Informe Jurídico sobre la Sentencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia en el caso del «Diferendo Marítimo (Perú c. Chile)», de 27 de enero de 2014

Trabajo de Suficiencia Profesional para optar el título de Abogado que presenta:

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Lima, 2023
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Resumen:

El caso objeto de estudio desarrolla la controversia entre el Perú y Chile relativa a su límite marítimo lateral sobre el Océano Pacífico. Ambos Estados tenían puntos de vista diametralmente opuestos. Si bien para el Perú no existía un límite marítimo establecido, para Chile éste se hallaba plenamente definido por una serie de instrumentos suscritos por las partes. Luego de buscar, sin éxito, una solución a este desencuentro por la vía diplomática, empleando los medios de solución pacífica de controversias reconocidos internacionalmente, el 16 de enero de 2008 el caso fue elevado por el Perú a la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Durante el proceso, las partes presentaron sus posiciones respecto de la existencia de un límite marítimo entre ellas y del curso que éste debería tener. Tras analizar las argumentaciones y los instrumentos que fueron considerados relevantes, el 27 de enero de 2014, la Corte emitió la sentencia que puso fin a la controversia, valiéndose de un recurso no previsto por las partes y asumiendo parcialmente la posición de ambos Estados. El fallo, en primer lugar, estableció la existencia de una frontera convenida, sobre la base de un acuerdo tácito, de una extensión únicamente de 80 millas náuticas, teniendo como criterio de su curso el paralelo geográfico, con su punto de inicio en la bajamar alineada a hito N° 1. El Tribunal interpretó que, en adelante, el límite marítimo no había sido acordado, por lo que decidió su trazado utilizando el principio de equidistancia del “método de tres pasos”.


Abstract:

The case under study develops the dispute between Peru and Chile regarding their lateral maritime boundary on the Pacific Ocean. Both States had diametrically opposed points of view, because although for Peru there was no established maritime limit, for Chile it was fully defined by a series of instruments signed by both parties. After unsuccessfully seeking a solution to this disagreement through diplomatic channels, using internationally recognized peaceful means of settlement of disputes, on January 16, 2008, the case was submitted by Peru to the International Court of Justice. During the process, the parties presented their positions regarding the existence of a maritime boundary between them and the course that it should have. After analyzing the arguments and the instruments that were considered relevant, on January 27, 2014, the Court issued the Judgement that put an end to the controversy, using a recourse not provided by the parties and partially assuming the position of both States. The judgement, in the first place, established the existence of an agreed border, on the basis of a tacit agreement, with an extension of only 80 nautical miles, having as a criterion of its course the geographical parallel, with its starting point at low-water line aligned to Boundary Marker No. 1. The Tribunal interpreted that, henceforth, the maritime boundary had not been agreed upon, therefore it decided its layout using the equidistance principle of the “three-step method”.

Keywords: International Court of Justice – Peaceful solving of controversies – Maritime delimitation – Dispute Peru v. Chile - Analysis of judgement.
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Derecho del Mar |
| Demandante / Denunciante | República del Perú |
| Demandado / Denunciado | República de Chile |
| Instancia administrativa o jurisdiccional | Tribunal internacional. Corte Internacional de Justicia - CIJ |
1. **Introducción**

En el presente informe se analizará la sentencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia - CIJ en el caso del «Differendo Marítimo (Perú c. Chile)», de 27 de enero de 2014, mediante la cual se puso fin a la controversia sobre el límite marítimo entre los mencionados Estados.

Para su estudio, se ha dividido este documento de la siguiente manera: una sección donde se justifica la elección de la sentencia; una sección de antecedentes, donde se hace un recuento de los hechos históricos y aspectos procesales más importantes; una sección relativa a la competencia de la CIJ en este caso; una sección referida a la materia sobre la que versa la controversia, donde se pasa revista al contenido de la misma, al petitorio peruano y a la contestación chilena, así como las posiciones asumidas por las partes en el proceso; una sección en la que se analiza si existía o no un límite marítimo entre Perú y Chile, a la luz de los diversos instrumentos relevantes, evaluando sus implicancias; una sección enfocada a la extensión y el curso del límite marítimo entre las partes establecido por la Corte, enfocada a lo relativo a su punto de origen y a cada una de las partes del límite; y una sección final, donde se analizan otros aspectos de trascendencia, como lo referido al petitorio peruano del “tríángulo externo”, el “dominio marítimo” del Perú y la invocación a la costumbre internacional, el encargo a las partes de establecer las coordenadas geográficas, así como las opiniones y declaraciones de los jueces sobre las decisiones tan complejas que debieron tomar.

Las múltiples aristas jurídicas que ofrece el caso y las importantes consecuencias de la sentencia bajo análisis hacen, definitivamente, que la revisión de los argumentos utilizados por la CIJ para arribar a sus conclusiones sea valiosa.

2. **Justificación de la elección de la sentencia**

La elección de este caso se encuentra justificada tanto por razones jurídicas que ameritan el estudio de la sentencia, así como por la relevancia que ésta ha tenido para nuestra vida como país y para la relación de vecindad que mantenemos con Chile.

Respecto a lo primero, este fallo de la Corte Internacional de Justicia merece especial atención por la interpretación jurídica innovadora que presentó respecto a determinados conceptos del Derecho internacional y del Derecho del Mar. Existe un rico debate en el ámbito académico sobre el tratamiento que realizó el Tribunal, apartándose incluso de la apreciación que él mismo había tenido en casos anteriores, para resolver sobre la base de un elemento que no había sido invocado por las partes, un acuerdo tácito.

En cuanto a lo segundo, se debe destacar que el tema fronterizo es fundamental para cualquier Estado, ya que conocer hasta dónde ejerce su soberanía, hasta dónde se extiende su territorio, es de suma importancia. La realidad de haber tenido controvertido por tantos años un asunto de tal gravitación como el establecimiento del límite marítimo con nuestro vecino del Sur no fue únicamente pernicioso desde una perspectiva política o económica,
sino que tenía la condición de asunto pendiente para nuestra plena configuración como Estado, situación que la sentencia resuelve.

En lo personal, ello tiene un significado aún más especial. Durante la formación del autor en la Academia Diplomática del Perú, hace ya más de dos décadas, citando al Embajador Carlos García Bedoya y su libro “Política exterior peruana. Teoría y práctica” (1992), se nos recordaba que nuestro país llevaba a cuestas ciertas herencias del pasado, temas pendientes que no le permitían todavía orientar del todo su atención hacia el desarrollo y establecer una política exterior con mayor proyección. A estas las denominaba “hipotecas territoriales” y se reiteraba el papel que debía jugar nuestra diplomacia para solucionarlas.

En el espíritu de lo anterior, como sabemos, este caso se constituyó en emblemático para nuestra Cancillería. Confluieron los esfuerzos de diferentes generaciones de funcionarios diplomáticos, quienes, junto con el conocimiento y experiencia de especialistas en la materia, afinaron la argumentación peruana y llevaron adelante exitosamente el proceso, pues finalmente se logró cerrar un capítulo pendiente en nuestra historia, al concluir la delimitación territorial con nuestros países vecinos.

Se hace muy destacable el hecho de haber puesto fin de manera pacífica al contencioso a través de esta sentencia, en respeto del artículo 2, numeral 3 de la Carta de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas - ONU, así como que la ejecución de sus disposiciones por ambas partes, fue en franca demostración de buena fe. Fruto de ello, podemos ahora tener una etapa de complementación de intereses en la agenda bilateral, para beneficio de ambos pueblos, dejando atrás las diferencias del pasado. Para alcanzar esa aspiración, se debe continuar trabajando en la implementación de estrategias que permitan revertir las barreras emocionales que nos han separado por tanto tiempo y potenciar los elementos comunes para fortalecer la cooperación y la confianza para una buena relación vecinal y el desarrollo de alianzas complementarias.

3. **Hechos relevantes**

3.1 **Antecedentes históricos**

El fallo, entre los párrafos 17 a 21, hace un recuento de los antecedentes históricos más antiguos del caso, remontándose al nacimiento de Chile (1818) y del Perú (1821) como repúblicas, tras lograr su independencia de España, destacando que no existía entre ellos la condición de países limítrofes (el territorio entre ellos era Charcas, que luego, en 1825 pasaría a ser Bolivia), sino hasta después de la Guerra del Pacífico.

Las hostilidades entre Chile y el Perú, en el marco de esta guerra que inició en 1879, cesaron con el Tratado de Ancón (1883), con el que el Perú cedió Tarapacá a Chile y este último mantuvo posesión de Tacna y Arica, estableciéndose que lo último sería por un plazo de 10 años, hasta la celebración de un plebiscito que definiera su destino, el mismo que no logró llevarse a cabo exitosamente. Por su parte, Chile y Bolivia formalizaron su situación limitrofe...
con la suscripción de la tregua en 1884 y la firma de su Tratado de Paz y Amistad de 1904, con lo que las costas bolivianas pasaron a ser chilenas.

En 1929 se suscribió entre Perú y Chile el Tratado de Lima y su protocolo adicional, que fijó el retorno de Tacna al Perú y la permanencia de Arica en Chile, estableciendo la frontera terrestre entre ambos países. La demarcación estuvo a cargo de una Comisión Mixta y concluyó en 1930, con la colocación de 80 hitos que delinearon la frontera terrestre. De ello se deriva el área geográfica concerniente a este proceso, pues tal como se indica en el párrafo 16 de la sentencia, el Perú terminó teniendo su costa en dirección Norte-Oeste desde el punto de partida de la frontera terrestre adyacente al Océano Pacífico y Chile con su costa que sigue mayormente una orientación Norte-Sur. Además, se señala que en el área en la que se ubica el referido punto de inicio de la frontera terrestre las costas tienen una topografía relativamente simple y suave, sin promontorios marcados u otras características distintivas (ver Anexo 1).

Posteriormente, en 1947 ambos países realizaron la proclamación unilateral de sus derechos marítimos sobre 200 millas desde sus costas. Chile lo hizo con la Declaración del 23 de junio de ese año, que estableció “la protección y control sobre todo el mar comprendido dentro del perímetro formado por la costa con una paralela matemática proyectada en el mar a doscientas millas marítimas de distancia de las costas continentales chilenas”. Por su parte, el Perú mediante el Decreto Supremo N° 78, de fecha 1 de agosto, declaró que ejercería dicho control y protección “sobre el mar adyacente a las costas del territorio peruano en una zona comprendida entre esas costas y una línea imaginaria paralela a ellas y trazada sobre el mar a una distancia de doscientas (200) millas marinas, medida siguiendo la línea de los paralelos geográficos”.

Al año siguiente, del 30 de abril al 2 de mayo, se realizó en Bogotá la IX Conferencia Internacional Americana. En el marco de esta, se adoptó el texto del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas (conocido como Pacto de Bogotá) el 30 de abril de 1948. Mediante este acuerdo, las partes contratantes, según se estipula en su artículo I, “convienen en abstenerse de la amenaza, del uso de la fuerza o de cualquier otro medio de coacción para el arreglo de sus controversias y en recurrir en todo tiempo a procedimientos pacíficos”. Tanto el Perú como Chile forman parte de este tratado.

Durante los años 50’s y 60’s, ambos países más Ecuador negociaron doce instrumentos relevantes al caso. Cuatro fueron adoptados en Santiago en agosto de 1952 durante la Conferencia sobre Explotación y Conservación de las Riquezas Marítimas del Pacífico Sur: (1) el Reglamento para las Faenas de Caza Marítima en las Aguas del Pacífico Sur, (2) la Declaración Conjunta a los problemas de la Pesquería en el Pacífico Sur, (3) la Declaración de Santiago y (4) el Acuerdo relativo a la Organización de la Comisión Permanente de la Conferencia sobre Explotación y Conservación de las Riquezas Marítimas del Pacífico Sur. Otros seis fueron adoptados en Lima en diciembre de 1954: (1) Convenio Complementario a la Declaración de Soberanía sobre la Zona Marítima de 200 Millas, (2) Convenio sobre Sistema de Sanciones, (3) Convenio sobre Medidas de Vigilancia y Control de las Zonas Marítimas de los Países Signatarios, (4) Convenio sobre el Otorgamiento de Permisos para la Explotación de las Riquezas del Pacífico Sur, (5) Convenio sobre la Reunión Ordinaria Anual
de la Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur, para actividades de caza ballenera, y (6) el Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima (al que, pese a no ser el único de ese año, en adelante nos referiremos como Convenio de 1954). Por último, dos acuerdos relacionados con el funcionamiento de la Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur se firmaron en Quito, en mayo de 1967.

En el marco de la Tercera Conferencia de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas - ONU sobre Derecho del Mar del 3 de diciembre de 1973, esos instrumentos fueron presentados para registro a la Secretaría General de la ONU. Debe destacarse que los cuatro tratados de 1952, incluyendo a la Declaración de Santiago, entraron en vigor el 18 de agosto de 1952, luego de su firma, y que el Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima de 1954 lo hizo el 21 de septiembre de 1967, por intercambio de instrumentos de ratificación.

Cabe resaltar que la Declaración de Santiago de 1952 señaló la proclamación de la soberanía de cada uno de los firmantes sobre el mar hasta una distancia mínima de 200 millas marinas desde las costas. Asimismo, en su punto IV se estableció la regla para el caso de territorio insular, de la siguiente manera:

IV. En el caso de territorio insular, la zona de 200 millas marinas se aplicará en todo el contorno de la isla o grupo de islas. Si una isla o grupo de islas pertenecientes a uno de los países declarantes estuviera a menos de 200 millas marinas de la zona marítima general que corresponde a otro de ellos, la zona marítima de esta isla o grupo de islas quedará limitada por el paralelo del punto en que llega al mar la frontera terrestre de los Estados respectivos.

Respecto al Convenio de 1954, merece recordarse que su artículo primero constituye una zona especial, en la cual la presencia accidental de embarcaciones de cualquiera de los Estados limítrofes no será considerada como violación de las aguas de la zona marítima, en los siguientes términos: “PRIMERO: Establécese una Zona Especial, a partir de las 12 millas marinas de la costa, de 10 millas marinas de ancho a cada lado del paralelo que constituye el límite marítimo entre los dos países”.

Años después, en 1968, el Perú y Chile realizaron un intercambio de notas –nota Nro. (J) 6-4/9 de fecha 6 de febrero y nota Nro. 81 de fecha 8 de marzo, respectivamente– estableciendo el acuerdo de construir dos marcas de enfilación diurna y nocturna. Una de ellas se ubicaría en las inmediaciones del Hito N° 1, en territorio peruano, y la otra a aproximadamente 1800 metros de la primera, en la dirección del paralelo de la frontera marítima, en territorio chileno.

Este acuerdo buscaba, en el espíritu de lo señalado por el Convenio de 1954, brindar las facilidades, mediante la construcción de dos faros, a los pescadores de embarcaciones artesanales que operaban cerca del litoral a una distancia aproximada de 15 millas marinas y evitar, así, fricciones entre ambos Estados. En este contexto, se estableció una Comisión Mixta chileno-peruana, que, en su Acta de fecha 22 de agosto de 1969, se refirió a los acuerdos de los representantes de ambas partes sobre la verificación de la posición geográfica del hito N° 1 y la fijación de las marcas de enfilación para señalar el límite
marítimo al “materializar el paralelo que pasa por el citado hito número uno situado en la orilla del mar”.

En el año 1986, el Perú activó la vía diplomática, exponiendo su posición de que era necesario establecer el límite marítimo entre ambos Estados. El Embajador Juan Miguel Bákula realizó una presentación ante el Canciller chileno y luego fue presentada por nuestra Embajada en Chile la nota Nro. 5-4-M/147, de fecha 23 de mayo, que acompañaba un memorándum (el luego denominado Memorándum Bákula) indicando que el Convenio de 1954 no estableció el límite marítimo entre las partes y proponiendo el inicio de negociaciones formales para su delimitación marítima lateral. Expresamente, señaló que “no es adecuado para satisfacer los requerimientos de seguridad ni para la mejor administración de los recursos marinos, con la circunstancia agravante de que una interpretación extensiva puede generar una notoria situación e inequidad y riesgo para el detrimento de los legítimos intereses del Perú, que podría resultar gravemente perjudicado”. En respuesta, el Canciller chileno mediante comunicado oficial recogido por el diario “El Mercurio” de ese país, señaló que se tomaba nota del interés peruano y que oportunamente se realizarían los estudios sobre la situación.

Viene al caso traer a colación, también, hechos ocurridos en tiempos más recientes. En el año 2000, Chile presentó ante la ONU sus cartas náuticas, mostrando al hito N° 1 de la frontera terrestre como punto de inicio de la frontera marítima siguiendo el curso del paralelo geográfico, lo que motivó la presentación de la respectiva nota de protesta de la Cancillería peruana a la Embajada chilena (el 20 de octubre de 2000) y la comunicación formal del desacuerdo peruano ante la ONU (9 de enero de 2001), afirmando enfáticamente que “el Perú y Chile no han celebrado, de conformidad con las reglas pertinentes del Derecho Internacional, un tratado específico de delimitación marítima, por lo tanto, la indicación del paralelo 18°21'00" como límite marítimo entre los dos Estados, carece de fundamento legal”.

Posteriormente, en julio de 2004 la Cancillería peruana cursó la nota (GAB) Nro. 6/43, proponiendo nuevamente al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile iniciar negociaciones para el establecimiento del límite marítimo entre ambos Estados, propuesta que este último rechazó en septiembre del mismo año, con la nota N° 16723, que tajantemente manifestó la posición chilena que consideraba improcedente referirse a negociaciones sobre convenios vigentes donde el límite marítimo había quedado establecido. Ante este expreso contexto de desacuerdo, en noviembre de ese año, los Cancilleres de ambos países emitieron un comunicado conjunto en el que se reconoció formalmente la controversia de naturaleza jurídica entre las partes.

En marzo del año siguiente, en el marco de la entrada en vigencia del Acuerdo de Galápagos, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú hizo llegar al Embajador de Chile una comunicación en la que se manifestó la importancia de que, en el ámbito de aplicación de este acuerdo (área de alta mar aledaña a la zona de soberanía y jurisdicción de los Estados ribereños), no exista malentendido alguno respecto de la extensión de los espacios de soberanía de cada uno. Ello, con referencia a los derechos que el Perú consideraba tener sobre el denominado “triángulo externo”, es decir, la zona extendida hasta la distancia de
200 millas desde las líneas de base peruanas, más allá de donde el Perú estimaba se hallaba la frontera común.

En respuesta, Chile a través de la nota N° 76 de setiembre de 2005 señaló que "el Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima de 1954, adoptado en el ámbito del Sistema del Pacífico Sur, es precisamente un instrumento vinculante entre el Perú y Chile que se refiere al límite marítimo existente y su plena aplicación no puede ser puesta en duda” y, en noviembre del mismo año, con la nota N° 18934 afirmó que “la Declaración de Santiago de 1952, y el Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima de 1954, ambos en vigor, establecen la delimitación marítima entre Chile y Perú en el paralelo geográfico”.

Viéndose trunca la posibilidad de lograr una salida bilateral a la controversia, el 4 de junio de 2007 el Canciller peruano notificó al Canciller chileno que, en búsqueda de zanjar el asunto, se accionaría ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia de La Haya, lo cual se vio concretado el 16 de enero de 2008, con la presentación de la solicitud respectiva del Perú ante la mencionada instancia jurisdiccional internacional.

3.2 Aspectos procesales del caso

La sentencia, en los primeros quince párrafos, detalla la cronología del proceso, que tuvo la siguiente secuencia:

- El proceso inició con la presentación por parte del Perú de su solicitud ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia, el 16 de enero de 2008.

- En lo que respecta a la fase escrita, mediante providencia de 31 de marzo de 2008 el Tribunal estableció los plazos para el depósito de la Memoria y Contramemoria. La presentación de ambos documentos se dio cumpliendo el plazo previsto: la Memoria del Perú, el 19 de marzo de 2009 y la Contramemoria de Chile, el 9 de marzo de 2010. Posteriormente, con providencia de fecha 27 de abril de 2010 la Corte facultó la presentación de una Réplica y una Contrarréplica. La Réplica peruana se presentó el 09 de noviembre de 2010 y la Contrarréplica chilena, el 11 de julio de 2011, dentro del plazo establecido.

- En base a lo dispuesto en el artículo 53, numeral 1, de su Reglamento, tras conocer la opinión de las partes, la Corte facilitó copia de los documentos a los gobiernos de Colombia, Ecuador y Bolivia, quienes lo solicitaron. Asimismo, en atención a lo estipulado en el numeral 2, se dispuso ponerlos a disposición del público al momento de la apertura de los procedimientos orales.

- Por su parte, la fase oral se desarrolló entre los días 03 y 14 de diciembre de 2012. En esta etapa, valiéndose de sus agentes y sus abogados, las partes expusieron sus argumentos en audiencias públicas llevadas a cabo en el Auditorio de la Academia de Derecho Internacional de La Haya.
El proceso concluyó, tras casi seis años, con la sentencia emitida por el Tribunal el 27 de enero de 2014.

Cabe señalar que el fallo al que arribó el colegiado de 16 magistrados (el juez Greenwood se inhibió, por haber brindado asesoría jurídica a Chile de manera previa a su elección por la Corte) tiene la condición de obligatorio, definitivo e inapelable, según establecen los artículos 60 del Estatuto y 94, numeral 2, del Reglamento de la CIJ.

Asimismo, debe recordarse, como señala el Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros, que:

La Corte Internacional de Justicia es el único tribunal internacional que forma parte del sistema de paz y de seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Consecuentemente, el cumplimiento de sus sentencias no solo se deriva de las disposiciones del Estatuto de la Corte, sino que está garantizado por las normas e instituciones de las Naciones Unidas, especialmente por el Consejo de Seguridad. Teniendo en cuenta que el respeto a la integridad territorial de los Estados es una norma imperativa del Derecho Internacional, ius cogens, una eventual actitud de rebeldía respecto de una sentencia que establezca límites territoriales o marítimos de los Estados, se encontraría razonablemente incursa en violación de esta norma del derecho imperativo. Constituiría también una violación del art. 94 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, a través del cual todo Estado miembro de la organización se compromete “... a cumplir la decisión de la Corte Internacional de Justicia en todo litigio en que sea parte” (Rodríguez Cuadros 2010: 160).

4. **Identificación de los principales problemas jurídicos**

El caso presenta una serie de preguntas problemáticas, tanto de forma, como de fondo. En esta sección se detalla los problemas principales, secundarios y complementarios que se han identificado para el análisis.

Con relación al aspecto de forma, se hace necesario absolver esta pregunta principal: ¿la Corte Internacional de Justicia tenía competencia contenciosa para el juzgamiento del caso? Para ello, debemos dar respuesta a las preguntas secundarias que llevan a la solución de este problema: ¿estaba comprendida la controversia en los alcances del artículo XXXI del Pacto de Bogotá? ¿era aplicable el artículo VI del mencionado Pacto? ¿podía haberse cuestionado la competencia de la Corte?

