2019-08es_ES
dc.date.issued2019-08-26es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/14818es_ES
dc.description.abstractSome resource-dependent countries experience substantial increases in government revenue during natural resource booms. Recent theoretical and empirical contributions (Robinson et al. 2006, Brollo et al. 2013) have argued that such abundance of windfalls can have a negative effect on the functioning of local institutions. In particular, abundance of windfalls could increase the incidence of corruption because their presence aggravates the moral hazard problem that exists between citizens and their elected authorities. This is so because an increased budget means that officials can appropiate rents illegally without compromising their obligations with the electorate, thus distorting the inferences that citizens make about their authorities’ competence. Furthermore, such agency problem could be aggravated by the self-selection of relatively worse candidates entering politics (assuming rents are more valuable for the relatively less skilled), because incumbent mayors (including corrupt ones) would face weaker competition. Exploiting substantial time and spatial variation in the amount of mining-related transfers received by the districts of Peru during the 2000s commodity boom, I implement a difference-in-differences strategy to put the mentioned theory to test. I find evidence supporting the hypothesis of a non-monotonic effect of windfalls on the incidence of corruption, and a negative effect of windfalls on the quality of candidates drawn to challenge incumbents and compete for public office. I do not find strong evidence of the theorized relationship between the two phenomena, but I propose further research pathways to improve our understanding of the results.es_ES
dc.description.uriTesises_ES
dc.language.isospaes_ES
dc.publisherPontificia Universidad Católica del Perúes_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial 2.5 Perú*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/pe/*
dc.sourcePontificia Universidad Católica del Perúes_ES
dc.sourceRepositorio de Tesis - PUCPes_ES
dc.subjectFinanzas locales--Perúes_ES
dc.subjectRecursos naturales--Perúes_ES
dc.subjectCorrupción política--Perúes_ES
dc.subjectDelitos de los funcionarios--Perúes_ES
dc.titleThe effects of fiscal windfalls on corrruption and selection into politics: evidence from the Peruvian commodity boom (2003-2014)es_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesises_ES
thesis.degree.nameLicenciado en Economíaes_ES
thesis.degree.levelTítulo Profesionales_ES
thesis.degree.grantorPontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru. Facultad de Ciencias Socialeses_ES
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomíaes_ES


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