En cuanto a los temas de fondo, se debe partir de esta pregunta principal: ¿existía un límite marítimo entre Perú y Chile? A fin de absolver esta cuestión, se debe responder las siguientes preguntas secundarias: ¿cuáles son los alcances de los instrumentos normativos relevantes, es decir, de las proclamaciones unilaterales de 1947, de la Declaración sobre Zona Marítima (Declaración de Santiago) de 1952, del Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima y los demás convenios vinculados de 1954, así como de las Actas de 1968 y 1969 (marcas de enfilación)? ¿existía alguna clase de acuerdo entre las partes sobre esta materia?
Una vez definido ese asunto, se hace relevante contestar a la siguiente gran pregunta: ¿cuál es la extensión y el curso del límite marítimo entre Perú y Chile? Las preguntas secundarias en este ámbito, son: ¿cómo establece la delimitación marítima la Corte Internacional de Justicia? ¿cuál es el punto de inicio del límite marítimo? ¿cuál es el trazado de la delimitación marítima entre ambos países?

Finalmente, se ha identificado otros asuntos que pueden entenderse como problemas complementarios que merecen ser abordados, los mismos que versen sobre el petitorio peruano del “triángulo exterior”, sobre el “dominio marítimo” del Perú y la invocación a la costumbre internacional, así como el encargo a las partes de establecer las coordenadas geográficas. También viene al caso referirnos al carácter complejo del fallo, trayendo a colación algunas de las opiniones y declaraciones de los jueces.

En las siguientes secciones se procederá al análisis jurídico de cada uno de estos problemas, con miras a resolver las preguntas que guiaron la resolución del caso, realizando, asimismo, una aproximación crítica sobre el tratamiento dado por el Tribunal a cada uno de ellos.

5. En relación con la competencia contenciosa de la Corte Internacional de Justicia – CIJ

Para abordar la problemática de forma, debemos recordar que, tras el agotamiento de los recursos diplomáticos previos, la invocación a la jurisdicción de la Corte Internacional de Justicia por parte del Perú se fundamentó en el artículo XXXI del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas (conocido como Pacto de Bogotá), del cual, como se ha señalado anteriormente, tanto el Perú como Chile son Estados parte. Como bien señalaban, desde tiempo atrás, autores como Alejandro Deustua, estaba claro que la definición, contenido y solución de la controversia tenía que darse en el marco del Derecho (Deustua 2007: 9).

Como sabemos, en el año 1967, el Perú ratificó este tratado (el 28 de febrero) y también Chile (con fecha 21 de agosto). Si bien al momento de la firma, el Perú había presentado una serie de reservas en relación con los artículos V, XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXV y XLV del Pacto de Bogotá, estas fueron retiradas en febrero de 2006, mediante la correspondiente notificación a la Secretaría General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, depositaria de dicho tratado.

El referido artículo del Pacto de Bogotá señala lo siguiente:

**ARTICULO XXXI**: De conformidad con el inciso 2º del artículo 36 del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional de Justicia, las Altas Partes Contratantes declaran que reconocen respecto a cualquier otro Estado Americano como obligatoria ipso facto, sin necesidad de ningún convenio especial mientras esté vigente el presente Tratado, la jurisdicción de la expresada Corte en todas las controversias de orden jurídico que surjan entre ellas y que versen sobre:

a) La interpretación de un Tratado;

b) Cualquier cuestión de Derecho Internacional;
c) La existencia de todo hecho que, si fuere establecido, constituiría la violación de una obligación internacional;

d) La naturaleza o extensión de la reparación que ha de hacerse por el quebrantamiento de una obligación internacional.

Viene al caso recordar que lo establecido en el precitado artículo no es aplicable si la controversia versa sobre asuntos ya resueltos por arreglo de las partes con anterioridad o que se hallen regidos por tratados en vigencia al momento de celebración del Pacto de Bogotá, según establece el artículo VI de dicho Pacto, cuyo contenido es el siguiente: “ARTÍCULO VI: Tampoco podrán aplicarse dichos procedimientos a los asuntos ya resueltos por arreglo de las partes, o por laudo arbitral, o por sentencia de un tribunal internacional, o que se hallen regidos por acuerdos o tratados en vigencia en la fecha de la celebración del presente Pacto”.

Con respecto a este último punto, cabe señalar que el Perú halló fundamento a su acción ante la Corte considerando la existencia de una controversia no resuelta entre las partes, asunto que no estaba regido por tratados en vigor, que empezó a exteriorizarse con posterioridad a la conclusión y entrada en vigor del Pacto de Bogotá, lo cual la deslinda de los alcances restrictivos del citado artículo VI.

Por cierto, es importante notar que no hubo oposición de Chile sobre la competencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia para resolver el caso. De haberlo estimado pertinente, podría haber considerado presentar una excepción preliminar, invocando al artículo 79 de su Reglamento (Moscoso 2014: 54), que recoge este mecanismo procesal de defensa previa que permite cuestionar la competencia del Tribunal o la admisibilidad de la demanda.

De haberlo interpuesto, el mismo Tribunal hubiera tenido que evaluar y decidir sobre si tenía o no competencia, en virtud del principio de “competence de la compétence”, que se consigna en el artículo 36, numeral 6 de su Estatuto. Así, hubiera debido pronunciarse sobre ello, y sólo tras declararse competente, podría haber pasado a analizar el asunto de fondo.

Al respecto, el jurista chileno Sebastián López Escarcena presume que Chile decidió no objetar la competencia de la Corte, vía excepción preliminar, en previsión de una eventual respuesta contraria que pudiera representarle un revés político en el ámbito interno, tras conocer que en el caso de la Disputa Territorial y Marítima de Nicaragua con Colombia, con ciertas similitudes, ya la Corte Internacional de Justicia se había declarado competente, apenas un mes antes de que el Perú presentara su demanda (López 2014: 1144).

En el presente caso, si bien el Tribunal no tuvo que pronunciarse de manera directa y expresa sobre su competencia, el mismo hecho de que haya continuado el proceso y procediera a emitir un pronunciamiento de fondo, demuestra plenamente que la Corte nunca tuvo cuestionamiento alguno de que sí era competente para resolver la controversia que se le puso a consideración, en virtud del artículo 36, numeral 1 de su Estatuto.
6. **Materia de la controversia**

Para entrar al estudio de la problemática de fondo, en esta sección, vamos a referirnos propiamente al contenido de la controversia. Se considera relevante para ello citar lo indicado por el Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros, quien fuera el Canciller peruano que emitió el comunicado conjunto, referido en el punto 3.1 de este informe, en el que se reconoció formalmente la controversia de naturaleza jurídica entre las partes:

Entre el Perú y Chile existe una controversia marítima de naturaleza jurídica, la cual tiene tres componentes: dos básicos y uno derivado. En primer lugar, el diferendo sobre delimitación marítima en cada uno de los espacios en que el Derecho internacional reconoce derechos de soberanía y jurisdicción a los estados (mar territorial, zona contigua, plataforma continental y zona económica exclusiva); en segundo lugar, la pretensión chilena de desconocer la soberanía y jurisdicción del Perú en un área de 28,471.86 km², aproximadamente, situada en una zona ajena al espacio marítimo objeto de la controversia limítrofe y a la propia proyección de las costas de Chile hasta las 200 millas y, finalmente, como derivación del diferendo limítrofe, el desacuerdo en relación con el punto de inicio de la frontera marítima (Rodríguez Cuadros 2007: 133).

Desarrollando lo señalado y remitiéndonos propiamente al contenido de la sentencia, a continuación, se presentará el petitorio del Perú, la contestación de Chile y en consonancia, las posiciones asumidas por las partes durante el desarrollo del proceso (ver Anexos 2 y 3).

6.1 **Petitorio del Perú**

El párrafo 13 de la sentencia señala que el Perú, en su demanda, realizó las solicitudes que, a continuación, se mencionan: “El Perú solicita a la Corte que determine el curso de la frontera entre las respectivas zonas marítimas de los dos Estados de conformidad con el Derecho Internacional (...) y que falle y declare que el Perú posee derechos soberanos exclusivos sobre el área marítima situada dentro del límite de 200 millas náuticas desde su costa, pero fuera de la zona económica exclusiva o plataforma continental de Chile”.

En ese mismo sentido, como se señala en los párrafos 14 y 15, en los procedimientos escritos (Memoria y Réplica) así como en las audiencias de la fase oral, el Perú solicitó a la Corte fallar declarando que:

1. La delimitación entre las respectivas zonas marítimas entre la República del Perú y la República de Chile es una línea que comienza en ‘Punto Concordia’ (definido como la intersección con la marca de bajamar en un arco de radio de 10 kilómetros, que tiene como centro el primer puente sobre el río Lluta del ferrocarril Arica-La Paz) y equidistante de las líneas de base de las dos Partes, hasta un punto situado a una distancia de 200 millas náuticas contadas desde dichas líneas de base, y
2. Más allá del punto donde termina la frontera marítima común, Perú tiene derecho a
ejercer derechos soberanos exclusivos sobre un área marítima que se extiende hasta una
distancia de 200 millas náuticas contadas desde sus líneas de base.

Como se señala luego, en los párrafos 22 y 23, la posición del Perú, por tanto, fue de
sostener que no existía una frontera marítima convenida entre los dos países y solicitar a la
Corte que trazara una línea divisoria utilizando el método de la equidistancia, en búsqueda
de un resultado equitativo. Asimismo, sostuvo que la línea de delimitación abogada por
Chile resultaba injusta, al otorgarle a este último una extensión marítima total de 200 millas
náuticas, mientras que al Perú esto le ocasionaba un efecto de amputación (“cut-off effect”).
Igualmente, el Perú cuestionó que Chile buscara presentar como estable y beneficiosa a una
línea de frontera que le otorga más del doble de zona marítima que a su contraparte.

6.2 Contestación de Chile

Tal como se recoge en los párrafos 14 y 15 de la sentencia, Chile (tanto en su Contra-
Memoria, como en su Contra-Réplica, así como en los procedimientos orales) solicitó a la
Corte lo siguiente:

a) desestimar los alegatos del Perú en su totalidad;

b) fallar y declarar que:

1. los respectivos derechos de zonas marítimas de Chile y Perú han sido totalmente
delimitados por acuerdo;

2. los derechos sobre las zonas marítimas están delimitados por una frontera que sigue el
paralelo de latitud que pasa a través del marcador de frontera de límite más hacia el mar
de la frontera terrestre entre Chile y Perú, conocido como Hito n° 1, que tiene una latitud
de 18° 21’ 00” S bajo Datum WGS 84; y

3. Perú no tiene derechos sobre ninguna zona marítima extendida hacia el sur de dicho
paralelo.

En consecuencia, la posición de Chile, como señala la sentencia en los párrafos 22 y 23, fue
la de afirmar que la Declaración de Santiago de 1952 estableció una frontera marítima
internacional a lo largo del paralelo de latitud que pasa a través del punto de partida de la
frontera terrestre entre ambos países (que, para Chile, era el Hito N° 1) y que esta frontera
marítima cuenta con una extensión hasta un mínimo de 200 millas náuticas. Basó su
argumentación, con la intención de sentar evidencia, en diversos acuerdos y en la práctica
ulterior, por lo que solicitó a la Corte que confirmara el trazo fronterizo de conformidad con
ello.

Además, al tiempo de señalar que había sido beneficioso para ambos la estabilidad de larga
data de su frontera marítima, Chile sostuvo a lo largo del proceso que el principio de pacta
sunt servanda y el principio de la estabilidad de las fronteras impedían “cualquier intento
de invitar a la Corte para redefinir una frontera que ya ha sido convenida”, tal como se menciona en el párrafo 23 del fallo.

7. **Análisis sobre la existencia o no de un límite marítimo entre el Perú y Chile**

A efectos de resolver la controversia entre ambos Estados, la Corte partió de evaluar si existía una frontera convenida entre las partes. Para ello, realizó su estudio reconstruyendo cronológicamente el caso, a la luz de las implicancias de diversos documentos que las partes consideraban relevantes, así como sobre su práctica subsecuente.

El Tribunal entendió que ninguno de los instrumentos que fueron puestos a su consideración tenía la condición de tratado de límites entre Perú y Chile, puesto que no establecieron la frontera marítima; sin embargo, llegó a la conclusión de la existencia de un límite que luego fue reconocido en algunos de los instrumentos.

Ello se podría resumir en que, como bien lo hace notar Gattās Abugattās, “no le dio la razón ni al Perú ni a Chile; señaló que no existía un acuerdo expreso sobre delimitación fronteriza marítima, negando el argumento chileno, pero que sí existía un acuerdo tácito sobre la materia, negando el argumento peruano” (Abugattās 2014: 90).

A continuación, se abordará con mayor detalle lo señalado con relación a cada instrumento.

7.1. **Sobre los alcances de las proclamaciones unilaterales de 1947**

7.1.1. **Las posiciones de las partes**

Sobre las proclamaciones de cada Estado, mencionadas en el punto 3.1, existía una diferencia de apreciación entre las partes. Para el Perú, éstas tenían el único fin de declarar soberanía y jurisdicción en el espacio marítimo sobre las 200 millas desde sus costas, con el fin de garantizar la protección de los recursos.

En cuanto a la mención de la extensión de esa zona siguiendo la línea de los paralelos geográficos, manifestó que no debe tomarse más allá de una manera de referencia de la forma en que se extendería la proyección, sin intención de establecer límite marítimo lateral alguno con los países vecinos.

Para Chile, en cambio, estas declaraciones tenían mayor relevancia, al considerar que sí establecieron fronteras marítimas, ya que interpretaba que la referencia al paralelo que realizó el Decreto peruano necesariamente implicaba el criterio de cómo se delimitaría al norte y al sur la zona señalada.
7.1.2. La interpretación de la CIJ

Luego de su estudio, la Corte concluyó que el Perú y Chile no establecieron su delimitación marítima a través de estas proclamaciones. Por su tenor, no podría entendérselas en sí mismas como una manifestación de la voluntad de las partes de definir ese límite.

En tal sentido, el Tribunal consideró que las declaraciones que realizaron ambos Estados en el año 1947 tenían la finalidad de crear sus zonas marítimas en proyección hasta las 200 millas marinas, pero no encontró elementos que fundamenten que estas hayan establecido los límites laterales entre ellos. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de que estas dieran pie a la posterior necesidad del establecimiento de los límites en el espacio sobre el cual se manifestó el interés de ejercer jurisdicción.

En cuanto a la referencia al paralelo, en las proclamaciones mismas no halló evidencia de que existiera una clara intención de las partes de buscar hacer coincidir la eventual frontera marítima con un paralelo.

7.1.3. Opinión personal

Más allá del desafortunado fraseo de la norma peruana -que había dado pie a la discusión sobre una eventual propuesta del empleo del paralelo geográfico para determinar los límites laterales, en vez de la idea de la mera proyección paralela con la intención de definir el límite frontal de ese espacio-, coincidimos con lo dispuesto por la Corte: no se buscaba delimitar, sino lograr el respeto y reconocimiento de derechos sobre las 200 millas.

Se es de la opinión de que el Tribunal hace evaluación conforme con la ratio legis de los pronunciamientos, pues no se aparta del sentido de lo que se busca con la norma, trascendiendo de la mera disposición del texto mismo.

Estimamos que su interpretación es adecuada, al reconocer, como afirmó el Perú, la “proyección frontal” contenida en estas proclamaciones, sin considerarlas elementos vinculantes que reflejaran un entendimiento común, ni con relevancia alguna para la determinación de un límite marítimo lateral por 200 millas entre los dos Estados, como sostenía la posición chilena.

7.2. Sobre los alcances de la Declaración sobre Zona Marítima (Declaración de Santiago) de 1952

7.2.1. Las posiciones de las partes

Respecto a las implicancias de la Declaración de Santiago también existía desacuerdo entre las partes. El Perú argumentó el mero carácter declarativo de la política marítima.
internacional de las partes con el que surgió este instrumento, para la creación de una zona que en ejercicio de la solidaridad regional funcionara como una unidad biológica única, no entendiéndolo como un tratado vinculante, sino hasta su posterior ratificación y registro ante la Secretaría General de las Naciones Unidas. Adicionalmente, señaló que no se trató de un acuerdo de límites, puesto que no cumplía con formalidades “que podrían esperarse de un acuerdo fronterizo, a saber, un formato apropiado, una definición o descripción de una frontera, material cartográfico y el requisito de ratificación”, como recoge el párrafo 50 de la sentencia.

En cuanto al artículo IV de la Declaración, cuyo texto fue citado en el punto 3.1 de este informe, el Perú indicó que el criterio que contempla era de aplicación limitada, exclusivamente para casos de territorio insular.

Para Chile, en cambio, este instrumento siempre se trató de un tratado internacional que comprometió desde sus inicios a los países signatarios y que, adicionalmente, sí tenía implicancias fronterizas, ya que, a su entender, al identificar las partes zonas marítimas donde los Estados ejercerían soberanía y jurisdicción, era natural que se definiera el perímetro de la zona de cada uno.

Asimismo, restó valor a los argumentos peruanos respecto a las características formales exigibles a un acuerdo fronterizo, al considerar que no existen requisitos de forma para que un tratado establezca una frontera. Consideraba de especial importancia lo señalado en el referido artículo IV, entendiéndolo como el criterio general para la delimitación.

7.2.2. La interpretación de la CIJ

Tras la evaluación de la Declaración de Santiago, el Tribunal determinó que este constituye, sin lugar a dudas, un tratado, pero que únicamente se circunscribe a la ratificación contra las principales potencias marítimas de la reclamación marítima de soberanía y jurisdicción de las partes hasta las 200 millas, sin establecer elementos de delimitación marítima más allá de los contenidos en el artículo IV.

La Corte fue precisa al señalar, en el párrafo 70 de la sentencia, que la Declaración no establece entre Perú y Chile una frontera marítima lateral que siguiera a lo largo del paralelo, como argumentaba Chile.

En adición, al pronunciarse en lo referente a la disposición del artículo IV, arribó a la conclusión de que el criterio contenido en este artículo solo es de aplicación para delimitación de las zonas marítimas que involucren islas y que claramente esta norma se encontraba pensada para el caso de la frontera peruano-ecuatoriana (por las Islas Galápagos, consideradas en las actas de la negociación de la Declaración) y no la peruano-chilena (donde apenas existe una pequeña isla cercana a la costa, que no fue de preocupación de las partes).
Igualmente, trajo a colación que la propuesta que fue planteada por Chile, pretendiendo establecer la delimitación general de los espacios marítimos en las líneas laterales, no había sido adoptada en la conferencia de 1952, que dio origen a la Declaración de Santiago.

7.2.3. Opinión personal

Si bien expertos, como el distinguido Embajador Juan Manuel Bákula, se habían pronunciado cuestionando la calidad de tratado que podría tener la Declaración de Santiago, señalando que se trataba específicamente de una norma de política que recogía principios (Bákula 2008: 133), concuerden con lo dispuesto por el Tribunal, al entender que la Declaración sí constituye un tratado para extender la competencia de Estados costeros para fines de protección de recursos, aunque no uno que buscara establecer el límite marítimo vinculante entre las partes, como adecuadamente argumentó el Perú.

Viene al caso traer a colación que el Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros expuso un argumento muy válido para concluir que este instrumento no podía ser un tratado de límites: la posibilidad de ser denunciado. Por su naturaleza, los tratados de límites no pueden serlo, sino que tienen vocación de perpetuidad (Rodríguez Cuadros 2007: 182). Este concepto de permanencia, de vigencia ilimitada, concuerda con el principio de estabilidad de las fronteras, como también recuerda María Teresa Infante al mencionar que la estabilidad y el carácter definitivo son elementos determinantes en la materia (Infante 2016: 78).

Asimismo, concuerdo con la conclusión de la Corte de que la disposición del artículo IV se refiere a una situación específica que no se encuadra con la realidad de la geografía marina frente de la frontera terrestre entre Perú y Chile, como adecuadamente hacían notar autores como el Embajador Alfonso Arias-Schreiber, desde hace más de dos décadas (Arias-Schreiber 2001: 40).

Coincido también con el Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros en pensar que de haber sido lo dispuesto en el precitado artículo un criterio de aplicación general, como sostenía Chile, se “amputaría” al Perú de un significativo espacio marítimo, lo que le hubiera impedido hacer efectivo el objeto y fin mismo del tratado en su plena extensión, por lo que esa hipótesis carecería de sentido (Rodríguez Cuadros 2007: 152).

La Corte concluye correctamente la especificidad del artículo IV ante una situación de tipo excepcional, haciendo empleo de las normas de interpretación de los tratados recogidas por la costumbre internacional y que además se encuentran codificadas en la regla general de interpretación consagrada en el artículo 31 de la Convención de Viena de 1969.

El referido artículo de esa Convención, como conocemos, expresamente señala, en su numeral I, que “un tratado deberá interpretarse de buena fe conforme al sentido corriente que haya de atribuirse a los términos del tratado en el contexto de estos y teniendo en cuenta su objeto y fin”.
7.3. Sobre los alcances del Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima y demás convenios vinculantes de 1954

7.3.1. Las posiciones de las partes

Chile había invocado los acuerdos de 1954 celebrados con Perú y Ecuador, así como las reuniones que llevaron a esos acuerdos, en sustento de su posición de que la frontera marítima se había delimitado por 200 millas en 1952, bajo el criterio del paralelo. Encontró particular relevancia en la redacción de algunos de los instrumentos, que señaló eran de aplicación para los tres países, con connotaciones limítrofes. En particular, Chile se enfocó en el tenor del artículo primero del Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima, texto citado en el punto 3.1 de este informe, cuya redacción en tiempo presente hace referencia “al paralelo que constituye el límite marítimo”.

Para el Perú, en cambio, el instrumento era de naturaleza estrictamente pesquera. Por ello, el término “límite marítimo” que se incorporó en el texto del Convenio no buscaba establecer una frontera definitiva, sino que, en el espíritu de lo expuesto en la parte considerativa del instrumento, pretendía establecer provisionalmente y de forma específica, una referencia para orientar a las embarcaciones pesqueras que precisamente por carecer de referencia geográficas de un límite marítimo entre los Estados parte, venían siendo detenidas, lo que generaba fricciones entre los países. En ese sentido, ese “límite marítimo” no podía extenderse a gran distancia. En otras palabras, el Convenio establecía una mera zona de tolerancia pesquera fronteriza, pensada para la pesca artesanal cercana a la orilla.

Además, el Perú esbozó el argumento de que la demora chilena (de 13 años) en la ratificación y registro del instrumento para que este entrara en vigor, reflejaba la falta de importancia que el país del Sur le otorgaba, de lo que se desprendía que no podría tratarse de un acuerdo de límites.

Finalmente, el Perú era del parecer de que las disposiciones del citado Convenio no tenían validez con Chile y eran de aplicación únicamente con Ecuador, dado que el texto surgió de una propuesta entre estos dos países. Así, el Perú entendía esta disposición como estrechamente vinculada al artículo IV de la Declaración de Santiago, que considera reglas especiales para los casos de territorio insular. En la argumentación peruana, la mención del término “entre los dos países”, en el precitado artículo primero de la Convención, reforzaría esta interpretación.

7.3.2. La interpretación de la CIJ

Luego del estudio de los diversos acuerdos de 1954, en particular del Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima, la Corte se pronunció señalando que el objeto principal de lo
pactado fue establecer una zona de tolerancia a lo largo del paralelo que constituye el límite marítimo para la actividad de las pequeñas embarcaciones pesqueras de los Estados parte.

Adicionalmente, el Tribunal confirmó la vigencia del referido Convenio; indicó que la demora chilena en la ratificación y registro del instrumento no era relevante; y manifestó que su aplicación no se restringía únicamente a la frontera entre Perú y Ecuador, como señalaba la argumentación peruana. La Corte explicó que, para comprender el sentido de este Convenio, se debe considerar el contenido de todos los acuerdos de manera complementaria.

Finalmente, y no menos importante, la Corte interpretó que el artículo primero del Convenio se refería a una frontera marítima ya existente, como señala el párrafo 90 de la sentencia, en estos términos: “[...] la formulación del acuerdo de 1954 relativo a una zona especial fronteriza marítima, particularmente aquella del artículo primero, considerada a la luz del preámbulo, es clara: reconoce, en el marco de un acuerdo internacional obligatorio, que ya existe una frontera marítima”.

El Tribunal concluyó, sin embargo, que este Convenio no indica cuándo ni por qué medio se llegó a convenirla, por lo que deberíase haberse llegado a un acuerdo tácito entre las partes con anterioridad. Más adelante, se procederá a desarrollar las implicancias que la Corte estimó que se derivan de este acuerdo tácito.

7.3.3 Opinión personal

Es interesante que el Tribunal no se detuviera en la discusión de posturas sobre si el Convenio tenía el carácter de tratado de límites, sino que haya interpretado algo distinto de sus términos al regular los temas de pesca: advertir que la frontera ya existía y que este tratado internacional obligatorio la reconocía.

Coincido con la lectura que hace el Tribunal de este instrumento, en el sentido de que lo que realiza este Convenio, de disposiciones puntuales y específicas, no es establecer el límite marítimo entre las partes, ya que no contiene cláusulas delimitatorias e incluso es denunciable en su totalidad (argumento que ya se explicó en el punto 7.2.3).

En mi opinión, también queda muy claro que este instrumento no podría haberlo establecido, al regular una zona de tolerancia (entendible en una época previa a los instrumentos precisos de geolocalización) más allá de las 12 millas de mar territorial, es decir, sin normar la totalidad de espacios marítimos.

Sin perjuicio de lo antes señalado, de sus términos, efectivamente, es deducible la existencia de un límite, aunque el Convenio en sí mismo no lo constituya. A mi juicio, la Corte concluye correctamente que este tratado evidencia el reconocimiento de una frontera preexistente.

La conclusión más determinante de la Corte, para efectos del caso, es que considere a esta frontera como producto de un acuerdo tácito, una situación que no había sido prevista en las argumentaciones del Perú ni de Chile. Lo anterior significa que la Corte no asumió la
posición peruana de que nunca se había acordado una frontera marítima entre las partes. De la misma manera, se apartó de la posición chilena, que sostenía que esta frontera se encontraba establecida y tenía una extensión de 200 millas por los instrumentos que fueron puestos a su análisis.

Ello, además, resulta especialmente relevante y novedoso, pues se trató de la primera vez que la Corte Internacional de Justicia reconoció la existencia de un acuerdo tácito y se valió de esta figura al momento de resolver una controversia, como más adelante veremos.

7.4 Sobre los alcances de las Actas de 1968 y 1969 (marcas de enfilación)

7.4.1. Las posiciones de las partes

El Perú sostuvo que la colocación de los faros en la zona tenía como único objetivo ser una herramienta para prevenir incidentes relacionados a la pesca costera de ese entonces, apuntando a evitar problemas con los pescadores en el rango de las 15 millas náuticas de alcance de las luces, sin intención alguna de establecer una frontera internacional definitiva y permanente. Es decir, acuerdos “con el propósito orientador de la navegación, no el de establecer un límite” (Deustua 2014: 122)

Chile, por su parte, expuso que esta acción se llevó a cabo en el entendimiento de que allí se encontraba la frontera marítima entre ambos países, buscando señalarla siguiendo la línea del paralelo que pasa por el Hit N° 1. Argumentó su posición en el Acta de la Comisión Conjunta de 1969, que reportó sus tareas en el sentido de “fijar la ubicación definitiva de las dos torres de alineación que señalarían la frontera marítima”.

7.4.2. La interpretación de la CIJ

En el párrafo 99 de su fallo, la Corte se pronunció, en primer lugar, en coincidencia con lo señalado por las partes, al afirmar que los fines de los arreglos que llevaron a la colocación de los faros tenían carácter limitado, como también lo tenía el alcance geográfico de éstos.

Adicionalmente, manifestó que en los registros de la construcción de dichos faros no obra referencia a ningún acuerdo de límites entre Perú y Chile. No obstante, el Tribunal fue enfático en afirmar que los trabajos se llevaron a cabo sobre la base de que ya existía un límite marítimo a lo largo del paralelo, más allá de las 12 millas marinas.

En concordancia con lo señalado, en los párrafos 96 y 97 de la sentencia, se pone atención a comunicaciones del año 1968 entre las partes, donde se indica que se busca realizar “un estudio in situ para la instalación de señales visibles desde el mar para materializar la línea paralela de la frontera marítima que se origina en el Marcador Fronterizo número uno”. También se resalta lo consignado en el Acta de la Comisión Mixta chileno-peruana de 1969,
donde se indica la intención de las partes de “señalar el límite marítimo y materializar el paralelo que pasa por el citado Hito Nº1”.

7.4.3 Opinión personal

Como punto de partida, considero que es muy pertinente el apunte que realiza el Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros, al señalar que el término “Actas de 1968 y 1969” no es del todo preciso, pues en realidad se trataba de un informe sobre las características que tendrían los faros y de un acta de levantamiento de las ocurrencias en el marco del trabajo de la delegación mixta, ambos instrumentos de carácter técnico e, incluso, sin la formalidad de un acta el primero de ellos (Rodríguez Cuadros 2007: 187-188).

En ese sentido, personal técnico no podría haber establecido acuerdo alguno que determine un límite entre el Perú y Chile. Más aún, considerando que sus trabajos técnicos emanaban del mandato de un intercambio de notas entre las partes (febrero y marzo de 1968) en el que se acordó medidas para orientar la pesca, no el establecimiento de límites marítimos.

No obstante, coincido con la interpretación realizada por la Corte, en el sentido de que los documentos aludidos son instrumentos que responden a una temática puntual y que, si bien no establecen en sí mismos ni hacen mención a acuerdo limítrofe alguno entre el Perú y Chile, su texto permite inferir que ya existía una frontera marítima y además un criterio de definición. Estos documentos resultaron claves para la determinación del punto de inicio de la frontera marítima en la latitud correspondiente al paralelo geográfico que atraviesa al Hito Nº 1, como se desarrollará más adelante.

El hecho de que estos documentos permitan concluir que ya existía una frontera marítima refuerza lo que ya fuera señalado en la sección 7.3.3, en el sentido de que la Corte rechazó el argumento peruano de que nunca había sido acordada una frontera entre las partes.

Sin embargo, la dificultad que ello representaba es que al aludirse al límite existente se hacía con una vaguedad que no brindaba detalles sobre su naturaleza, punto de inicio o extensión, como bien señala el fallo en su párrafo 92, razón por la cual el Tribunal debió proceder, como también veremos más adelante, a definirlas en base a otros elementos.

7.5. Sobre la existencia de un límite entre las partes: el acuerdo tácito

7.5.1. Problemática en torno a la definición de un acuerdo tácito

Resulta de especial importancia recordar la dificultad conceptual que conlleva término “acuerdo tácito”, al que la Corte se refiere, pero no define. El asunto se torna complejo, ya que ni en la doctrina ni en la jurisprudencia existe una definición generalmente aceptada que propiamente lo establezca como fuente del derecho Internacional.
Por esta razón, podríamos plantearnos la cuestión de precisar si la referencia a estos acuerdos se confunde o no con otras fuentes ya existentes cuya determinación y contenido en este caso podría haber sido analizada por la Corte.

En esta línea, autores como Gattās Abugattās han realizado una aproximación conceptual al mismo, demostrando lo complicado de alcanzar satisfactoriamente el objetivo definitorio. El citado profesor realiza una evaluación de la naturaleza que podría tener un acuerdo tácito en comparación con las características de otras categorías a las que se pudiera asimilar, como podrían ser los tratados o la costumbre internacional, así como a la aquiescencia, derivada de la doctrina de los actos propios (Abugattās 2014: 92).

El referido jurista concluye lo siguiente:

- Por la naturaleza jurídica convencional de los tratados, se requiere de la exteriorización por agente capaz de la manifestación coincidente de voluntades, ya sea verbalmente o por escrito, para llegar a su celebración y comprometer un contenido que cree derechos y obligaciones. Un acuerdo tácito, al remitirse a comportamientos de las partes, no cumple con esto; en consecuencia, no podríamos asimilarlo a esta categoría como tratado tácito.

- En cuanto a la costumbre internacional, donde el comportamiento de los sujetos de Derecho Internacional sí es relevante, es necesario que la práctica se haya presentado de manera clara y constante, a fin de concluir su establecimiento, para lo cual estos elementos deben ser verificables. El rigor de ese requisito probatorio, lo aparta de lo meramente implícito que un acuerdo tácito podría conllevar.

- Asimilar a los acuerdos tácitos con la aquiescencia, entendida como consentimiento tácito, es igualmente problemático, pues esta última exige una conducta o hecho conocido y, sobre todo, no reclamado oportunamente. En otras palabras, la configuración de los hechos o conductas necesarios para que se forme un “acuerdo” no es la misma que se requiere para la determinación de la aquiescencia.

A lo anterior, el citado autor agrega que, ante la imprecisión de su naturaleza y la consiguiente inseguridad jurídica que ésta representa, tampoco sería razonable ni prudente que a los acuerdos tácitos se les considere como una nueva fuente de Derecho Internacional.

Además, como bien señala, “adicionar más normas inseguras a las que, por la naturaleza del Derecho Internacional ya existen, sería una locura; iría contra todo lo que significó la creación de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y el sistema ideado en torno a ella para lograr la paz y la seguridad internacionales” (Abugattās 2014: 98).
7.5.2. Determinación por parte de la CIJ de la existencia de un acuerdo tácito entre las partes

En el caso en cuestión, trascendiendo de la discusión entre las partes sobre si existía o no algún instrumento jurídico que de manera vinculante estableciera el límite marítimo entre ellas, la Corte determinó la existencia de una frontera marítima, basada en un acuerdo tácito, que está reconocida por el Convenio de 1954.

Así, la Corte concluye que en el caso existe esta indeterminada fuente de Derecho Internacional, como se aprecia en el párrafo 91 del fallo, de la siguiente manera:

El acuerdo de 1954 relativo a una zona especial de frontera marítima no indica cuando ni por qué medios esta frontera fue acordada. El reconocimiento expreso de su existencia por las Partes descansa necesariamente sobre un acuerdo tácito realizado entre ellas con anterioridad. (…) En el caso, la Corte tiene ante sí un acuerdo que muestra claramente que existía ya entre las Partes una frontera marítima que seguía un paralelo. El acuerdo de 1954 es un elemento decisivo a este respecto. Él tiene como efecto consagrar el acuerdo tácito en cuestión.

Según el razonamiento del Tribunal, este acuerdo tácito tendría que haber surgido con posterioridad a las proclamaciones de 1947 y la Declaración de Santiago de 1952, en los que halló ciertos elementos referenciales, pero antes del Convenio de 1954.

Además, según estableció en los párrafos 100 y 102 de la sentencia, en el espíritu de las proclamaciones de 1947 (que reivindicaban derechos sobre las aguas, el subsuelo y los recursos), la Corte consideró que la naturaleza de esta frontera marítima contaría con vocación general, pues al no haber realizado las partes distinción entre sus espacios, se aplicaría de manera simple sobre la columna de agua, el lecho marino y su subsuelo.

7.5.3. Opinión personal

Se debe recordar que la Corte ya antes había afirmado, en el párrafo 253 de la sentencia en el Asunto Nicaragua c. Honduras (2007), que la determinación de una frontera marítima es una cuestión de especial gravedad, por lo que no puede presumirse a la ligera o ser deducida de cualquier acuerdo que se haya celebrado entre las partes. También señaló que la evidencia de un acuerdo legal tácito debe ser convincente.

Asimismo, hay que tomar en cuenta que luego del citado asunto, mantuvo este criterio en sus fallos, como, por ejemplo, en el Asunto de la frontera marítima en el Mar Negro (Rumania c. Ucrania, 2009) y en el Asunto Nicaragua c. Colombia (2012). En este último caso, la Corte se pronunció, en el párrafo 219 de la sentencia, recordando que “los elementos de prueba que acrediten la existencia de un acuerdo tácito deben ser convincentes. El establecimiento de una frontera marítima permanente es una cuestión de gran importancia, y un acuerdo no debe ser presumido fácilmente”. 
En el presente caso, estimo que la Corte Internacional de Justicia, al definir este acuerdo que tácitamente establece la frontera entre Perú y Chile, se apartó de sus antecedentes jurisprudenciales de exigencia de rigor para poder valerse de él, pese a que no obra registro del mismo. Más aun, las partes no solo no habían argumentado su existencia, sino que tampoco presentaron evidencia que pudiera dar sustento a la conclusión de la Corte, por lo que hasta que el Tribunal no determinó su contenido, los supuestamente vinculados por este acuerdo tampoco lo habrían conocido.

Además, lo dispuesto por la Corte resulta bastante criticable desde lo conceptual, pues no solo se aduce a un límite que se encuentra fundado en un acuerdo del cual no se tiene fecha certa de su origen, sino que tampoco cuenta con un punto de inicio definido para dicho límite o precisión sobre su extensión.

Resulta cuestionable que la CIJ haya decidido valerse de un medio sobre el cual no hay claridad sobre su naturaleza o relación con otras fuentes de Derecho Internacional, condiciones para su establecimiento o desde cuándo se le considera existente. Es así que, en concordancia con lo señalado por autores como Gattās Abugattās, se considera que, de los recursos que se pudieron utilizar como sustento para la frontera marítima, valerse de este “acuerdo tácito” resulta siendo una opción de débil seguridad jurídica. Es muy necesario contar con normas claras, cuya aplicación pueda brindar a los Estados resultados previsibles (Abugattās 2014: 98).

En la línea de reiterar lo frágil que puede ser la alusión a esta figura, resulta interesante traer a colación lo posteriormente indicado por el Tribunal Internacional de Derecho del Mar, cuando en 2017 falló sobre la delimitación marítima entre Ghana y Costa de Marfil. En este caso, cuando Ghana pretendió argumentar la existencia de un acuerdo tácito, el Tribunal fue enfático al rechazar su argumento, indicando que la práctica de una actividad económica “sin importar lo constante que sea, no puede por sí misma establecer la existencia de un acuerdo tácito sobre una frontera marítima” (Jiménez 2018: 33).

8. La extensión y el curso del límite marítimo entre Perú y Chile establecido por la Corte Internacional de Justicia

Como conocemos, según las reglas del Derecho Internacional, se puede llegar a la delimitación marítima entre Estados de dos maneras:

1) Valiéndose de la vía convencional, es decir, cuando existe una norma jurídica internacional vigente que plasme un acuerdo entre las partes mediante el cual el límite internacional haya quedado determinado.

En este punto, no debe obviarse el valor relativo que actualmente la CIJ otorga a la costumbre internacional. La jurisprudencia reciente de la Corte muestra la tendencia de descartar a los argumentos consuetudinarios para efectos de la delimitación marítima y privilegiar a los tratados como fuente definitoria de límites (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 43-44).
2) Ante la falta de acuerdo entre las partes, con el empleo del método de tres pasos desarrollado por la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Según contempla este método, el primer paso consiste en un delineado provisional medio o equidistante, luego se pasa a una segunda etapa en la que se realiza los ajustes en la eventualidad de que existieran circunstancias relevantes para ello y, finalmente, se da curso a una tercera fase en la que se realiza el llamado test de desproporcionalidad para verificar que no haya una marcada desproporción entre los espacios resultantes, en la búsqueda de una solución equitativa.

Según podremos constatar, la Corte Internacional de Justicia estableció el límite marítimo entre las partes combinando ambos criterios de delimitación marítima (ver Anexos 5 y 6):

- En una primera sección, atendió parcialmente a lo solicitado por Chile respecto al curso de una frontera que el Tribunal identificó como existente y convenida (método 1). Lo particular es que no se valió de un tratado, sino que apeló a algo nuevo que no había hecho antes, determinando la existencia de un acuerdo tácito.

- Luego, para la parte en la que estipuló que no existía frontera, se valió de los criterios solicitados por el Perú en la delimitación del resto de su curso, a la luz de las normas que recoge la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar (método 2).

En los siguientes acápites de esta sección se procederá a evaluar la línea argumental seguida por el Tribunal para la determinación del límite entre las partes.

8.1. El punto de inicio del límite marítimo

8.1.1. Las posiciones de las partes

Si bien es cierto que tanto Perú como Chile coincidieron en afirmar que el punto de inicio de su límite marítimo debía partir del punto donde termina (o inicia, según cómo se le entienda) la frontera terrestre, se presentó una distinta interpretación sobre la ubicación de ese punto, lo cual dejó al descubierto la diferencia de interpretación sobre el límite terrestre entre las partes.

El Perú solicitó puntualmente a la Corte que establezca la frontera marítima teniendo como su punto de inicio a aquel donde termina la frontera terrestre, el denominado “Punto Concordia” (18°21’08”), conforme a lo dispuesto por el Tratado de 1929 y su Protocolo complementario y las Actas de la Comisión Demarcadora de Límites de 1930. Chile, por su parte, se remitió al Hito Nº 1, con latitud 18° 21’ 00” S referida a Datum WGS84 como punto de término de la frontera terrestre desde el que, por tanto, debía partir la frontera marítima.

Al respecto, es necesario señalar que, aunque el Tratado de Lima de 1929 estableció como punto de partida de la frontera terrestre a “un punto de la costa denominado ‘Concordia’ distante 10 kilómetros al norte del puente del Río Lluta”, cuando se realizaron los trabajos
demarcatorios en 1929 y 1930, por razones prácticas, se colocó el primer hito en la latitud 18°21’03”. Ello obedeció a la necesidad de demarcar sobre la costa en un lugar con la mayor cercanía al mar posible, pero a una distancia donde la señal física pueda preservarse y garantizar su carácter permanente, ya que las orillas están sujetas a fenómenos como la erosión y los cambios de mareas. Por esta razón, el Hito N° 1 terminó instalándose a unos 260 metros de la orilla y no precisamente donde la tierra se une con el mar.

Por otro lado, debe recordarse que instrumentos bilaterales de orden técnico, las Actas de 1968 y 1969 a las que se hizo mención en el punto 7.4 de este informe, por ambigüedades no corregidas oportunamente, hicieron luego referencia al Hito N° 1, el cual “incrementó su función de referencia para múltiples usos sin mayor precisión” (Deustua 2014: 122). Por ello, Chile argumentaba, en clara violación de los principios de pacta sunt servanda y de buena fe, consagrados en el artículo 26 del Convenio de Viena de 1969 sobre Derecho de los Tratados, que la frontera pactada había sido modificada para ubicarse en ese hito (Novak y García-Corrochano 2008: 200).

8.1.2. La interpretación de la CIJ

En el párrafo 175 de la sentencia, la Corte se pronunció en reconocimiento de la argumentación peruana de la existencia del “Punto Concordia” donde empieza la frontera terrestre entre las partes, según lo establecido en el Tratado de Lima; sin embargo, el Tribunal señaló que no estaba llamado a tomar posición para definir su ubicación.

En ese orden de ideas, se abocó a establecer el punto de inicio de la frontera marítima, aclarando que ese punto podría no coincidir con el del inicio de la frontera terrestre, lo que, de ser el caso, se habría producido debido a acuerdos entre las partes.

Para tomar su decisión, el Tribunal valoró lo establecido en los acuerdos para la colocación de los faros de 1968 y el Acta de la Comisión Mixta chileno-peruana de 1969, donde se indica la intención de las partes de “señalar el límite marítimo y materializar el paralelo que pasa por el citado Hito Nº 1”, entendiendo que con ese compromiso se establecía el inicio de la frontera marítima.

Es en atención a ello que, en su párrafo 198, punto 1, la Corte señaló que: “Por quince votos contra uno, Decide que el punto de partida de la frontera marítima única que delimita los espacios marítimos respectivos de la República del Perú y la República de Chile está ubicado en la intersección del paralelo de latitud que pasa por el hito fronterizo N° 1 con la línea de bajamar”.

8.1.3. Opinión Personal

Más allá de que no fuera tomado como punto de inicio del límite marítimo, coincido con la opinión de autores como Elvira Méndez y Hubert Wieland en el sentido de que, si bien la
frontera terrestre no fue materia sometida a evaluación de la Corte, el fallo tiene la virtud de demostrar la prevalencia del punto Concordia como punto de inicio de ésta y, por consiguiente, la posición chilena en torno a un nuevo punto de inicio de la frontera terrestre resulta jurídicamente insostenible. Cuando el Tribunal hizo la salvedad de que los puntos de inicio de las fronteras terrestre y marítima no necesariamente tienen por qué coincidir, también esclareció en favor del Perú la supuesta discusión por el “triángulo terrestre” (ver Anexo 4), zona que se encuentra entre el punto de inicio de la frontera marítima, la ubicación del Hito N° 1 y el Punto Concordia. Sostener cualquier otra interpretación carecería de sentido (Méndez 2014: 44-45).

Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, en sintonía con lo señalado por diversos juristas, encuentro que esta decisión de la Corte es jurídicamente criticable en otros aspectos, por lo siguiente:

a) Al no hacer coincidir los puntos de inicio de la delimitación de la frontera terrestre y marítima, y como resultado de esa separación, ocurre en el lado peruano una situación bastante inusual de la que sólo se tiene registro de unos pocos casos en el mundo, que se conoce como “costa seca”. Se trata de alrededor de 240 metros en la zona entre el Punto Concordia y el punto de intersección del paralelo que atraviesa el Hito N° 1 y la línea de bajamar. En esta zona de costa, el Perú tiene soberanía sobre el área terrestre y no sobre el espacio marítimo adyacente, que pertenece a Chile (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 39).

Lo anterior, además de ser una situación nada óptima para efectos prácticos, por ser un absurdo que separa espacios geográficamente vinculados, atenta contra el principio del Derecho del Mar de que la tierra domina el mar; es decir que desde esta se proyecta sus zonas marinas (Novak y García-Corrochano 2008: 205). Como bien recuerda el Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros, ese principio jurídico se entiende bajo el criterio de adyacencia como fuente de atribución del título jurídico de los Estados con litoral al mar contiguo a sus costas, lo que fue reconocido por la Corte en diversas sentencias, como, por ejemplo, el caso de las pesquerías anglo-noruegas (1951), el asunto del Mar del Norte (1969) o incluso el caso Nicaragua c. Honduras (2007) (Rodríguez Cuadros 2010: 162-163).

No obstante, coincido con lo señalado por Gattās Abugattās, en el sentido de que este hecho no debe, bajo ninguna circunstancia, ser considerado “como un impedimento, traba o condición para el cumplimiento de la sentencia” (Abugattās 2014: 3)

b) Resulta cuestionable, por decir lo menos, que el punto de partida del límite marítimo, en la interpretación de la CIJ, se haya visto definido en base a los precitados acuerdos de los faros de fines de la década de los sesentas; es decir, con posterioridad al surgimiento del acuerdo tácito que el Tribunal entiende que estableció la frontera entre las partes desde la década de los cincuenta.

Como hacen notar los juristas, la misma Corte se aparta de sus precedentes, pues en la determinación de la frontera marítima entre Senegal y Guinea-Bissau (1989), el Tribunal se había pronunciado señalando que “una frontera internacional es una línea formada por la sucesión de los puntos extremos de validez espacial de las normas del orden jurídico de un Estado”. En tal sentido, para que esta se configure, necesariamente debió haber considerado el punto de partida (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 47-48).
8.2. La extensión del límite acordado tácitamente

Para esta tarea de determinación de la anchura de la frontera, en la sentencia se señala que el Tribunal realizó la evaluación de los instrumentos jurídicos vinculantes para las partes de los años 50’s y las actas de 1968 y 1969 referidas a los faros colocados alrededor del Hito N° 1. Además, la conducta de las partes en la Tercera Convención sobre el Derecho del Mar y las conversaciones con Bolivia de 1975-1976 (sobre la propuesta de intercambio de territorio para facilitarle un corredor al mar y una zona marítima adyacente), sin encontrar elementos suficientes respecto de la extensión del límite entre el Perú y Chile.

Adicionalmente, es importante señalar que en el párrafo 141 de la sentencia se recoge la interpretación hecha por la Corte en el sentido de que los términos del memorándum Bákula, que llama a negociaciones para la formal y definitiva delimitación de los espacios marítimos, sí confirmaron la existencia de una frontera (lo opuesto a lo que sostenía la posición peruana), si bien no ofrecieron detalles precisos sobre su extensión.

En este orden de ideas, los magistrados se vieron precisados a construir un argumento que permitiera determinar la longitud, ante esa falta de precisión. La Corte arribó a la conclusión de que, en virtud del acuerdo fronterizo, este límite seguía el paralelo de latitud por una distancia de 80 millas náuticas, siendo consciente, como bien señala el párrafo 193 del fallo, de que esta constituyó “una situación no habitual”.

En concordancia, los puntos 2 y 3 del párrafo 198 del fallo señalan que la Corte:

2) Por quince votos contra uno,

Decide que el segmento inicial de la frontera marítima única sigue, en dirección oeste, el paralelo de latitud que pasa por el hito fronterizo n° 1;

3) Por diez votos contra seis,

Decide que el segmento inicial se extiende hasta un punto (punto A) ubicado a una distancia de 80 millas náuticas del punto de partida de la frontera marítima única.

Con esta decisión del Tribunal, se descartó que el límite entre las partes tuviera la extensión de 200 millas, es decir, tampoco asumió la posición chilena que existiera frontera convenida por la totalidad de esa extensión. Al haber sido establecido el acuerdo tácito entre las partes en algún momento entre 1952 y 1954, éste debía enmarcarse en el derecho de la época, previo a los Convenios de Derecho del Mar de 1958. En ese tiempo, no se reconocía derechos a los Estados más allá del mar territorial, es decir, la tesis americana de las 200 millas sobre las cuales se ejerce soberanía y jurisdicción no tenía mayor aceptación en la comunidad internacional (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 35).

Sobre esa premisa, y tomando en cuenta tanto que la Declaración de Santiago y el Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima tienen una finalidad eminentemente económica, así como que, por la ubicación de la biomasa, las actividades pesqueras fueron desarrolladas por las partes fundamentalmente alrededor de las 60 millas marinas desde la costa, el
Tribunal concluyó que no contaba con elementos que le permitieran concluir que la frontera marítima se hubiera podido extender más allá de las 80 millas marinas.

En adición, la Corte entendió como confirmatoria de la existencia de una frontera marítima a lo largo del curso del paralelo a la práctica de las partes, en cuanto a control e interceptación de embarcaciones, que respetó ese criterio.

En concordancia con lo anterior, y considerando que la Corte fue clara en señalar que el Convenio de 1954 se encontraba vigente, se podría concluir que la extensión de la Zona Especial que estableció ese tratado se vería limitada también a 80 millas marinas, lo cual se condice con la finalidad de evitar incidentes con los pescadores artesanales de ambos Estados, cuyas actividades no podrían desarrollarse a grandes distancias de la costa.

Hay quienes consideran que las razones de la Corte para dar por acordado un paralelo hasta las 80 millas náuticas son “confusas y carentes de fundamento” (Ranson 2014: 65-66). En esa línea de pensamiento, podría señalarse que esta decisión del Tribunal es cuestionable en su motivación, por las siguientes dos razones:

a) Podría entenderse como insuficiente desde lo jurídico, pues la decisión no encuentra soporte en una fuente de derecho internacional reconocida. La imprecisión del acuerdo tácito lleva incluso a que la Corte deba valerse de razones de orden económico, como la pesca de altura para establecer la extensión.

b) Podría calificársele de arbitraria, ya que no se halla un sustento que justifique plenamente haber determinado que la extensión fuera establecida hasta las 80 millas náuticas. Existe evidencia de que las actividades pesqueras a las que se le vincula se desarrollaban en diversas distancias, tal como recoge la información de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura - FAO que sirvió de fundamento para la argumentación del Tribunal. En tal sentido, tampoco se encontraría un sólido argumento práctico para la determinación coherente de la extensión del límite establecido hasta ese punto de 80 millas marinas.

8.3. Delimitación del curso del límite marítimo más allá de las 80 millas marinas

Tras determinar que la frontera marítima entre las partes se encontraba regulada por el acuerdo tácito hasta una extensión de 80 millas, la Corte emprendió el trabajo de delimitación a partir del punto final de esta (al que llamó punto A).

Para la determinación del curso del resto de la frontera, como ha sido mencionado, se aplicó el procedimiento del método de tres pasos, a nuestro juicio de forma correcta y respetando sus criterios, de la siguiente manera:

- En cuanto al primer paso, que consiste en la construcción, sobre la base de la equidistancia, de una línea media provisional.- En los párrafos 185, 186 y 190, el Tribunal dispuso que su trazado se prolonga hasta el punto de la intersección del límite de las 200 millas marinas desde las líneas de base de Chile (al que llama punto B). Luego
de ello, las proyecciones de las costas de las partes dejan de sobreponerse, por lo que la línea se extiende en su último segmento hasta el punto de intersección de las 200 millas náuticas de los espacios marítimos de cada parte (denominado punto C).

- Sobre el segundo paso, que comprende la evaluación de las circunstancias relevantes para el ajuste de la línea provisional, a fin de poder alcanzar un resultado equitativo.- La conclusión de la Corte en su párrafo 191 fue que, en tanto “la línea de equidistancia evita una limitación excesiva de las proyecciones en el mar de los Estados parte”, no existen razones que lo ameritaran.

- Respecto al tercer paso, que implica la aplicación del test de desproporcionalidad.- En el párrafo 194 de la sentencia, el Tribunal concluye que no existe evidencia de que el carácter equitativo de la línea de equidistancia provisional, establecida en el primer paso, dé origen a una desproporcionalidad relevante.

En ese orden de ideas, la decisión de la Corte sobre el curso del límite luego de las 80 millas, contenida en el párrafo 198, punto 4, fue la siguiente:

Por diez votos contra seis,

Decide que, a partir del punto A, la frontera marítima única sigue en dirección suroeste, a lo largo de la línea de equidistancia de las costas de la República del Perú y de la República de Chile, calculada desde ese punto, hasta el punto (punto B) donde se encuentra el límite de las 200 millas náuticas calculadas desde las líneas de base a partir de las cuales está medido el mar territorial de Chile. A partir del punto B, la frontera marítima única sigue en dirección sur a lo largo de este límite hasta el punto de intersección (punto C) del límite de las 200 millas náuticas calculadas desde las líneas de base a partir de las cuales se miden los mares territoriales respectivos de la República del Perú y de la República de Chile.

9. Otros aspectos relevantes

9.1. Respecto al petitorio peruano del “triángulo externo”

Con relación a este asunto, que constituía el segundo punto del petitorio peruano, en el párrafo 189 del fallo se señaló lo siguiente:

Habiendo ya la Corte concluido que la línea fronteriza convenida que sigue el paralelo de latitud llega hasta las 80 millas náuticas de la costa, el argumento chileno pierde sentido. Es decir, en la medida en que decidió que delimitaría los espacios marítimos a los que las Partes pueden pretender en la zona en que se sobreponen al trazar una línea de equidistancia, el segundo punto de las conclusiones de Perú perdió su objeto y por ello no es necesario que la Corte se pronuncie.
En consonancia, en el punto 5 del párrafo 198 se dispuso: “Por quince votos contra uno, Decide que, por las razones expuestas en el párrafo 189, no hay lugar a que la Corte se pronuncie sobre el segundo punto de las conclusiones finales de la República del Perú”.

Es así que, de lo afirmado por la Corte, se concluye indudablemente que al Perú se le reconoció esa área en condición de zona económica exclusiva. Ello implica que, con el fallo, claramente esa zona no debía considerarse alta mar, como lo había sostenido Chile durante el proceso. Ello también se entiende en detrimento de los intereses de este último más allá de las 200 millas, en el marco de su polémica y aislada tesis de “mar presencial”.

A pesar de que algunos autores chilenos hayan manifestado que esta fue, prácticamente, una concesión de valor simbólico (Ranson 2014: 66), los más de 28 mil kilómetros cuadrados del triángulo externo que se reconocieron en favor del Perú son valiosos, por la importante extensión donde éste pasó a ejercer jurisdicción (ver Anexo 3), con derechos claramente confirmados mediante la sentencia.

9.2. Sobre el “dominio marítimo” del Perú y la invocación a la costumbre internacional

La sentencia recoge, en el párrafo 178, el hecho de que Chile sí es parte de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar de 1982, mientras que no lo es el Perú, dejando constancia de que si bien ambos Estados reivindican espacios marítimos que se extienden hasta las 200 millas náuticas, Chile lo hace en virtud de las zonas que comprende la Convención (un mar territorial, una zona contigua y una zona económica exclusiva, así como la plataforma continental) y el Perú lo considera bajo el concepto de “dominio marítimo”.

Asimismo, el fallo indica que el agente peruano realizó en el marco del proceso la declaración formal de que el precitado concepto, que se encuentra contemplado constitucionalmente, se utiliza en concordancia con los espacios marítimos previstos en la precitada Convención. Esta fue una demostración de que el Derecho peruano concordaba con el Derecho consuetudinario actual y que “confirma que le son aplicables las normas de delimitación sobre los diferentes espacios marítimos establecidos en este instrumento jurídico internacional” (Namihas 2023: 202).

La Corte, sin exigirle al Perú adherirse a la Convención, hizo expresa mención de que tomaba esta declaración con efecto vinculante. En este contexto, resulta importante aclarar dos preguntas: ¿cómo fue posible que Perú se remitiera a lo dispuesto en la CONVEMAR a lo largo del proceso sin ser parte de ella? y ¿qué implicancias tiene la declaración realizada por el agente peruano?

A efectos de responder la primera pregunta, resulta necesario considerar que, tal como recuerda la Embajadora Elvira Velásquez, el Perú ha sido precursor en la transformación del Derecho del Mar (Velásquez 2023: 35) que actualmente está codificado en la CONVEMAR y que, como señala la Embajadora Marisol Agüero, si bien nuestro país tiene la condición de tercer Estado respecto de la citada Convención, puede perfectamente remitirse a sus
Disposiciones haciendo un llamado a otra fuente del Derecho Internacional, la costumbre internacional obligatoria que esta Convención ha recogido y positivizado (Agüero 2023: 177-178). El Embajador Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros concuerda (Rodríguez Cuadros 2010: 149).

Respecto a la segunda interrogante, se trata claramente de un acto unilateral de Estado y, por consiguiente, vinculante a la luz del Derecho Internacional. En adición a ello, cabe señalar que el Perú fue consecuente con este compromiso, al luego reiterarlo en el ámbito bilateral en el marco del mecanismo 2+2 (reunión de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y de Defensa de ambos países), celebrado con fecha 06 de febrero de 2014. No solo ello, sino que también inició un proceso de ajuste de su normativa en el marco del compromiso asumido, “no obstante que a nivel constitucional no existe ninguna incompatibilidad” (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 48).

Merece la pena destacar que, con ese párrafo, la Corte establece con claridad el asunto y da por descartada cualquier discusión respecto a la naturaleza de ese concepto, que había sido repetidamente cuestionado por Chile (Moscoso 2014: 88).

Viene al caso recordar que antes de esto, también había existido por mucho tiempo un debate interno en nuestro país sobre si el concepto de “dominio marítimo” debía entenderse asimilado a la naturaleza del mar territorial o si la interpretación se ajustaba más a una zona de jurisdicción funcional respecto a los recursos (Del Aguila y Malpica 1997: 194). Estas disquisiciones de “territorialistas” versus “zonistas” que existieron entre juristas y funcionarios de Estado habrían motivado incluso que no se alcance un consenso para que el Perú pase a ser signatario de la CONVEMAR, ya que a ojos de los de visión territorialista, ello implicaba un recorte del ámbito geográfico del alcance de los derechos que entiendan se tendría sobre toda la extensión (Ranson 2014: 66).

Esta declaración tiene la virtud de dejar zanjado el tema y poner punto final a cualquier especulación. Como bien señala la jurista Sandra Namihas, “no tenemos 200 millas de mar territorial. Es más, nunca las tuvimos porque el derecho internacional jamás reconoció esta posición” (Namihas 2014: 3).

¿Qué significa entonces este compromiso reconocido por la Corte? Que el Perú tiene el derecho a ejercer su jurisdicción sobre el espacio marino adyacente a sus costas hasta la distancia de 12 millas marinas en condición de mar territorial, en la zona contigua hasta la milla 24 y en la zona económica exclusiva hasta la milla 200, así como en la plataforma continental. Pero no solo ello, también tiene el deber de garantizar, más allá de las 12 millas de mar territorial, el respeto de ciertas facilidades en favor de la comunidad internacional, incluido Chile, como el libre tránsito para la navegación de embarcaciones y el sobrevuelo de aeronaves, obligaciones que no se puede desconocer.

Considero firmemente que, habiendo quedado lo anterior claramente establecido, sería positivo para nuestros intereses nacionales dar el siguiente paso y adherirnos a la CONVEMAR. Ello no solo sería una consecuencia lógica, en concordancia con los compromisos asumidos, sino que otorgaría un marco regulatorio de mayor institucionalidad a los deberes a los que el Perú se encuentra obligado y también le permitiría favorecerse de
los derechos no amparados por la costumbre internacional que la Convención sí contempla para los Estados parte.

Ya hace más de dos décadas, el Embajador Nicolás Roncagliolo había expresado, con total razón, que no formar parte una convención tan importante como la CONVEMAR resulta desventajoso para un país en desarrollo como el Perú, pues su principal poder para la protección de sus intereses es el Derecho y precisamente contar con ese marco jurídico le sería favorable. Permitiría al Perú, por ejemplo, participar de la Autoridad de los Fondos Marinos, tener posibilidad de acceso al Tribunal Internacional del Derecho del Mar, o beneficiarse de diversos mecanismos de cooperación y asistencia en el campo de la investigación científica y tecnológica marina o de protección del medio marino con el apoyo de los demás Estados parte (Roncagliolo 2001: 59-60).

En este contexto, viene al caso traer a colación lo dispuesto por el D.S. N° 12-2019-DE, de 20 de diciembre de 2019, que aprueba la Política Nacional Marítima 2019-2030, la cual se articula sobre cinco objetivos prioritarios: 1) Fortalecer la influencia del Perú en asuntos marítimos internacionales; 2) Fortalecer las actividades productivas en el ámbito marítimo, en forma racional y sostenible; 3) Incrementar el comercio de manera sostenible y diversificada en el ámbito marítimo; 4) Asegurar la sostenibilidad de los recursos y ecosistemas en el ámbito marítimo; y 5) Fortalecer la seguridad en el ámbito marítimo.

En concordancia, se hace necesario tomar en consideración que los intereses marítimos del Perú sobre los 3 080 km de su extensión costera y 200 millas de su dominio marítimo se relacionan con diversas actividades, las principales de las cuales se encuentran “reguladas en la Convención del Mar, como son las normas para la conservación y el aprovechamiento de los recursos marinos renovables y no renovables, sobre la navegación para el transporte y el comercio marítimo, la investigación científica y preservación del medio ambiente marítimo y los aspectos de seguridad” (Ferrero 2023: 98).

9.3. Sobre el encargo a las partes de establecer las coordenadas geográficas

Resulta interesante señalar que la Corte se limitó a señalar el trazado del límite marítimo, pero no pasó a precisar las coordenadas geográficas en su fallo, manifestando en el párrafo 197 que, en tanto esto no le fue solicitado por las partes, les correspondía realizar esta tarea a ambos Estados, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la sentencia y en un espíritu de buena vecindad.

Llama la atención que el Tribunal, pudiendo haberlas fijado, decidiera no hacerlo y optara por otorgarles este encargo a las partes. Más aún, si lo comparamos con el fallo que recientemente la Corte había emitido en la controversia de Nicaragua con Colombia (caso con similitudes y en el cual el Tribunal tuvo prácticamente la misma conformación), donde la misma CIJ fue la que calculó las coordenadas sobre la base de lo indicado por las partes (Moscoso 2014: 90).
Ahora bien, hay que destacar que el fallo fue ejecutado y esta tarea fue acatada de manera casi inmediata por las partes. Dando muestra ejemplar de buena fe, las delegaciones de Perú y Chile sostuvieron una serie de reuniones de trabajo en el ámbito político y técnico para establecer las coordenadas geográficas de su límite marítimo (Ver Anexo 7). Viene al caso recordar que la labor del Grupo de Trabajo Técnico y Cartográfico concluyó exitosamente en marzo de 2014, lo que mereció una felicitación del presidente de la Corte.

Adicionalmente, debemos mencionar que como consecuencia de la distinción de los puntos de inicio de las fronteras marítima y terrestre que resultó de lo dispuesto en la sentencia y a partir del trabajo conjunto realizado por ambos países para la definición de las coordenadas precisas del curso de su límite marítimo, el Perú consideró necesario realizar el ajuste pertinente a la Ley N° 28621, “Ley de líneas de base del dominio marítimo del Perú”, que había sido emitida en el año 2005.

Así, el 11 de julio de 2014, mediante la Ley N° 30223, “Ley que adecúa la Ley 28621, Ley de líneas de base del dominio marítimo del Perú, según la delimitación marítima entre la República del Perú y la República de Chile, realizada por la Corte internacional de Justicia de 27 de enero de 2014”, se establecieron dos nuevos puntos para el trazado de las líneas de base (220 A en Puerto Mollendo y 265 A en el punto de inicio de la frontera marítima que estableció la Corte) y se adecuó el punto 244, actualizando sus coordenadas. Asimismo, se dejó sin efecto el punto 266 (inicio de la frontera terrestre), pues en atención a lo decidido por la Corte Internacional de Justicia, entre los puntos 265 A y 266 no se genera proyección marítima por parte del Perú.

Es importante aclarar que los cambios recién citados corresponden a una necesidad técnica, sin implicancia alguna sobre el inicio de la frontera terrestre en el Punto Concordia, tal como fue establecido en el Tratado de Lima de 1929. Por ello, se puede afirmar con certeza que esta modificación legislativa no conlleva alteración alguna del trazo de la frontera entre el Perú y Chile ni afectación a la soberanía nacional.

9.4. Sobre las opiniones y declaraciones de los jueces

Si bien no se puede tener acceso a las actas de los debates de los jueces, en atención a lo dispuesto con relación al secreto de las deliberaciones que consigna la normativa de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (artículos 54, numeral 3 de su Estatuto y 21, numeral 1, de su Reglamento), queda claro que en este caso hubo diferencias de opinión por parte de los magistrados, que se vieron reflejadas en las diversas opiniones que fueron emitidas por algunos de los jueces e incluidas como parte de la sentencia, en virtud de los artículos 57 del Estatuto y 95, numeral 2, del Reglamento de la Corte.

El fallo da cuenta de aspectos en los que hubo solo un voto en contra, pero también de otros asuntos en los que estos sumaron seis. Es así importante recordar que las decisiones más divididas versaron sobre los temas neurálgicos del fallo, como el establecimiento del acuerdo tácito entre las partes o la extensión de la frontera definida por este acuerdo hasta las 80 millas náuticas.
En relación con el primer punto, el acuerdo tácito, por ejemplo, los magistrados Bhandari, Gaja, Hue y Orrego Vicuña cuestionaron, en su opinión disidente conjunta, que la Corte no definiera cuándo y dónde se alcanzó este acuerdo; la juez Donoghue manifestó no encontrarse convencida de su existencia; la jueza Sebuntide no encontró convincente el argumento para inferirlo. Incluso, el juez Sepúlveda Amor lo consideró como un retroceso, al apartarse de precedentes de la Corte en cuanto al rigor del estándar probatorio exigible a una frontera (recordando el fallo sobre el Diferendo Marítimo y Territorial entre Nicaragua y Honduras en el Mar Caribe, de 2007), con lo que coincidió el juez Owada.

En cuanto a lo segundo, la extensión de la frontera convenida, de manera ilustrativa, podemos mencionar que magistrados como Tomka y Skotnikov consideraron que la frontera establecida tácitamente debería extenderse más allá de las 80 millas, mientras que, por el contrario, el juez Guillaume opinó que su extensión debía ser de solo 60 millas marinas.

Como se puede apreciar, lo disímiles de estas opiniones y declaraciones de los magistrados, tanto con respecto a la posición mayoritaria como entre sí, dan cuenta del rico debate que la complejidad de este caso propició al interior del Tribunal, así como de la dificultad que les representó alcanzar los acuerdos.

10. Conclusiones

I. La Corte Internacional de Justicia aborda en este caso un asunto no solo de alta sensibilidad, sino también difícil. En una primera parte, en este informe se coincide con el análisis que realiza el Tribunal de los instrumentos normativos que le fueron sometidos a evaluación, al indicar que estos no establecen el límite marítimo entre las partes.

No obstante, luego resuelve de una manera que no nos diera la impresión de ser del todo contundente. Se es de la opinión que, para determinar el límite que identifica como reconocido en el Convenio de 1954, la argumentación que realizó de la existencia de un acuerdo tácito fue, por decir lo menos, “novedosa”, al alejarse incluso de sus propios antecedentes jurisprudenciales (en los fallos de los casos Nicaragua c. Honduras de 2007, Rumania c. Ucrania de 2009 o Nicaragua c. Colombia de 2012, por ejemplo).

II. Se hubiera podido encontrar mayor rigor jurídico en la línea argumental de la Corte si su decisión hubiera estado amparada directamente por alguna fuente de Derecho Internacional a las que alude el artículo 38 de su propio Estatuto. En concordancia con ello, el Tribunal tal vez pudiera haber resuelto de manera distinta, ya sea:

a) Declarando que la falta de certeza respecto a esa frontera que había identificado como reconocida en 1954 sustentaba la decisión de asumir la inexistencia de un acuerdo de delimitación, puesto que esta tarea debe desarrollarse con certidumbre y coherencia, y, por lo tanto, proceder a delimitar desde cero; o

b) Enfocándose más en la práctica de las partes a lo largo del tiempo, buscar fundamentar su decisión en figuras plenamente reconocidas, como: i). la consecuente creación de
una costumbre internacional en la configuración del límite valiéndose del paralelo (argumentando una costumbre instantánea que luego es declarada o una costumbre en formación que pasa a ser cristalizada con el Convenio de 1954); o ii). argumentar la doctrina de los actos propios, ya sea entendiendo que el Convenio de 1954 materializa la aquiescencia de Chile y Ecuador a una posición peruana de asumir al paralelo como criterio o, incluso, tomando en consideración la conducta de respeto del paralelo como frontera que por años se había venido presentando por parte del Perú, entender que éste no podía reclamar lo contrario.

Por el contrario, el Tribunal decidió, a pesar de la incertidumbre, no descartar el límite que consideraba reconocido en el Convenio de 1954 y, tal vez conociendo la dificultad de probanza que conllevaba la opción b), optó por recorrer un camino que, si bien le resultó útil, a nuestro juicio, no termina de ser jurídicamente sólido.

III. La argumentación que realiza el Tribunal sobre la frontera convenida no nos resulta convincente por las siguientes razones:

1) El fallo define la existencia de la frontera marítima en base a un acuerdo tácito, no aducido por las partes, que fue débilmente sustentado, del cual no da luces sobre su origen ni su contenido preciso ni su fecha.

2) Determina el curso de esa frontera sobre el paralelo con un punto de partida que, cuestionablemente, entiende que fue definido posteriormente (a fines de la década de los sesentas) y que, además, no es coincidente con el fin de la frontera terrestre, lo que genera un fenómeno de costa seca.

3) Decide la extensión de la frontera bajo el fundamento económico y no jurídico de la ubicación de la biomasa y que, por ello, históricamente la pesca habría llegado hasta una determinada distancia, argumento que también se hace cuestionable y que tampoco fue aducido por las partes.

4) Finalmente, bajo ese argumento económico, dispone que la longitud de esa línea divisoria llega hasta la milla 80, lo cual es igualmente bastante criticable, tanto que podría entenderse como una creación arbitraria de la Corte.

No cabe la menor duda de que la sentencia se ajusta a lo dispuesto en el artículo 38, numeral 1, del Estatuto de la Corte, que señala que ésta tiene como función “decidir conforme al Derecho Internacional las controversias que le sean sometidas”. No obstante, la fundamentación del fallo en esa parte podría generar, incluso, la impresión de que, en su búsqueda por encontrar una solución pacífica y ante la dificultad probatoria de valerse de figuras jurídicas ya existentes, la Corte Internacional de Justicia estuvo dispuesta a valerse de un recurso creativo, así como también a otorgar una valoración significativa a consideraciones de diversa naturaleza no jurídica.

Encuentro cierta justificación en la preocupación de algunos juristas, como Sebastián López Escarcena, en el sentido de que ello podría llegar a transmitir un mensaj
comunidad internacional, no solo sobre el actuar de este órgano de justicia, sino sobre todo el sistema de solución pacífica de controversias.

IV. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, el fallo también tiene el muy positivo aspecto de dejar en el pasado un tema controvertido que complicaba la relación bilateral y abrir las puertas a una nueva etapa de fortalecimiento de los vínculos entre el Perú y Chile, de mayor cooperación, confianza y desarrollo común. Resulta muy destacable, en sintonía, el espíritu de buena vecindad mostrado por las partes para la ejecución de los asuntos que se desprendieron de la decisión de la Corte.

Además, la sentencia es valiosa por haber arribado al esperado resultado de solución definitiva de esta controversia de manera pacífica. Es importante, a todas luces, que haya otorgado claridad, no solo al determinar la cuestión limitrofe, sino al dejar sentada, entre otros asuntos, la forma en que ambos Estados ejercen su jurisdicción en sus respectivos espacios marítimos.

V. Más allá del triunfalismo o la inconformidad que pudiera haber ocasionado en un primer momento en la opinión pública de cada país lo dispuesto en la sentencia, el fallo tiene el mérito de haber hecho llegar a ambos Estados a una suerte de punto medio: el espacio marino en discusión se terminó delimitando siguiendo lo que entendemos como una combinación de criterios, empleando las dos maneras metodológicas propuestas por las partes. Incluso, la longitud de cada una de esas secciones en la delimitación entre ambos Estados terminó aproximándose a la mitad.

Por ello, estimo que en este caso no podemos hablar de un ganador absoluto ni de un perdedor total: el Perú logró buena parte de lo demandado, alrededor de 50 mil kilómetros cuadrados (más de 21 mil en el “triángulo interno”, que hasta ese entonces habían estado en jurisdicción de facto chilena, así como más de 28 mil en el “triángulo externo”), mientras que Chile mantuvo más de 16 mil kilómetros cuadrados de la zona en disputa, lo que le garantizó tanto su conectividad y operatividad portuaria en el Norte de su territorio, como su acceso privilegiado a los recursos de ese espacio marítimo, rico en anchoveta y otras especies marinas.

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12. **Anexos**

Imágenes que ilustran el área geográfica, las posiciones de las partes y el trazado del límite marítimo entre Perú y Chile en virtud de la sentencia de 27 de enero de 2014 de la CIJ.
Anexo 1

Anexo 2

Ilustración de las zonas marítimas en disputa (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 26, gráfico 1).

Fuente: Diario Peru21.
Ilustración de las posiciones de las partes sobre el punto de inicio de la frontera marítima, donde se puede apreciar el “triángulo terrestre” (Novak y García-Corrochano 2014: 33, gráfico 2).

Fuente: Diario El Comercio.
Anexo 5

Anexo 6

Anexo 7

Fuente: Acta de los trabajos conjuntos de 25 de marzo de 2014, correspondientes a la precisión de los puntos del límite marítimo entre el Perú y Chile, conforme al fallo de la CIJ.
Official citation:
Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 3

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Différend maritime (Pérou c. Chili), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 3

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DIFFÉREND MARITIME
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 2014

27 January 2014

MARITIME DISPUTE

(PERU v. CHILE)

Geography — Historical background — 1929 Treaty of Lima between Chile and Peru — 1947 Proclamations of Chile and Peru — Twelve instruments negotiated by Chile, Ecuador and Peru.

* No international maritime boundary established by 1947 Proclamations — No shared understanding of the Parties concerning maritime delimitation — Necessity of establishing the lateral limits of their maritime zones in the future.

1952 Santiago Declaration is an international treaty — Rules of interpretation — No express reference to delimitation of maritime boundaries — Certain elements relevant however to maritime delimitation — Ordinary meaning of paragraph IV — Maritime zones of island territories — Scope of 1952 Santiago Declaration restricted to agreement on limits between certain insular maritime zones and zones generated by continental coasts — Object and purpose — Supplementary means of interpretation confirm that no general maritime delimitation was effected by 1952 Santiago Declaration — Suggestion of existence of some sort of a shared understanding of a more general nature concerning maritime boundaries — 1952 Santiago Declaration did not establish a lateral maritime boundary between Chile and Peru along the parallel.

1954 Agreements — Complementary Convention to 1952 Santiago Declaration — Primary purpose to assert signatory States’ claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction made in 1952 — Agreement relating to Measures of Supervision and Control of Maritime Zones — No indication as to location or nature of maritime boundaries — Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement — Not limited to the Ecuador-Peru maritime boundary — Delay in ratification without bearing on scope and effect of Agreement — Acknowledgment of existence of an agreed maritime boundary — Tacit agreement — Tacit agreement cemented by 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement — No indication of nature and extent of maritime boundary — 1964 Bazán
MARITIME DISPUTE (JUDGMENT)

Opinion — Conclusion of the Court as to the existence of an agreed maritime boundary not altered.

1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements — Limited purpose and geographical scope — No reference to a pre-existent delimitation agreement — Arrangements based on presumed existence of a maritime boundary extending along parallel beyond 12 nautical miles — No indication of extent and nature of maritime boundary.

Nature of agreed maritime boundary — All-purpose maritime boundary.

Extent of agreed maritime boundary — Assessment of relevant practice of the Parties pre-1954 — Fishing potential and activity — Species taken in the early 1950s were generally to be found within a range of 60 nautical miles from the coast — Orientation of the coast — Location of main ports in the region — Zone of tolerance along the parallel for small fishing boats — Principal fishing activity carried out by small boats — Fisheries activity, in itself, not determinative of extent of the boundary — Parties however unlikely to have considered the agreed maritime boundary to extend to 200-nautical-mile limit — Contemporaneous developments in the law of the sea — State practice — Work of the International Law Commission — Claim made in 1952 Santiago Declaration did not correspond to the international law of that time — No evidence to conclude that the agreed maritime boundary along parallel extended beyond 80 nautical miles.


In view of entirety of relevant evidence presented to the Court, agreed maritime boundary between the Parties extends to a distance of 80 nautical miles along the parallel.

* Starting-point of the agreed maritime boundary — 1929 Treaty of Lima — The Court not asked to determine location of starting-point of land boundary identified as “Concordia” — Boundary Marker No. 1 — 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements serve as compelling evidence that the agreed maritime boundary follows the parallel that passes through Boundary Marker No. 1 — Point Concordia may not coincide with starting-point of maritime boundary — Starting-point of maritime boundary identified as the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line.

* Delimitation to be effected beginning at endpoint of agreed maritime boundary (Point A) — Method of delimitation — Three-stage procedure.
First stage — Construction of a provisional equidistance line starting at Point A — Determination of base points — Provisional equidistance line runs until intersection with the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from Chilean baselines (Point B).

Peru’s second final submission moot — No need for the Court to rule thereon.

Course of the maritime boundary from Point B — Boundary runs along the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines until intersection of the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties (Point C).

Second stage — Relevant circumstances calling for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line — No basis for adjusting the provisional equidistance line.

Third stage — Disproportionality test — Calculation does not purport to be precise — No evidence of significant disproportion calling into question equitable nature of provisional equidistance line.

Course of the maritime boundary — Geographical co-ordinates to be determined by the Parties in accordance with the Judgment.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhanderi; Judges ad hoc Guillaume, Orrego Vicuña; Registrar Couvreur.

In the case concerning the maritime dispute, between
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Mr. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd.,
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MARITIME DISPUTE (JUDGMENT)

THE COURT,

composed as above,

after deliberation,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 16 January 2008, the Republic of Peru (hereinafter “Peru”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Chile (hereinafter “Chile”) in respect of a dispute concerning, on the one hand, “the delimitation of the boundary between the maritime zones of the two States in the Pacific Ocean, beginning at a point on the coast called Concordia . . . the terminal point of the land boundary established pursuant to the Treaty . . . of 3 June 1929” and, on the other, the recognition in favour of Peru of a “maritime zone lying within 200 nautical miles of Peru’s coast” and which should thus appertain to it, “but which Chile considers to be part of the high seas.”

In its Application, Peru seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement signed on 30 April 1948, officially designated, according to Article LX thereof, as the “Pact of Bogotá” (hereinafter referred to as such).

2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, the Registrar immediately communicated the Application to the Government of Chile; and, under paragraph 3 of that Article, all other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.

3. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to States parties to the Pact of Bogotá the notifications provided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. In accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar moreover addressed to the Organization of American States (hereinafter referred to as “OAS”) the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court. As provided for in Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registry transmitted the written pleadings to the OAS and asked that organization whether or not it intended to furnish observations in writing within the meaning of that Article; the OAS indicated that it did not intend to submit any such observations.

4. On the instructions of the Court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific (hereinafter the “CPPS”, from the Spanish acronym for “Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur”) the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court with regard to the Declaration on the Maritime Zone, signed by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, in Santiago on 18 August 1952 (hereinafter the “1952 Santiago Declaration”), and to the Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone, signed by the same three States in Lima on 4 December 1954 (hereinafter the “1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement”). In response, the CPPS indicated that it did not intend to submit any observations in writing within the meaning of Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.

5. On the instructions of the Court under Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to Ecuador, as a State party to the 1952 Santiago Declaration and to the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, the notification provided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court.
6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise the right conferred upon it by Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case. Peru chose Mr. Gilbert Guillaume and Chile Mr. Francisco Orrego Vicuña.

7. By an Order dated 31 March 2008, the Court fixed 20 March 2009 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Peru and 9 March 2010 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Chile. Those pleadings were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.

8. By an Order of 27 April 2010, the Court authorized the submission of a Reply by Peru and a Rejoinder by Chile, and fixed 9 November 2010 and 11 July 2011 as the respective time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits thus fixed.

9. Referring to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia asked to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents annexed in the case. Having ascertained the views of the Parties pursuant to that same provision, the Court decided to grant each of these requests. The Registrar duly communicated these decisions to the said Governments and to the Parties.

10. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Court, after having ascertained the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings.

11. Public hearings were held between 3 and 14 December 2012, at which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For Peru: H.E. Mr. Allan Wagner,
            Mr. Alain Pellet,
            Mr. Rodman Bundy,
            Mr. Tullio Treves,
            Sir Michael Wood,
            Mr. Vaughan Lowe.

For Chile: H.E. Mr. Albert van Klaveren Stork,
           Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
           Mr. David Colson,
           Mr. James Crawford,
           Mr. Jan Paulsson,
           Mr. Georgios Petrochilos,
           Mr. Luigi Condorelli,
           Mr. Samuel Wordsworth.

12. At the hearings, a Member of the Court put a question to the Parties, to which replies were given orally in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.

* 

13. In its Application, the following requests were made by Peru:

“Peru requests the Court to determine the course of the boundary between the maritime zones of the two States in accordance with international law . . .
and to adjudge and declare that Peru possesses exclusive sovereign rights in
the maritime area situated within the limit of 200 nautical miles from its coast
but outside Chile’s exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

The Government of Peru, further, reserves its right to supplement, amend
or modify the present Application in the course of the proceedings.”

14. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by
the Parties:

On behalf of the Government of Peru,
in the Memorial and in the Reply:

“For the reasons set out [in Peru’s Memorial and Reply], the Republic
of Peru requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

(1) The delimitation between the respective maritime zones between the
Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile, is a line starting at ‘Point
Concordia’ (defined as the intersection with the low-water mark of a
10-kilometre radius arc, having as its centre the first bridge over the River
Lluta of the Arica-La Paz railway) and equidistant from the baselines of
both Parties, up to a point situated at a distance of 200 nautical miles
from those baselines, and

(2) Beyond the point where the common maritime border ends, Peru is
entitled to exercise exclusive sovereign rights over a maritime area lying
out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from its baselines.

The Republic of Peru reserves its right to amend these submissions as the
case may be in the course of the present proceedings.”

On behalf of the Government of Chile,
in the Counter-Memorial and in the Rejoinder:

“Chile respectfully requests the Court to:

(a) dismiss Peru’s claims in their entirety;
(b) adjudge and declare that:

(i) the respective maritime zone entitlements of Chile and Peru have
been fully delimited by agreement;

(ii) those maritime zone entitlements are delimited by a boundary
following the parallel of latitude passing through the most sea-
ward boundary marker of the land boundary between Chile and
Peru, known as Hito No. 1, having a latitude of 18° 21´ 00˝ S under
WGS 84 Datum; and

(iii) Peru has no entitlement to any maritime zone extending to the
south of that parallel.”

15. At the oral proceedings, the Parties presented the same submissions as
those contained in their written pleadings.

*   *   *

13
I. Geography

16. Peru and Chile are situated in the western part of South America; their mainland coasts face the Pacific Ocean. Peru shares a land boundary with Ecuador to its north and with Chile to its south. In the area with which these proceedings are concerned, Peru’s coast runs in a north-west direction from the starting-point of the land boundary between the Parties on the Pacific coast and Chile’s generally follows a north-south orientation. The coasts of both Peru and Chile in that area are mostly uncomplicated and relatively smooth, with no distinct promontories or other distinguishing features. (See sketch-map No. 1: Geographical context, p. 14.)

II. Historical Background

17. Chile gained its independence from Spain in 1818 and Peru did so in 1821. At the time of independence, Peru and Chile were not neighbouring States. Situated between the two countries was the Spanish colonial territory of Charcas which, as from 1825, became the Republic of Bolivia. In 1879 Chile declared war on Peru and Bolivia, in what is known historically as the War of the Pacific. In 1883 hostilities between Chile and Peru formally came to an end under the Treaty of Ancón. Under its terms, Peru ceded to Chile the coastal province of Tarapacá; in addition, Chile gained possession of the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of ten years on the basis of an agreement that after that period of time there would be a plebiscite to determine sovereignty over these provinces. After the signing of the truce between Bolivia and Chile in 1884 and of the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between them, the entire Bolivian coast became Chilean.

18. Chile and Peru failed to agree on the terms of the above-mentioned plebiscite. Finally, on 3 June 1929, following mediation attempts by the President of the United States of America, the two countries signed the Treaty for the Settlement of the Dispute regarding Tacna and Arica (hereinafter the “1929 Treaty of Lima”) and its Additional Protocol, whereby they agreed that Tacna would be returned to Peru while Chile would retain Arica. The 1929 Treaty of Lima also fixed the land boundary between the two countries. Under Article 3 of that Treaty, the Parties agreed that a Mixed Commission of Limits should be constituted in order to determine and mark the agreed boundary using a series of markers (“hitos” in Spanish). In its 1930 Final Act, the 1929-1930 Mixed Commission recorded the precise locations of the 80 markers that it had placed on the ground to demarcate the land boundary.

19. In 1947 both Parties unilaterally proclaimed certain maritime rights extending 200 nautical miles from their coasts (hereinafter collectively the “1947 Proclamations”). The President of Chile issued a Declaration concerning his country’s claim on 23 June 1947 (hereinafter the “1947 Declara-
Sketch-map No. 1:
Geographical context

This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes only.

Mercator Projection (20° S)
WGS 84

Geographical context

- Chile
- Peru
- Ecuador
- Colombia
- Bolivia
- Argentina

- Iquique
- Arica
- Tacna
- Ilo
- Quito
- Lima

Ocean

PACIFIC

OCEAN

Sketch-map No. 1:
Geographical context

This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes only.

Mercator Projection (20° S)
WGS 84

Geographical context

- Chile
- Peru
- Ecuador
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- Bolivia
- Argentina

- Iquique
- Arica
- Tacna
- Ilo
- Quito
- Lima

Ocean

PACIFIC

OCEAN
ation” or “Chile’s 1947 Declaration”, reproduced at paragraph 37 below). The President of Peru issued Supreme Decree No. 781, claiming the rights of his country, on 1 August 1947 (hereinafter the “1947 Decree” or “Peru’s 1947 Decree”, reproduced at paragraph 38 below).

20. In 1952, 1954 and 1967, Chile, Ecuador and Peru negotiated twelve instruments to which the Parties in this case make reference. Four were adopted in Santiago in August 1952 during the Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific (the Regulations for Maritime Hunting Operations in the Waters of the South Pacific; the Joint Declaration concerning Fishing Problems in the South Pacific; the Santiago Declaration; and the Agreement relating to the Organization of the Permanent Commission of the Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific). Six others were adopted in Lima in December 1954 (the Complementary Convention to the Declaration of Sovereignty on the Two-Hundred-Mile Maritime Zone; the Convention on the System of Sanctions; the Agreement relating to Measures of Supervision and Control in the Maritime Zones of the Signatory Countries; the Convention on the Granting of Permits for the Exploitation of the Resources of the South Pacific; the Convention on the Ordinary Annual Meeting of the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific; and the Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone). And, finally, two agreements relating to the functioning of the CPPS were signed in Quito in May 1967.

21. On 3 December 1973, the very day the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea began, the twelve instruments were submitted by the three signatory States to the United Nations Secretariat for registration under Article 102 of the Charter. The four 1952 instruments (including the Santiago Declaration) were registered on 12 May 1976 (United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1006, pp. 301, 315, 323 and 331, Registration Nos. I-14756 to I-14759). The United Nations Treaty Series specifies that the four 1952 treaties came into force on 18 August 1952 upon signature. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was registered with the United Nations Secretariat on 24 August 2004 (UNTS, Vol. 2274, p. 527, Registration No. I-40521). The United Nations Treaty Series indicates that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement entered into force on 21 September 1967 by the exchange of instruments of ratification. With regard to the two 1967 agreements, the Secretariat was informed in 1976 that the signatory States had agreed not to insist upon the registration of these instruments, as they related to matters of purely internal organization.

Representatives of the three States also signed in 1955 and later ratified the Agreement for the Regulation of Permits for the Exploitation of the Resources of the South Pacific. That treaty was not, however, submitted
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

22. Peru and Chile have adopted fundamentally different positions in this case. Peru argues that no agreed maritime boundary exists between the two countries and asks the Court to plot a boundary line using the equidistance method in order to achieve an equitable result. Chile contends that the 1952 Santiago Declaration established an international maritime boundary along the parallel of latitude passing through the starting-point of the Peru-Chile land boundary and extending to a minimum of 200 nautical miles. It further relies on several agreements and subsequent practice as evidence of that boundary. Chile asks the Court to confirm the boundary line accordingly. (See sketch-map No. 2: The maritime boundary lines claimed by Peru and Chile respectively, p. 17.)

Peru also argues that, beyond the point where the common maritime boundary ends, it is entitled to exercise exclusive sovereign rights over a maritime area lying out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from its baselines. (This maritime area is depicted on sketch-map No. 2 in a darker shade of blue.) Chile responds that Peru has no entitlement to any maritime zone extending to the south of the parallel of latitude along which, as Chile maintains, the international maritime boundary runs.

23. Chile contends that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* and the principle of stability of boundaries prevent any attempt to invite the Court to redraw a boundary that has already been agreed. Chile adds that there have been significant benefits to both Parties as a result of the stability of their long-standing maritime boundary. Peru argues that the delimitation line advocated by Chile is totally inequitable as it accords Chile a full 200-nautical-mile maritime extension, whereas Peru, in contrast, suffers a severe cut-off effect. Peru states that it is extraordinary for Chile to seek to characterize a boundary line, which accords Chile more than twice as much maritime area as it would Peru, as a stable frontier which is beneficial to Peru.

IV. WHETHER THERE IS AN AGREED MARITIME BOUNDARY

24. In order to settle the dispute before it, the Court must first ascertain whether an agreed maritime boundary exists, as Chile claims. In addressing this question, the Parties considered the significance of the 1947 Proclamations, the 1952 Santiago Declaration and various agreements concluded in 1952 and 1954. They also referred to the practice of
Sketch-map No. 2:
The maritime boundary lines claimed by Peru and Chile respectively

This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes only.

Mercator Projection (18° 20' S)
WGS 84

Maritime boundary along parallel as claimed by Chile

Maritime boundary along equidistance line as claimed by Peru

200 nautical miles from Peru’s coast

200 nautical miles from Chile’s coast
the Parties subsequent to the 1952 Santiago Declaration. The Court will deal with each of these matters in turn.

1. The 1947 Proclamations of Chile and Peru

25. As noted above (see paragraph 19), in their 1947 Proclamations, Chile and Peru unilaterally proclaimed certain maritime rights extending 200 nautical miles from their respective coasts.

26. The Parties agree that the relevant historical background to these Proclamations involves a number of comparable proclamations by other States, namely the United States of America’s two Proclamations of its policy with respect to both the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf, and coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas, both dated 28 September 1945, the Mexican Declaration with Respect to Continental Shelf dated 29 October 1945 and the Argentine Declaration Proclaiming Sovereignty over the Epicontinental Sea and the Continental Shelf dated 11 October 1946. Both Parties agree on the importance of fish and whale resources to their economies, submitting that the above-mentioned Proclamations by the United States of America placed increased pressure on the commercial exploitation of fisheries off the coast of the Pacific States of Latin America, thus motivating their 1947 Proclamations.

27. Beyond this background, the Parties present differing interpretations of both the content and legal significance of the 1947 Proclamations.

28. According to Peru, Chile’s 1947 Declaration was an initial and innovative step, whereby it asserted an alterable claim to jurisdiction, dependent on the adoption of further measures; nothing in this Declaration indicated any intention, on the part of Chile, to address the question of lateral maritime boundaries with neighbouring States. Peru argues that its own 1947 Decree is similarly provisional, representing an initial step and not purporting to fix definitive limits of Peruvian jurisdiction.

Peru contends that although its 1947 Decree refers to the Peruvian zone of control and protection as “the area covered between the coast and an imaginary parallel line to it at a distance of two hundred (200) nautical miles measured following the line of the geographical parallels”, such reference simply described the manner in which the seaward limits of the maritime zone would be drawn, with there being no intention to set any lateral boundaries with neighbouring States. Peru further considers that, according to terminology at the relevant time, the language of “sovereignty” in its 1947 Decree referred simply to rights over resources.

29. By contrast, Chile understands the Parties’ 1947 Proclamations as more relevant, considering them to be “concordant unilateral proclama-
tions, each claiming sovereignty to a distance of 200 nautical miles", being “substantially similar in form, content and effect”. Chile observes that each of the Parties proclaims national sovereignty over its adjacent continental shelf, as well as in respect of the water column, indicating also a right to extend the outer limit of its respective maritime zone.

30. Peru contests Chile’s description of the 1947 Proclamations as “concordant”, emphasizing that, although Chile’s 1947 Declaration and Peru’s 1947 Decree were closely related in time and object, they were not co-ordinated or agreed between the Parties.

31. Chile further argues that the 1947 Proclamations set clear boundaries of the maritime zones referred to therein. Chile contends that the method in Peru’s 1947 Decree of using a geographical parallel to measure the outward limit of the maritime zone also necessarily determines the northern and southern lateral limits of such zone along such line of geographical parallel. According to Chile, its own references to a “perimeter” and to the “mathematical parallel” in its 1947 Declaration could be similarly understood as indicating that a tracé parallèle method was used to indicate the perimeter of the claimed Chilean zone.

32. Chile adds that parallels of latitude were also used in the practice of American States. Peru responds that the use of parallels of latitude by other American States described by Chile are not instances of the use of parallels of latitude as international maritime boundaries.

33. For Chile, the primary significance of the 1947 Proclamations is as antecedents to the 1952 Santiago Declaration. Chile also refers to the 1947 Proclamations as circumstances of the conclusion of the 1952 Santiago Declaration and the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Chile maintains that the 1947 Proclamations, in particular Peru’s use of a “line of the geographic parallels” to measure its maritime projection, rendered the boundary delimitation uncontroversial in 1952, as there could be no less controversial boundary delimitation than when the claimed maritime zones of two adjacent States abut perfectly but do not overlap. However, Chile further clarifies that it does not consider that the 1947 Proclamations themselves established a maritime boundary between the Parties.

34. Peru questions the Chilean claim that the adjacent maritime zones abut perfectly by pointing out that the 1947 Proclamations do not stipulate co-ordinates or refer to international boundaries. Peru’s view on the connection between the 1947 Proclamations and the 1952 Santiago Declaration is that the 1947 Proclamations cannot constitute circumstances of the 1952 Santiago Declaration’s conclusion in the sense of Article 32.
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as they pre-date the conclusion of the 1952 Santiago Declaration by five years. Peru also questions Chile’s assertion that the 1947 Proclamations constitute circumstances of the conclusion of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement.

35. The Parties further disagree on the legal nature of the 1947 Proclamations, particularly Chile’s 1947 Declaration. Chile contends that the 1947 Proclamations each had immediate effect, without the need for further formality or enacting legislation. Peru denies this, contending rather that Chile’s 1947 Declaration did not have the nature of a legal act. It points to the fact that the 1947 Declaration was published only in a daily newspaper and not in the Official Gazette of Chile.

36. Chile’s response to these arguments is that the status of its 1947 Declaration under domestic law is not determinative of its status under international law, emphasizing that it was an international claim made by the President of Chile and addressed to the international community. Chile points out that the Parties exchanged formal notifications of their 1947 Proclamations, arguing that the lack of protest thereto demonstrates acceptance of the validity of the other’s claim to sovereignty, including in relation to the perimeter. This was challenged by Peru.

37. The relevant paragraphs of Chile’s 1947 Declaration provide as follows:

“Considering:

1. That the Governments of the United States of America, of Mexico and of the Argentine Republic, by presidential declarations made on 28 September 1945, 29 October 1945, and 11 October 1946, respectively,

2. That they have explicitly proclaimed the rights of their States to protect, preserve, control and inspect fishing enterprises, with the object of preventing illicit activities threatening to damage or destroy the considerable natural riches of this kind contained in the seas adjacent to their coasts, and which are indispensable to the welfare and progress of their respective peoples; and that the justice of such claims is indisputable;

3. That it is manifestly convenient, in the case of the Chilean Republic, to issue a similar proclamation of sovereignty, not only by the fact of possessing and having already under exploitation natural riches essential to the life of the nation and contained in the continental shelf, such as the coal-mines, which are exploited both on the mainland and under the sea, but further because, in view of its topogra-
phy and the narrowness of its boundaries, the life of the country is linked to the sea and to all present and future natural riches contained within it, more so than in the case of any other country;

(1) The Government of Chile confirms and proclaims its national sovereignty over all the continental shelf adjacent to the continental and island coasts of its national territory, whatever may be their depth below the sea, and claims by consequence all the natural riches which exist on the said shelf, both in and under it, known or to be discovered.

(2) The Government of Chile confirms and proclaims its national sovereignty over the seas adjacent to its coasts whatever may be their depths, and within those limits necessary in order to reserve, protect, preserve and exploit the natural resources of whatever nature found on, within and below the said seas, placing within the control of the Government especially all fisheries and whaling activities with the object of preventing the exploitation of natural riches of this kind to the detriment of the inhabitants of Chile and to prevent the spoiling or destruction of the said riches to the detriment of the country and the American continent.

(3) The demarcation of the protection zones for whaling and deep sea fishery in the continental and island seas under the control of the Government of Chile will be made in accordance with this declaration of sovereignty at any moment which the Government may consider convenient, such demarcation to be ratified, amplified, or modified in any way to conform with the knowledge, discoveries, studies and interests of Chile as required in the future. Protection and control is hereby declared immediately over all the seas contained within the perimeter formed by the coast and the mathematical parallel projected into the sea at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coasts of Chilean territory. This demarcation will be calculated to include the Chilean islands, indicating a maritime zone contiguous to the coasts of the said islands, projected parallel to these islands at a distance of 200 nautical miles around their coasts.

(4) The present declaration of sovereignty does not disregard the similar legitimate rights of other States on a basis of reciprocity, nor does it affect the rights of free navigation on the high seas.”

38. The relevant paragraphs of Peru’s 1947 Decree provide as follows:

“The President of the Republic,

Considering:

That the shelf contains certain natural resources which must be proclaimed as our national heritage;
That it is deemed equally necessary that the State protect, maintain and establish a control of fisheries and other natural resources found in the continental waters which cover the submerged shelf and the adjacent continental seas in order that these resources which are so essential to our national life may continue to be exploited now and in the future in such a way as to cause no detriment to the country’s economy or to its food production;

That the right to proclaim sovereignty and national jurisdiction over the entire extension of the submerged shelf as well as over the continental waters which cover it and the adjacent seas in the area required for the maintenance and vigilance of the resources therein contained, has been claimed by other countries and practically admitted in international law (Declaration of the President of the United States of 28 September 1945; Declaration of the President of Mexico of 29 October 1945; Decree of the President of the Argentine Nation of 11 October 1946; Declaration of the President of Chile of 23 June 1947);

With the advisory vote of the Cabinet,

Decrees:

1. To declare that national sovereignty and jurisdiction are extended to the submerged continental or insular shelf adjacent to the continental or insular shores of national territory, whatever the depth and extension of this shelf may be.

2. National sovereignty and jurisdiction are exercised as well over the sea adjoining the shores of national territory whatever its depth and in the extension necessary to reserve, protect, maintain and utilize natural resources and wealth of any kind which may be found in or below those waters.

3. As a result of previous declarations the State reserves the right to establish the limits of the zones of control and protection of natural resources in continental or insular seas which are controlled by the Peruvian Government and to modify such limits in accordance with supervening circumstances which may originate as a result of further discoveries, studies or national interests which may become apparent in the future and at the same time declares that it will exercise the same control and protection on the seas adjacent to the Peruvian coast over the area covered between the coast and an imaginary parallel line to it at a distance of two hundred (200) nautical miles measured following the line of the geographical parallels. As regards islands pertaining to the nation, this demarcation will be traced to include the sea area adjacent to the shores of these islands to a distance of two hundred (200) nautical miles, measured from all points on the contour of these islands.
4. The present declaration does not affect the right to free navigation of ships of all nations according to international law.”

39. The Court notes that the Parties are in agreement that the 1947 Proclamations do not themselves establish an international maritime boundary. The Court therefore will consider the 1947 Proclamations only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the texts evidence the Parties’ understanding as far as the establishment of a future maritime boundary between them is concerned.

40. The Court observes that paragraph 3 of Chile’s 1947 Declaration referred to a “mathematical parallel” projected into the sea to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the Chilean coast. Such a mathematical parallel limited the seaward extent of the projection, but did not fix its lateral limits. The 1947 Declaration nonetheless stated that it concerned the continental shelf and the seas “adjacent” to the Chilean coasts. It implied the need to fix, in the future, the lateral limits of the jurisdiction that it was seeking to establish within a specified perimeter. The Court further notes that Peru’s 1947 Decree, in paragraph 3, referred to “geographical parallels” in identifying its maritime zone. The description of the relevant maritime zones in the 1947 Proclamations appears to use a tracé parallèle method. However, the utilization of such method is not sufficient to evidence a clear intention of the Parties that their eventual maritime boundary would be a parallel.

41. The Court recalls that paragraph 3 of Chile’s 1947 Declaration provides for the establishment of protective zones for whaling and deep sea fishery, considering that these may be modified in any way “to conform with the knowledge, discoveries, studies and interests of Chile as required in the future”. This conditional language cannot be seen as committing Chile to a particular method of delimiting a future lateral boundary with its neighbouring States; rather, Chile’s concern relates to the establishment of a zone of protection and control so as to ensure the exploitation and preservation of natural resources.

42. The language of Peru’s 1947 Decree is equally conditional. In paragraph 3, Peru reserves the right to modify its “zones of control and protection” as a result of “national interests which may become apparent in the future”.

43. In view of the above, the language of the 1947 Proclamations, as well as their provisional nature, precludes an interpretation of them as reflecting a shared understanding of the Parties concerning maritime delimitation. At the same time, the Court observes that the Parties’ 1947 Proclamations contain similar claims concerning their rights and jurisdiction in the maritime zones, giving rise to the necessity of establishing the lateral limits of these zones in the future.
44. Having reached this conclusion, the Court does not need to address Chile’s argument concerning the relevance of the communication of the 1947 Proclamations inter se and Peru’s response to that argument. The Court notes, however, that both Peru and Chile simply acknowledged receipt of each other’s notification without making any reference to the possible establishment of an international maritime boundary between them.

2. The 1952 Santiago Declaration

45. As noted above (see paragraph 20), the Santiago Declaration was signed by Chile, Ecuador and Peru during the 1952 Conference held in Santiago de Chile on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific.

46. According to Chile, the 1952 Santiago Declaration has been a treaty from its inception and was always intended by its signatories to be legally binding. Chile further notes that the United Nations Treaty Series indicates that the 1952 Santiago Declaration entered into force upon signature on 18 August 1952, with there being no record of any objection by Peru to such indication.

47. Peru considers that the 1952 Santiago Declaration was not conceived as a treaty, but rather as a proclamation of the international maritime policy of the three States. Peru claims that it was thus “declarative” in character, but accepts that it later acquired the status of a treaty after being ratified by each signatory (Chile in 1954, Ecuador and Peru in 1955) and registered as such with the United Nations Secretariat on 12 May 1976, pursuant to Article 102, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations.

48. In view of the above, the Court observes that it is no longer contested that the 1952 Santiago Declaration is an international treaty. The Court’s task now is to ascertain whether it established a maritime boundary between the Parties.

49. The 1952 Santiago Declaration provides as follows:

1. Governments have the obligation to ensure for their peoples the necessary conditions of subsistence, and to provide them with the resources for their economic development.

2. Consequently, they are responsible for the conservation and protection of their natural resources and for the regulation of the development of these resources in order to secure the best possible advantages for their respective countries.

3. Thus, it is also their duty to prevent any exploitation of these resources, beyond the scope of their jurisdiction, which endangers the existence, integrity and conservation of these resources to the
detriment of the peoples who, because of their geographical situation, possess irreplaceable means of subsistence and vital economic resources in their seas.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, determined to conserve and safeguard for their respective peoples the natural resources of the maritime zones adjacent to their coasts, formulate the following Declaration:

I. The geological and biological factors which determine the existence, conservation and development of marine fauna and flora in the waters along the coasts of the countries making the Declaration are such that the former extension of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone are inadequate for the purposes of the conservation, development and exploitation of these resources, to which the coastal countries are entitled.

II. In the light of these circumstances, the Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru proclaim as a norm of their international maritime policy that they each possess exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea along the coasts of their respective countries to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles from these coasts.

III. The exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over this maritime zone shall also encompass exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof.

IV. In the case of island territories, the zone of 200 nautical miles shall apply to the entire coast of the island or group of islands. If an island or group of islands belonging to one of the countries making the declaration is situated less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone belonging to another of those countries, the maritime zone of the island or group of islands shall be limited by the parallel at the point at which the land frontier of the States concerned reaches the sea.

V. This declaration shall be without prejudice to the necessary limitations to the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction established under international law to allow innocent and inoffensive passage through the area indicated for ships of all nations.

VI. For the application of the principles contained in this Declaration, the Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru hereby announce their intention to sign agreements or conventions which shall establish general norms to regulate and protect hunting and fishing within the maritime zone belonging to them, and to regulate and co-ordinate the exploitation and development of all other kinds of products or natural resources existing in these waters which are of common interest.”

*
50. Peru asserts that the 1952 Santiago Declaration lacks characteristics which might be expected of a boundary agreement, namely, an appropriate format, a definition or description of a boundary, cartographic material and a requirement for ratification. Chile disagrees with Peru’s arguments concerning the characteristics of boundary agreements, pointing out that a treaty effecting a boundary delimitation can take any form.

51. According to Chile, it follows from paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration that the maritime boundary between neighbouring States parties is the parallel of latitude passing through the point at which the land boundary between them reaches the sea. Chile contends that paragraph IV delimits both the general and insular maritime zones of the States parties, arguing that the reference to islands in this provision is a specific application of a generally agreed rule, the specification of which is explained by the particular importance of islands to Ecuador’s geographical circumstances. In support of this claim, Chile relies upon the minutes of the 1952 Conference dated 11 August 1952, asserting that the Ecuadorian delegate requested clarification that the boundary line of the jurisdictional zone of each country be the respective parallel from the point at which the border of the countries touches or reaches the sea and that all States expressed their mutual consent to such an understanding. Chile argues that such an understanding, as recorded in the minutes, constitutes an agreement relating to the conclusion of the 1952 Santiago Declaration, within the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 2 (a), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Although Chile recognizes that the issue of islands was of particular concern to Ecuador, it also stresses that there are relevant islands in the vicinity of the Peru-Chile border.

52. Chile maintains that the relationship between general and insular maritime zones must be understood in light of the fact that the delimitation of insular zones along a line of parallel is only coherent and effective if there is also a general maritime delimitation along such parallel. Further, Chile points out that, in order to determine if an island is situated less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone of another State party to the 1952 Santiago Declaration, the perimeter of such general maritime zone must have already been defined.

53. Peru argues that in so far as the continental coasts of the States parties are concerned, the 1952 Santiago Declaration simply claims a maritime zone extending to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles, addressing only seaward and not lateral boundaries. In Peru’s view, paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration refers only to the entitlement generated by certain islands and not to the entitlement generated by continental coasts, with the issue of islands being relevant only between Ecuador and Peru, not between Peru and Chile. Peru contends that even if some very small islands exist in the vicinity of the Peru-Chile border these are immediately adjacent to the coast and do not have any effect on maritime entitlements distinct from the coast itself, nor were they of concern during the 1952 Conference.
54. Peru rejects Chile’s argument that a general maritime delimitation must be assumed in paragraph IV so as to make the reference to insular delimitation effective. It also questions that a maritime boundary could result from an alleged practice implying or presupposing its existence. Peru argues that, if it were true that parallels had been established as international maritime boundaries prior to 1952, there would have been no need to include paragraph IV as such boundaries would have already settled the question of the extent of the maritime entitlements of islands. Peru further claims that the purpose of paragraph IV is to provide a protective zone for insular maritime entitlements so that even if an eventual maritime delimitation occurred in a manner otherwise detrimental to such insular entitlements, it could only do so as far as the line of parallel referred to therein. Finally, Peru contests Chile’s interpretation of the minutes of the 1952 Conference, arguing also that these do not constitute any form of “recorded agreement” but could only amount to travaux préparatoires.

55. According to Chile, the object and purpose of the 1952 Santiago Declaration can be stated at varying levels of specificity. Its most generally stated object and purpose is “to conserve and safeguard for their respective peoples the natural resources of the maritime zones adjacent to [the parties’] coasts”. It also has a more specific object and purpose, namely to set forth zones of “exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction”. This object and purpose is naturally concerned with identifying the physical perimeter of each State’s maritime zone within which such sovereignty and jurisdiction would be exercised. Chile further emphasizes that, although the 1952 Santiago Declaration constitutes a joint proclamation of sovereignty, it is made by each of the three States parties, each claiming sovereignty over a maritime zone which is distinct from that claimed by the other two.

56. Peru agrees with Chile to the extent that the 1952 Santiago Declaration involves joint action to declare the maritime rights of States parties to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles from their coasts so as to protect and preserve the natural resources adjacent to their territories. Yet, Peru focuses on the 1952 Conference’s purpose as being to address collectively the problem of whaling in South Pacific waters, arguing that, in order to do so, it was necessary that “between them” the States parties police the 200-nautical-mile zone effectively. According to Peru, the object and purpose of the 1952 Santiago Declaration was not the division of fishing grounds between its States parties, but to create a zone functioning “as a single biological unit” — an exercise of regional solidarity — designed to address the threat posed by foreign whaling. Thus, Peru stresses that the 1952 Santiago Declaration does not include any stipulation as to how the States parties’ maritime zones are delimited from each other.

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58. The Court commences by considering the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 1952 Santiago Declaration in their context, in accordance with Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 1952 Santiago Declaration does not make express reference to the delimitation of maritime boundaries of the zones generated by the continental coasts of its States parties. This is compounded by the lack of such information which might be expected in an agreement determining maritime boundaries, namely, specific co-ordinates or cartographic material. Nevertheless, the 1952 Santiago Declaration contains certain elements (in its paragraph IV) which are relevant to the issue of maritime delimitation (see paragraph 60 below).

59. The Court notes that in paragraph II, the States parties “proclaim as a norm of their international maritime policy that they each possess exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea along the coasts of their respective countries to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles from these coasts”. This provision establishes only a seaward claim and makes no reference to the need to distinguish the lateral limits of the maritime zones of each State party. Paragraph III states that “[t]he exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over this maritime zone shall also encompass exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof”. Such a reference to jurisdiction and sovereignty does not necessarily require any delimitation to have already occurred. Paragraph VI expresses the intention of the States parties to establish by agreement in the future general norms of regulation and protection to be applied in their respective maritime zones. Accordingly, although a description of the distance of maritime zones and reference to the exercise of jurisdiction and sovereignty might indicate that the States parties were not unaware of issues of general delimitation, the Court concludes that neither paragraph II nor paragraph III refers explicitly to any lateral boundaries of the proclaimed 200-nautical-mile maritime zones, nor can the need for such boundaries be implied by the references to jurisdiction and sovereignty.
60. The Court turns now to paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration. The first sentence of paragraph IV specifies that the proclaimed 200-nautical-mile maritime zones apply also in the case of island territories. The second sentence of that paragraph addresses the situation where an island or group of islands of one State party is located less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone of another State party. In this situation, the limit of the respective zones shall be the parallel at the point at which the land frontier of the State concerned reaches the sea. The Court observes that this provision, the only one in the 1952 Santiago Declaration making any reference to the limits of the States parties’ maritime zones, is silent regarding the lateral limits of the maritime zones which are not derived from island territories and which do not abut them.

61. The Court is not convinced by Chile’s argument that paragraph IV can be understood solely if it is considered to delimit not only insular maritime zones but also the entirety of the general maritime zones of the States parties. The ordinary meaning of paragraph IV reveals a particular interest in the maritime zones of islands which may be relevant even if a general maritime zone has not yet been established. In effect, it appears that the States parties intended to resolve a specific issue which could obviously create possible future tension between them by agreeing that the parallel would limit insular zones.

62. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ordinary meaning of paragraph IV, read in its context, goes no further than establishing the Parties’ agreement concerning the limits between certain insular maritime zones and those zones generated by the continental coasts which abut such insular maritime zones.

63. The Court now turns to consider the object and purpose of the 1952 Santiago Declaration. It recalls that both Parties state such object and purpose narrowly: Peru argues that the Declaration is primarily concerned with addressing issues of large-scale whaling, whereas Chile argues that it can be most specifically understood as concerned with identifying the perimeters of the maritime zone of each State party. The Court observes that the Preamble of the 1952 Santiago Declaration focuses on the conservation and protection of the necessary natural resources for the subsistence and economic development of the peoples of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, through the extension of the maritime zones adjacent to their coasts.

64. The Court further considers that it is not necessary for it to address the existence of small islands located close to the coast in the region of the Peru-Chile land boundary. The case file demonstrates that the issue of insular zones in the context of the 1952 Santiago Declaration arose from a concern expressed by Ecuador. It is equally clear from the case file that the small islands do not appear to have been of concern to the Parties. As stated by Chile in its Rejoinder, referring to these small islands, “[n]one of
them was mentioned in the negotiating record related to the 1952 Santiago Declaration . . . The only islands that were mentioned in the context of the Santiago Declaration were Ecuador’s Galápagos Islands.” Peru did not contest this.

65. The Court recalls Chile’s argument, based on Article 31, paragraph 2 (a), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that the minutes of the 1952 Conference constitute an “agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”. The Court considers that the minutes of the 1952 Conference summarize the discussions leading to the adoption of the 1952 Santiago Declaration, rather than record an agreement of the negotiating States. Thus, they are more appropriately characterized as travaux préparatoires which constitute supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

66. In light of the above, the Court does not need, in principle, to resort to supplementary means of interpretation, such as the travaux préparatoires of the 1952 Santiago Declaration and the circumstances of its conclusion, to determine the meaning of that Declaration. However, as in other cases (see, for example, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 653, para. 53; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 21, para. 40; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 27, para. 55), the Court has considered the relevant material, which confirms the above interpretation of the 1952 Santiago Declaration.

67. Chile’s original proposal presented to the 1952 Conference provided as follows:

“The zone indicated comprises all waters within the perimeter formed by the coasts of each country and a mathematical parallel projected into the sea to 200 nautical miles away from the mainland, along the coastal fringe.

In the case of island territories, the zone of 200 nautical miles will apply all around the island or island group.

If an island or group of islands belonging to one of the countries making the declaration is situated less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone belonging to another of those countries, according to what has been established in the first paragraph of this article, the maritime zone of the said island or group of islands shall be limited, in the corresponding part, to the distance that separates it from the maritime zone of the other State or country.”

The Court notes that this original Chilean proposal appears intended to effect a general delimitation of the maritime zones along lateral lines. However, this proposal was not adopted.
68. Further, the minutes of the 1952 Conference indicate that the delegate for Ecuador:

“observed that it would be advisable to provide more clarity to Article 3 [which became paragraph IV of the final text of the 1952 Santiago Declaration], in order to avoid any error in the interpretation of the interference zone in the case of islands, and suggested that the declaration be drafted on the basis that the boundary line of the jurisdictional zone of each country be the respective parallel from the point at which the frontier of the countries touches or reaches the sea”.

According to the minutes, this proposition met with the agreement of all of the delegates.

Ecuador’s intervention, with which the Parties agreed, is limited in its concern to clarification “in the case of islands”. Thus the Court is of the view that it can be understood as saying no more than that which is already stated in the final text of paragraph IV. The Court considers from the foregoing that the travaux préparatoires confirm its conclusion that the 1952 Santiago Declaration did not effect a general maritime delimitation.

69. Nevertheless, various factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, such as the original Chilean proposal and the use of the parallel as the limit of the maritime zone of an island of one State party located less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone of another State party, suggest that there might have been some sort of shared understanding among the States parties of a more general nature concerning their maritime boundaries. The Court will return to this matter later.

70. The Court has concluded, contrary to Chile’s submissions, that Chile and Peru did not, by adopting the 1952 Santiago Declaration, agree to the establishment of a lateral maritime boundary between them along the line of latitude running into the Pacific Ocean from the seaward terminus of their land boundary. However, in support of its claim that that line constitutes the maritime boundary, Chile also invokes agreements and arrangements which it signed later with Ecuador and Peru, and with Peru alone.

3. The Various 1954 Agreements

71. Among the agreements adopted in 1954, Chile emphasizes, in particular, the Complementary Convention to the 1952 Santiago Declaration and the Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement. It puts the meetings that led to those agreements and the agreements themselves in the context of the challenges which six maritime powers had made to the 1952 Santiago Declaration in the period running from August to late October 1954 and of the planned whale hunting by a fleet operating under the Panamanian flag.
72. The meeting of the CPPS, preparatory to the Inter-State conference of December 1954, was held between 4 and 8 October 1954. The provisional agenda items correspond to five of the six agreements which were drafted and adopted at the December Inter-State Conference: the Complementary Convention to the 1952 Santiago Declaration, the Convention on the System of Sanctions, the Agreement on the Annual Meeting of the CPPS, the Convention on Supervision and Control, and the Convention on the Granting of Permits for the Exploitation of the Resources of the South Pacific.

73. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement also resulted from the meetings that took place in 1954. In addition to considering the matters listed on the provisional agenda described above, the October 1954 meeting of the CPPS also considered a proposal by the Delegations of Ecuador and Peru to establish a “neutral zone . . . on either side of the parallel which passes through the point of the coast that signals the boundary between the two countries”. The Permanent Commission approved the proposal unanimously “and, consequently, entrusted its Secretariat-General to transmit this recommendation to the signatory countries so that they put into practice this norm of tolerance on fishing activities”. As a consequence, at the inaugural session of “The Second Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific”, the proposed Agreement appeared in the agenda as the last of the six agreements to be considered and signed in December 1954. The draft text relating to the proposal to establish a “neutral zone” along the parallel was then amended in certain respects. The term “neutral zone” was replaced with the term “special maritime frontier zone” and the reference to “the parallel which passes through the point of the coast that signals the boundary between the two countries” was replaced with “the parallel which constitutes the maritime boundary between the two countries”. This is the language that appears in the first paragraph of the final text of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, which was adopted along with the other five agreements referred to in the preceding paragraph. All of the agreements included a standard clause, added late in the drafting process without any explanation recorded in the minutes. According to this clause, the provisions contained in the agreements were “deemed to be an integral and supplementary part” of the resolutions and agreements adopted in 1952 and were “not in any way to abrogate” them. Of these six agreements only the 1954 Complementary Convention and the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement were given any real attention by the Parties in the course of these proceedings, except for brief references by Chile to the Supervision and Control Convention (see paragraph 78 below). The Court notes that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement is still in force.

A. The Complementary Convention to the 1952 Santiago Declaration

74. According to Chile, “the main instrument” prepared at the 1954 Inter-State Conference was the Complementary Convention, “[t]he
primary purpose [of which] was to reassert the claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction that had been made two years earlier in Santiago and to defend jointly the claim against protests by third States”. It quotes its Foreign Minister speaking at the inaugural session of the 1954 CPPS Meeting:

“The right to proclaim our sovereignty over the sea zone that extends to two hundred miles from the coast is thus undeniable and inalienable. We gather now to reaffirm our decision to defend, whatever the cost, this sovereignty and to exercise it in accordance with the high national interests of the signatory countries to the Declaration.

We strongly believe that, little by little, the legal statement that has been formulated by our countries into the 1952 Agreement [the Santiago Declaration] will find its place in international law until it is accepted by all Governments that wish to preserve, for mankind, resources that today are ruthlessly destroyed by the unregulated exercise of exploitative activities that pursue diminished individual interests and not collective needs.”

75. Peru similarly contends that the purpose of the 1954 Complementary Convention was to reinforce regional solidarity in the face of opposition from third States to the 200-nautical-mile claim. It observes that in 1954, as in 1952, the primary focus of the three States was on maintaining a united front towards third States, “rather than upon the development of an internal legal régime defining their rights inter se”. It also contends that the 1954 instruments were adopted in the context of regional solidarity vis-à-vis third States and that they were essentially an integral part of the agreements and resolutions adopted in 1952. The Inter-State Conference was in fact held less than a month after the Peruvian Navy, with the co-operation of its air force, had seized vessels of the Onassis whaling fleet, under the Panamanian flag, more than 100 nautical miles off shore (for extracts from the Peruvian judgment imposing fines see American Journal of International Law, 1955, Vol. 49, p. 575). Peru notes that when it rejected a United Kingdom protest against the seizure of the Onassis vessels, the Chilean Foreign Minister sent a congratulatory message to his Peruvian counterpart — according to Peru this was “an indication of the regional solidarity which the zone embodied”. In its Reply, Peru recalls Chile’s characterization in its Counter-Memorial of the 1954 Complementary Convention as “the main instrument” prepared at the 1954 Inter-State Conference.

76. The Parties also refer to the agreed responses which they made, after careful preparation in the first part of 1955, to the protests made by maritime powers against the 1952 Santiago Declaration. Those responses were made in accordance with the spirit of the Complementary Conven-
tion even though Chile was not then or later a party to it. Similar co-
ordinated action was taken in May 1955 in response to related proposals
made by the United States of America.

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77. The Court observes that it is common ground that the proposed
Complementary Convention was the main instrument addressed by Chile,
Ecuador and Peru as they prepared for the CPPS meeting and the
Inter-State Conference in Lima in the final months of 1954. Given the
challenges being made by several States to the 1952 Santiago Declaration,
the primary purpose of that Convention was to assert, particularly against
the major maritime powers, their claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
made jointly in 1952. It was also designed to help prepare their common
defence of the claim against the protests by those States, which was the
subject-matter of the second agenda item of the 1954 Inter-State Confer-
ence. It does not follow, however, that the “primary purpose” was the
sole purpose or even less that the primary purpose determined the sole
outcome of the 1954 meetings and the Inter-State Conference.

B. The Agreement relating to Measures of Supervision and Control
of the Maritime Zones of the Signatory Countries

78. Chile seeks support from another of the 1954 Agreements, the
Agreement relating to Measures of Supervision and Control of the Mar-
time Zones of the Signatory Countries. It quotes the first and second
articles:

“First,
It shall be the function of each signatory country to supervise and
control the exploitation of the resources in its Maritime Zone by the
use of such organs and means as it considers necessary.
Second,
The supervision and control referred to in Article one shall be exer-
cised by each country exclusively in the waters of its jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis added by Chile.)

Chile contends that the second article proceeds on the basis that each
State’s maritime zone had been delimited. Peru made no reference to
the substance of this Agreement. Chile also referred in this context to the
1955 Agreement for the Regulation of Permits for Exploitation of the
Resources of the South Pacific (see paragraph 21 above) and to its
1959 Decree providing for that regulation.

79. The Court considers that at this early stage there were at least in
practice distinct maritime zones in which each of the three States might,
in terms of the 1952 Santiago Declaration, take action as indeed was
exemplified by the action taken by Peru against the Onassis whaling fleet shortly before the Lima Conference; other instances of enforcement by the two Parties are discussed later. However the Agreements on Supervision and Control and on the Regulation of Permits give no indication about the location or nature of boundaries of the zones. On the matter of boundaries, the Court now turns to the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement.

C. The Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone

80. The Preamble to the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement reads as follows:

“Experience has shown that innocent and inadvertent violations of the maritime frontier [la frontera marítima] between adjacent States occur frequently because small vessels manned by crews with insufficient knowledge of navigation or not equipped with the necessary instruments have difficulty in determining accurately their position on the high seas;

The application of penalties in such cases always produces ill-feeling in the fishermen and friction between the countries concerned, which may affect adversely the spirit of co-operation and unity which should at all times prevail among the countries signatories to the instruments signed at Santiago; and

It is desirable to avoid the occurrence of such unintentional infringements, the consequences of which affect principally the fishermen.”

81. The substantive provisions of the Agreement read as follows:

“1. A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of [a partir de] 12 nautical miles from the coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either side of the parallel which constitutes the maritime boundary [el límite marítimo] between the two countries.

2. The accidental presence in the said zone of a vessel of either of the adjacent countries, which is a vessel of the nature described in the paragraph beginning with the words ‘Experience has shown’ in the Preamble hereto, shall not be considered to be a violation of the waters of the maritime zone, though this provision shall not be construed as recognizing any right to engage, with deliberate intent, in hunting or fishing in the said special zone.

3. Fishing or hunting within the zone of 12 nautical miles from the coast shall be reserved exclusively to the nationals of each country.”

Article 4 is the standard provision, included in all six of the 1954 Agreements, deeming it to be “an integral and supplementary part” of the 1952 instruments which it was not in any way to abrogate (see paragraph 73 above).
82. According to Chile, the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was “the most relevant instrument adopted at the December 1954 Conference”. Its “basic predicate” was that the three States “already had lateral boundaries, or ‘frontiers’, in place between them”. Chile continues, citing the Judgment in the case concerning Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), that in the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement “the existence of a determined frontier was accepted and acted upon” (I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 35, para. 66). It points out that Article 1 uses the present tense, referring to a maritime boundary already in existence, and the first recital indicates that it was violations of that existing boundary that prompted the Agreement.

83. Peru contends (1) that the Agreement was applicable only to Peru’s northern maritime border, that is, with Ecuador, and not also to the southern one, with Chile; (2) that Chile’s delay in ratifying (in 1967) and registering (in 2004) the Agreement shows that it did not regard it of major importance in establishing a maritime boundary; and (3) that the Agreement had a very special and temporary purpose and that the Parties were claiming a limited functional jurisdiction. Peru in its written pleadings, in support of its contention that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement applied only to its boundary with Ecuador and not to that with Chile, said that the “rather opaque formula” — the reference to the parallel in Article 1, introduced on the proposal of Ecuador — referred to only one parallel between two countries; it seems clear, Peru says, that the focus was on the waters between Peru and Ecuador.

84. With regard to Peru’s first argument, Chile in reply points out that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement has three States parties and that the ordinary meaning of “the two countries” in Article 1 is a reference to the States on either side of their shared maritime boundary. Chile notes that there is no qualification of the “maritime frontier” (in the Preamble), nor is there any suggestion that the term “adjacent States” refers only to Ecuador and Peru. Chile also points out that in 1962 Peru complained to Chile about “the frequency with which Chilean fishing vessels have trespassed into Peruvian waters”, stating that “the Government of Peru, taking strongly into account the sense and provisions of ‘the Agreement’” wished that the Government of Chile take certain steps particularly through the competent authorities at the port of Arica. As Chile noted, Peru did not at that stage make any reference to the argument that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement applied only to its northern maritime boundary.

85. In the view of the Court, there is nothing at all in the terms of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement which would limit it
only to the Ecuador-Peru maritime boundary. Moreover Peru did not in practice accord it that limited meaning which would preclude its application to Peru’s southern maritime boundary with Chile. The Court further notes that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was negotiated and signed by the representatives of all three States, both in the Commission and at the Inter-State Conference. All three States then proceeded to ratify it. They included it among the twelve treaties which they jointly submitted to the United Nations Secretariat for registration in 1973 (see paragraph 21 above).

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86. With regard to Peru’s second argument, Chile responds by pointing out that delay in ratification is common and contends that of itself the delay in ratification has no consequence for the legal effect of a treaty once it has entered into force. Further, it submits that the fact that registration of an Agreement is delayed is of no relevance.

87. The Court is of the view that Chile’s delay in ratifying the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement and submitting it for registration does not support Peru’s argument that Chile considered that the Agreement lacked major importance. In any event, this delay has no bearing on the scope and effect of the Agreement. Once ratified by Chile the Agreement became binding on it. In terms of the argument about Chile’s delay in submitting the Agreement for registration, the Court recalls that, in 1973, all three States signatory to the 1952 and 1954 treaties, including the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, simultaneously submitted all of them for registration (see paragraphs 20 to 21 above).

88. With regard to Peru’s third argument that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement had a special and temporary purpose and that the Parties were claiming a limited functional jurisdiction, Chile’s central contention is that the “basic predicate” of the Agreement was that the three States “already had lateral boundaries, or ‘frontiers’, in place between them” (see paragraph 82 above). The reference in the title of the Agreement to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone and in the recitals to violations of the maritime frontier between adjacent States demonstrates, Chile contends, that a maritime frontier or boundary already existed when the three States concluded the Agreement in December 1954. The granting to small vessels of the benefit of a zone of tolerance was, in terms of the Preamble, intended to avoid “friction between the countries concerned, which may affect adversely the spirit of co-operation and unity which should at all times prevail among the countries signatories to the instruments signed at Santiago”. According to Chile, this was an inter-State problem and “not a problem relating to itinerant fishermen”. The States wished to eliminate obstacles to their complete co-operation in defence of their maritime claims. Chile emphasizes that Article 1, the pri-
mary substantive provision, is in the present tense: the ten-nautical-mile zones are being created to the north and south of a maritime boundary which already exists. Article 2, it says, also supports its position. The “accidental presence” in that zone of the vessels referred to in the Agreement is not considered a “violation” of the adjacent State’s maritime zone. Chile claims that although its ratification of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement came some time after its signature, the boundary whose existence was acknowledged and acted upon was already in place throughout the period leading to its ratification.

89. According to Peru, the aim of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement “was narrow and specific”, establishing a “zone of tolerance” for small and ill-equipped fishing vessels. Defining that zone by reference to a parallel of latitude was a practical approach for the crew of such vessels. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement did not have a larger purpose, such as establishing a comprehensive régime for the exploitation of fisheries or adding to the content of the 200-nautical-mile zones or setting out their limits and borders. Peru also maintains that “the 1954 Agreement was a practical arrangement, of a technical nature, and of limited geographical scope, not one dealing in any sense with political matters”.

90. In the view of the Court, the operative terms and purpose of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement are indeed narrow and specific. That is not however the matter under consideration by the Court at this stage. Rather, its focus is on one central issue, namely, the existence of a maritime boundary. On that issue the terms of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, especially Article 1 read with the preambular paragraphs, are clear. They acknowledge in a binding international agreement that a maritime boundary already exists. The Parties did not see any difference in this context between the expression “límite marítimo” in Article 1 and the expression “frontera marítima” in the Preamble, nor does the Court.

91. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement does not indicate when and by what means that boundary was agreed upon. The Parties’ express acknowledgment of its existence can only reflect a tacit agreement which they had reached earlier. In this connection, the Court has already mentioned that certain elements of the 1947 Proclamations and the 1952 Santiago Declaration suggested an evolving understanding between the Parties concerning their maritime boundary (see paragraphs 43 and 69 above). In an earlier case, the Court, recognizing that “[t]he establishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance”, underlined that “[e]vidence of a tacit legal agreement must be compelling” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 735, para. 253). In this case, the Court has before it an Agreement which makes clear that the maritime boundary along a parallel already existed between the Parties. The 1954 Agreement is decisive in this respect. That Agreement cements the tacit agreement.

92. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement gives no indication of the nature of the maritime boundary. Nor does it indicate its extent, except that its provisions make it clear that the maritime boundary extends beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast.

93. In this context, the Parties referred to an opinion prepared in 1964 by Mr. Raúl Bazán Dávila, Head of the Legal Advisory Office of the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to a request from the Chilean Boundaries Directorate regarding “the delimitation of the frontier between the Chilean and Peruvian territorial seas”. Having recalled the relevant rules of international law, Mr. Bazán examined the question whether some specific agreement on maritime delimitation existed between the two States. He believed that it did, but was not able to determine “when and how this agreement was reached”. Paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration was not “an express pact” on the boundary, but it “assum[ed] that this boundary coincides with the parallel that passes through the point at which the land frontier reaches the sea”. It was possible to presume, he continued, that the agreement on the boundary preceded and conditioned the signing of the 1952 Santiago Declaration.

94. According to Peru, the fact that such a request was addressed to the Head of the Legal Advisory Office illustrates that the Chilean Government was unsure about whether there was a pre-existing boundary. Chile emphasizes Mr. Bazán’s conclusion that the maritime boundary between the Parties is the parallel which passes through the point where the land boundary reaches the sea. Chile also notes that this was a publicly available document and that Peru would have responded if it had disagreed with the conclusion the document stated, but did not do so.

95. Nothing in the opinion prepared by Mr. Bazán, or the fact that such an opinion was requested in the first place, leads the Court to alter the conclusion it reached above (see paragraphs 90 to 91), namely, that by 1954 the Parties acknowledged that there existed an agreed maritime boundary.

4. The 1968-1969 Lighthouse Arrangements

96. In 1968-1969, the Parties entered into arrangements to build one lighthouse each, “at the point at which the common border reaches the sea, near boundary marker number one”. At this point, the Court
observes that on 26 April 1968, following communication between the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chilean chargé d'affaires earlier that year, delegates of both Parties signed a document whereby they undertook the task of carrying out “an on-site study for the installation of leading marks visible from the sea to materialise the parallel of the maritime frontier originating at Boundary Marker number one (No. 1)”. That document concluded as follows:

“Finally, given that the parallel which it is intended to materialise is that which corresponds to the geographical location indicated in the Act signed in Lima on 1 August 1930 for Boundary Marker No. 1, the Representatives suggest that the positions of this pyramid be verified by a Joint Commission before the execution of the recommended works.”

97. Chile sees the Parties, in taking this action, as explicitly recording their understanding that there was a “maritime frontier” between the two States and that it followed the line of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 (referred to in Spanish as “Hito No. 1”). Chile states that the Parties’ delegates “recorded their joint understanding that their task was to signal the existing maritime boundary”. Chile quotes the terms of the approval in August 1968 by the Secretary-General of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the minutes of an earlier meeting that the signalling marks were to materialize (materializar) the parallel of the maritime frontier. Chile further relies on an August 1969 Peruvian Note, according to which the Mixed Commission entrusted with demarcation was to verify the position of Boundary Marker No. 1 and to “fix the definitive location of the two alignment towers that were to signal the maritime boundary”. The Joint Report of the Commission recorded its task in the same terms.

98. In Peru’s view, the beacons erected under these arrangements were evidently a pragmatic device intended to address the practical problems arising from the coastal fishing incidents in the 1960s. It calls attention to the beacons’ limited range — not more than 15 nautical miles offshore. Peru argues that they were plainly not intended to establish a maritime boundary. Throughout the process, according to Peru, there is no indication whatsoever that the two States were engaged in the drawing of a definitive and permanent international boundary, nor did any of the correspondence refer to any pre-existent delimitation agreement. The focus was consistently, and exclusively, upon the practical task of keeping Peruvian and Chilean fishermen apart and solving a very specific problem within the 15-nautical-mile range of the lights.

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99. The Court is of the opinion that the purpose and geographical scope of the arrangements were limited, as indeed the Parties recognize.
The Court also observes that the record of the process leading to the arrangements and the building of the lighthouses does not refer to any pre-existent delimitation agreement. What is important in the Court’s view, however, is that the arrangements proceed on the basis that a maritime boundary extending along the parallel beyond 12 nautical miles already exists. Along with the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, the arrangements acknowledge that fact. Also, like that Agreement, they do not indicate the extent and nature of that maritime boundary. The arrangements seek to give effect to it for a specific purpose.

5. The Nature of the Agreed Maritime Boundary

100. As the Court has just said, it is the case that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement refers to the existing boundary for a particular purpose; that is also true of the 1968-1969 arrangements for the lighthouses. The Court must now determine the nature of the maritime boundary, the existence of which was acknowledged in the 1954 Agreement, that is, whether it is a single maritime boundary applicable to the water column, the sea-bed and its subsoil, or a boundary applicable only to the water column.

101. Chile contends that the boundary is an all-purpose one, applying to the sea-bed and subsoil as well as to the waters above them with rights to their resources in accordance with customary law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Peru submits that the line to which the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement refers is related only to aspects of the policing of coastal fisheries and facilitating safe shipping and fishing in near-shore areas.

102. The Court is concerned at this stage with the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement only to the extent that it acknowledged the existence of a maritime boundary. The tacit agreement, acknowledged in the 1954 Agreement, must be understood in the context of the 1947 Proclamations and the 1952 Santiago Declaration. These instruments expressed claims to the sea-bed and to waters above the sea-bed and their resources. In this regard the Parties drew no distinction, at that time or subsequently, between these spaces. The Court concludes that the boundary is an all-purpose one.

6. The Extent of the Agreed Maritime Boundary

103. The Court now turns to consider the extent of the agreed maritime boundary. It recalls that the purpose of the 1954 Agreement was narrow and specific (see paragraph 90 above): it refers to the existing maritime boundary for a particular purpose, namely to establish a zone of tolerance for fishing activity operated by small vessels. Consequently, it must be considered that the maritime boundary whose existence it rec-
recognizes, along a parallel, necessarily extends at least to the distance up to which, at the time considered, such activity took place. That activity is one element of the Parties’ relevant practice which the Court will consider, but it is not the only element warranting consideration. The Court will examine other relevant practice of the Parties in the early and mid-1950s, as well as the wider context including developments in the law of the sea at that time. It will also assess the practice of the two Parties subsequent to 1954. This analysis could contribute to the determination of the content of the tacit agreement which the Parties reached concerning the extent of their maritime boundary.

A. Fishing potential and activity

104. The Court will begin with the geography and biology in the area of the maritime boundary. Peru described Ilo as its principal port along this part of the coast. It is about 120 km north-west of the land boundary. On the Chilean side, the port city of Arica lies 15 km to the south of the land boundary and Iquique about 200 km further south (see sketch-map No. 1: Geographical context, p. 14).

105. Peru, in submissions not challenged by Chile, emphasizes that the areas lying off the coasts of Peru and Chile are rich in marine resources, pointing out that the area in dispute is located in the Humboldt Current Large Maritime Ecosystem. That current, according to Peru, supports an abundance of marine life, with approximately 18 to 20 per cent of the world’s fish catch coming from this ecosystem. The Peruvian representative at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (paragraph 106 below) referred to the opinion of a Peruvian expert (writing in a book published in 1947), according to which the “biological limit” of the current was to be found at a distance of 80 to 100 nautical miles from the shore in the summer, and 200 to 250 nautical miles in the winter.

Peru recalls that it was the “enormous whaling and fishing potential” of the areas situated off their coasts which led the three States to proclaim 200-nautical-mile zones in 1952. Industrial fishing is carried out nowadays at significant levels in southern areas of Peru, notably from the ports of Ilo and Matarani: the former is “one of Peru’s main fishing ports and the most important fishing centre in southern Peru”.

106. Chilean and Peruvian representatives emphasized the richness and value of the fish stocks as preparations were being made for the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and at that Conference itself. In 1956 the Chilean delegate in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, declaring that it was tragic to see large foreign fishing fleets exhausting resources necessary for the livelihood of coastal populations and expressing the hope that the rules established by the three States, including Ecuador, would be endorsed by
international law, observed that “[t]he distance of 200 miles was explained by the need to protect all the marine flora and fauna living in the Humboldt Current, as all the various species depended on one another for their existence and have constituted a biological unit which had to be preserved”. At the 1958 Conference, the Peruvian representative (who was the foreign minister at the time of the 1947 Declaration), in supporting the 200-nautical-mile limit, stated that what the countries had proclaimed was a biological limit:

“Species such as tunny and barrilete were mostly caught 20 to 80 miles from the coast; the same anchovetas of the coastal waters sometimes went 60 or more miles away; and the cachalot and whales were usually to be found more than 100 miles off.”

He then continued:

“The requests formulated by Peru met the conditions necessary for their recognition as legally binding and applicable since first, they were the expression of principles recognized by law; secondly, they had a scientific basis; and thirdly, they responded to national vital necessities.”

107. Chile referred the Court to statistics produced by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to demonstrate the extent of the fishery activities of Chile and Peru in the early 1950s and later years for the purpose of showing, as Chile saw the matter, the benefits of the 1952 Santiago Declaration to Peru. Those statistics reveal two facts which the Court sees as helpful in identifying the maritime areas with which the Parties were concerned in the period when they acknowledged the existence of their maritime boundary. The first is the relatively limited fishing activity by both Chile and Peru in the early 1950s. In 1950, Chile’s catch at about 90,000 tonnes was slightly larger than Peru’s at 74,000 tonnes. In the early 1950s, the Parties’ catches of anchovy were exceeded by the catch of other species. In 1950, for instance, Peru’s take of anchovy was 500 tonnes, while its catch of tuna and bonito was 44,600 tonnes; Chile caught 600 tonnes of anchovy that year, and 3,300 tonnes of tuna and bonito.

Second, in the years leading up to 1954, the Parties’ respective catches in the Pacific Ocean included large amounts of bonito/barrilete and tuna. While it is true that through the 1950s the take of anchovy, especially by Peru, increased very rapidly, the catch of the other species continued at a high and increasing level. In 1954 the Peruvian catch of tuna and bonito was 65,900 tonnes and of anchovy 43,100 tonnes while Chile caught 5,200 and 1,300 tonnes of those species, respectively.
The Parties also referred to the hunting of whales by their fleets and by foreign fleets as one of the factors leading to the adoption of the 1947 and 1952 instruments. The FAO statistics provide some information about the extent of whale catches by the Parties; there is no indication of where those catches occurred.

108. The above information shows that the species which were being taken in the early 1950s were generally to be found within a range of 60 nautical miles from the coast. In that context, the Court takes note of the orientation of the coast in this region, and the location of the most important relevant ports of the Parties at the time. Ilo, situated about 120 km north-west of the seaward terminus of the land boundary, is described by Peru as “one of [its] main fishing ports and the most important fishing centre in Southern Peru”. On the Chilean side, the port of Arica lies just 15 km to the south of the seaward terminus of the land boundary. According to Chile, “[a] significant proportion of the country’s small and medium-sized fishing vessels, of crucial importance to the economy of the region, are registered at Arica”, while the next significant port is at Iquique, 200 km further south.

The purpose of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was to establish a zone of tolerance along the parallel for small fishing boats, which were not sufficiently equipped (see paragraphs 88 to 90 and 103). Boats departing from Arica to catch the above-mentioned species, in a west-north-west direction, in the range of 60 nautical miles from the coast, which runs essentially from north to south at this point, would not cross the parallel beyond a point approximately 57 nautical miles from the starting-point of the maritime boundary. The orientation of the coast turns sharply to the north-west in this region (see sketch-maps Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 14 and 17), such that, on the Peruvian side, fishing boats departing seaward from Ilo, in a south-west direction, to the range of those same species would cross the parallel of latitude at a point up to approximately 100 nautical miles from the starting-point of the maritime boundary.

109. The Court, in assessing the extent of the lateral maritime boundary which the Parties acknowledged existed in 1954, is aware of the importance that fishing has had for the coastal populations of both Parties. It does not see as of great significance their knowledge of the likely or possible extent of the resources out to 200 nautical miles nor the extent of their fishing in later years. The catch figures indicate that the principal maritime activity in the early 1950s was fishing undertaken by small vessels, such as those specifically mentioned in the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement and which were also to benefit from the 1968-1969 arrangements relating to the lighthouses.
110. A central concern of the three States in the early 1950s was with long-distance foreign fishing, which they wanted to bring to an end. That concern, and the Parties’ growing understanding of the extent of the fish stocks in the Humboldt Current off their coasts, were major factors in the decisions made by Chile and Peru to declare, unilaterally, their 200-nautical-mile zones in 1947, and, with Ecuador, to adopt the 1952 Santiago Declaration and other texts in 1952 and to take the further measures in 1954 and 1955. To repeat, the emphasis in this period, especially in respect of the more distant waters, was, as Chile asserts, on “[t]he exclusion of unauthorized foreign fleets . . . to facilitate the development of the fishing industries of [the three States]”.

111. The Court recalls that the all-purpose nature of the maritime boundary (see paragraph 102 above) means that evidence concerning fisheries activity, in itself, cannot be determinative of the extent of that boundary. Nevertheless, the fisheries activity provides some support for the view that the Parties, at the time when they acknowledged the existence of an agreed maritime boundary between them, were unlikely to have considered that it extended all the way to the 200-nautical-mile limit.

B. Contemporaneous developments in the law of the sea

112. The Court now moves from the specific, regional context to the broader context as it existed in the 1950s, at the time of the acknowledgment by the Parties of the existence of the maritime boundary. That context is provided by the State practice and related studies in, and proposals coming from, the International Law Commission and reactions by States or groups of States to those proposals concerning the establishment of maritime zones beyond the territorial sea and the delimitation of those zones. By the 1950s that practice included several unilateral State declarations.

113. Those declarations, all adopted between 1945 and 1956, may be divided into two categories. The first category is limited to claims in respect of the sea-bed and its subsoil, the continental shelf, and their resources. They include declarations made by the United States (28 September 1945), Mexico (29 October 1945), Argentina (11 October 1946), Saudi Arabia (28 May 1949), Philippines (18 June 1949), Pakistan (9 March 1950), Brazil (8 November 1950), Israel (3 August 1952), Australia (11 September 1953), India (30 August 1955), Portugal (21 March 1956) and those made in respect of several territories then under United Kingdom authority: Jamaica (26 November 1948), Bahamas (26 November 1948), British Honduras (9 October 1950), North Borneo (1953), British Guiana (1954), Brunei (1954) and Sarawak (1954), as well as nine Arab States then under the protection of the United Kingdom (Abu Dhabi (10 June 1949), Ajman (20 June 1949), Bahrain
(5 June 1949), Dubai (14 June 1949), Kuwait (12 June 1949), Qatar (8 June 1949), Ras al Khaimah (17 June 1949), Sharjah (16 June 1949), and Umm al Qaiwain (20 June 1949)). Other declarations, the second category, also claim the waters above the shelf or sea-bed or make claims in respect of the resources of those waters. In addition to the three claims in issue in this case, those claims include those made by the United States of America (28 September 1945), Panama (17 December 1946), Iceland (5 April 1948), Costa Rica (5 November 1949), Honduras (7 March 1950), El Salvador (7 September 1950) and Nicaragua (1 November 1950). The above-mentioned acts are reproduced in the United Nations collection, Laws and Regulations on the High Seas, Vol. I, 1951, Part 1, Chap. 1, and Supplement, 1959, Part 1, Chap. 1, and in the Parties’ Pleadings.

114. Some of the declarations did address the issue of establishing maritime boundaries. The first was the continental shelf declaration of the United States, which provided that, whenever the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles. Those of Mexico and Costa Rica (like that of Chile, see paragraph 37 above) stated that the particular declaration each had made did not mean that that Government sought to disregard the lawful rights of other States, based on reciprocity. The wording in the Argentinean decree accorded conditional recognition to the right of each nation to the same entitlements as it claimed. Proclamations made by the Arab States then under United Kingdom protection all provided in similar terms that their exclusive jurisdiction and control of the sea-bed and subsoil extended to boundaries to be determined more precisely, as occasion arises, on equitable or, in one case, just principles, after consultation with the neighbouring States.

115. Those declarations were part of the background against which the International Law Commission worked in preparing its 1956 draft articles for the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in 1958. On the basis, among other things, of the material summarized above, the report of a committee of experts, and comments by a significant range of States, the Commission proposed that, in the absence of an agreement or special circumstances, an equidistance line be used for delimitation of both the territorial sea and the continental shelf. The Commission in particular rejected, in the absence of an agreement, as a basis for the line the geographical parallel passing through the point at which the land frontier meets the coast. Chile and Ecuador in their observations submitted to the Commission contended that the rights of the coastal State over its continental shelf went beyond just “control” and
“jurisdiction”; Chile, in addition, called for “sovereignty” over both the continental shelf and superjacent waters. However, neither State made any comment on the matter of delimitation. Peru made no comment of any kind. This further supports the view that the chief concern of the three States in this period was defending their 200-nautical-mile claims as against third States. The Commission’s proposals were adopted by the 1958 Conference and incorporated, with drafting amendments, in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Art. 12) and the Convention on the Continental Shelf (Art. 6). The territorial sea was not seen by the International Law Commission, and would not have been seen at that time by most nations, as extending beyond 6 nautical miles and the continental shelf line was for the sea-bed and subsoil, extending to a 200-metre depth or beyond to the limit of exploitability, and not for the resources of the water above the shelf.

116. The Court observes that, during the period under consideration, the proposal in respect of the rights of a State over its waters which came nearest to general international acceptance was for a 6-nautical-mile territorial sea with a further fishing zone of 6 nautical miles and some reservation of established fishing rights. As the Court has noted previously, in this period the concept of an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles was “still some long years away” (“Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 87, para. 70), while its general acceptance in practice and in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was about 30 years into the future. In answering a question from a Member of the Court, both Parties recognized that their claim made in the 1952 Santiago Declaration did not correspond to the international law of that time and was not enforceable against third parties, at least not initially.

117. On the basis of the fishing activities of the Parties at that time, which were conducted up to a distance of some 60 nautical miles from the main ports in the area, the relevant practice of other States and the work of the International Law Commission on the Law of the Sea, the Court considers that the evidence at its disposal does not allow it to conclude that the agreed maritime boundary along the parallel extended beyond 80 nautical miles from its starting-point.

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118. In light of this tentative conclusion, the Court now considers further elements of practice, for the most part subsequent to 1954, which may be of relevance to the issue of the extent of the agreed maritime boundary.
C. Legislative practice

119. In examining the legislative practice, the Court first turns to the adoption by Peru in 1955 of a Supreme Resolution on the Maritime Zone of 200 Miles. Its Preamble recites the need to specify, in cartographic and geodesic work, the manner of determining the Peruvian maritime zone of 200 nautical miles referred to in the 1947 Decree and the 1952 Santiago Declaration. Its first article states that the line was to be limited at sea by a line parallel to the Peruvian coast and at a constant distance of 200 nautical miles from it. Article 2 provides:

“In accordance with clause IV [el inciso IV] of the Declaration of Santiago, the said line may not extend beyond that of the corresponding parallel at the point where the frontier of Peru [la frontera del Perú] reaches the sea.”

Peru contends that Article 1 employs an arc of circles method, as, it says, was also the case with its 1952 Petroleum Law. Chile rejects that interpretation of both instruments and submits that both use the tracé parallèle method, supporting the use of the parallel of latitude for the maritime boundary. Chile also places considerable weight on the reference in the resolution to paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration.

120. In this regard, the Court has already concluded that paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration does not determine the maritime boundary separating the general maritime zones of Peru and Chile. It need not consider that matter further in the present context. The Court does not see the requirement in Article 1 of the 1955 Supreme Resolution that the line be “at a constant distance of 200 nautical miles from [the coast]” and parallel to it as using the tracé parallèle method in the sense that Chile appears to understand it. Some points on a line drawn on that basis (using the parallel lines of latitude) would in certain areas of Peruvian coastal waters, especially near the land boundary of the two States, be barely 100 nautical miles from the closest point on the coast. That would not be in conformity with the plain words of the 1955 Supreme Resolution. Hence, the Peruvian 1955 Supreme Resolution is of no assistance when it comes to determining the extent of the maritime frontier whose existence the Parties acknowledged in 1954.

121. In respect of Chilean legislation, Peru highlights the absence of references to a lateral maritime boundary in five Chilean texts: a 25 July 1953 Decree which defined the maritime jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine; a 26 July 1954 Message from the Chilean Executive to the Congress for the Approval of the 1952 Agreements; a 23 September 1954 Supreme Decree by which Chile approved the 1952 Santiago Declaration; an 11 February 1959
Decree on Permits for Fishing by Foreign Vessels in Chilean Territorial Waters; and a 4 June 1963 Decree on the Appointment of the Authority which Grants Fishing Permits to Foreign Flag Vessels in Chilean Jurisdictional Waters. In response, Chile contends that the 1952 Santiago Declaration became part of Chilean law upon ratification and so there was no need to reaffirm the existence of the maritime boundary in subsequent legislation.

122. The Court finds that these five Chilean instruments are of no assistance as to the extent of the maritime frontier whose existence the Parties acknowledged in 1954, for the following reasons. The 1953 Decree relates to the territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles. The 1954 Message recalls the 200-nautical-mile claim made by the three States in 1952 but makes no mention of boundaries between those States. The 1954 Supreme Decree simply reproduces the text of the instruments adopted at the Lima Conference without commenting on their effect. The 1959 Decree refers repeatedly to “Chilean territorial waters” without defining the limits — lateral or seaward — of these waters. Finally, the 1963 Decree speaks of the 200-nautical-mile zone established under the 1952 Santiago Declaration but makes no reference to a lateral boundary within that zone.

D. The 1955 Protocol of Accession

123. In 1955 the three States adopted a Protocol of Accession to the 1952 Santiago Declaration. In that Protocol they agree “to open the accession of Latin American States to [the 1952 Santiago Declaration] with regard to its fundamental principles” contained in the paragraphs of the Preamble. The three States then reproduce substantive paragraphs I, II, III and V, but not paragraph IV. On the matter of boundaries they declare that

“[T]he adhesion to the principle stating that the coastal States have the right and duty to protect, conserve and use the resources of the sea along their coasts, shall not be constrained by the assertion of the right of every State to determine the extension and boundaries of its Maritime Zone. Therefore, at the moment of accession, every State shall be able to determine the extension and form of delimitation of its respective zone whether opposite to one part or to the entirety of its coastline, according to the peculiar geographic conditions, the extension of each sea and the geological and biological factors that condition the existence, conservation and development of the maritime fauna and flora in its waters.”

The only other provision of the 1952 Santiago Declaration which was the subject of an express exclusion from the 1955 Protocol was paragraph VI which concerns the possibility of future agreements in application of these principles. This provision was excluded on the basis that it was “determined by the geographic and biological similarity of the coastal maritime
zones of the signatory countries” to the Declaration. It is common ground that no State in fact ever took advantage of the 1955 Protocol.

124. Peru sees the affirmation of the power of an acceding State to determine the extension and limits of its zone as confirming that the 1952 Santiago Declaration had not settled the question of the maritime boundaries between the States parties. Chile reads the positions of the two Parties on paragraph IV in the contrary sense: by that exclusion they indicated their understanding that their maritime boundary was already determined.

125. Given the conclusion that the Court has already reached on paragraph IV, its exclusion from the text of the 1955 Protocol, and the fact that no State has taken advantage of the Protocol, the Court does not see the Protocol as having any real significance. It may however be seen as providing some support to Peru’s position that the use of lateral maritime boundaries depended on the particular circumstances of the States wishing to accede to the 1952 Santiago Declaration. More significantly, the 1955 Protocol may also be seen as an attempt to reinforce solidarity for the reasons given by Peru, Chile and Ecuador in their own national legal measures and in the 1952 Santiago Declaration, and as manifested in their other actions in 1955, in response to the protests of maritime powers (see paragraphs 76 to 77 above).

E. Enforcement activities

126. Much of the enforcement practice relevant to the maritime boundary can be divided between that concerning vessels of third States and that involving Peru and Chile, and by reference to time. In respect of the second distinction the Court recalls that its primary, but not exclusive, interest is with practice in the early 1950s when the Parties acknowledged the existence of their maritime boundary.

127. In respect of vessels of third States, Chile draws on a 1972 report of the CPPS Secretary-General on Infractions in the Maritime Zone between 1951 and 1971. The data, the report says, are incomplete for the first ten years. According to the report, in the course of the 20 years it covers, Peru arrested 53 vessels, Chile five and Ecuador 122, the final figure explained by the fact that the interest of foreign fishing fleets had focused, especially in more recent years, on tuna, the catch of which was greater in Ecuadorean waters. All but six of the 53 vessels arrested in Peruvian waters carried the United States flag; five (in the Onassis fleet) carried the Panamanian; and one the Japanese. In the case of 20 of the 53 arrests, the report records or indicates the place at which the arrests took place and all of those places are far to the north of the parallel of latitude extending from the land boundary between Peru and Chile, and
closer to the boundary between Peru and Ecuador. For 36, the distance from the coast is indicated. They include the Onassis fleet which on one account was arrested 126 nautical miles offshore (see paragraph 75 above). Of the other arrests, only one (in 1965) was beyond 60 nautical miles of the coast of Peru and only two others (in 1965 and 1968) were beyond 35 nautical miles; all three of these arrests occurred more than 500 nautical miles to the north of that latitudinal parallel.

128. Until the mid-1980s, all the practice involving incidents between the two Parties was within about 60 nautical miles of the coasts and usually much closer. In 1954 and 1961, Chile proposed that fishing vessels of the Parties be permitted to fish in certain areas of the maritime zone of the other State, up to 50 nautical miles north/south of the parallel, but the exchanges between the Parties do not indicate how far seaward such arrangements would have operated; in any event Chile’s proposals were not accepted by Peru. In December 1962, Peru complained about “the frequency with which Chilean fishing vessels have trespassed into Peruvian waters, at times up to 300 metres from the beach”. In March 1966, the Peruvian patrol ship Diez Canseco was reported to have intercepted two Chilean fishing vessels and fired warning shots at them, but the entire incident took place within 2 nautical miles of the coast. Two incidents in September 1967 — the sighting by Peru of several Chilean trawlers “north of the jurisdictional boundary” and the sighting by Chile of a Peruvian patrol boat “south of the Chile-Peru boundary parallel” — both occurred within 10 nautical miles of Point Concordia. Following a third incident that month, Peru complained about a Chilean fishing net found 2 nautical miles west of Point Concordia. In respect of these incidents, the Court recalls that the zone of tolerance established under the 1954 Agreement starts at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast along the parallel of latitude.

129. The practice just reviewed does not provide any basis for putting into question the tentative conclusion that the Court expressed earlier. That conclusion was based on the fishing activity of the Parties and contemporaneous developments in the law of the sea in the early and mid-1950s.

F. The 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements

130. The Court recalls its discussion of the 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements (see paragraphs 96 to 99 above). The record before the Court indicates that the lights would have been visible from a maximum distance of approximately 15 nautical miles; as Chile acknowledges, the Parties were particularly concerned with visibility within the first 12 naut-
ical miles from the coast, up to the point where the zone of tolerance under the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement commenced, and where many of the incursions were reported. There are indications in the case file that the towers had radar reflectors but there is no information at all of their effective range or their use in practice. The Court does not see these arrangements as having any significance for the issue of the extent of the maritime boundary.

G. Negotiations with Bolivia (1975-1976)

131. In 1975-1976, Chile entered into negotiations with Bolivia regarding a proposed exchange of territory that would provide Bolivia with a “corridor to the sea” and an adjacent maritime zone. The record before the Court comprises the Chilean proposal to Bolivia of December 1975, Peru’s reply of January 1976, Chile’s record (but not Peru’s) of discussions between the Parties in July 1976 and Peru’s counter-proposal of November 1976. Chile’s proposal of December 1975 stated that the cession would include, in addition to a strip of land between Arica and the Chile-Peru land boundary, “the maritime territory between the parallels of the extreme points of the coast that will be ceded (territorial sea, economic zone and continental shelf)”. This proposal was conditional, among other things, on Bolivia ceding to Chile an area of territory as compensation. The record before the Court does not include the Bolivian-Chilean exchanges of December 1975. As required under Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty of Lima, Peru was formally consulted on these negotiations. In January 1976, Peru acknowledged receipt of documents from Chile regarding the proposed cession. Peru’s response was cautious, noting a number of “substantial elements” arising, including the consequences of “the fundamental alteration of the legal status, the territorial distribution, and the socio-economic structure of an entire region”. According to Chile’s record of discussions between the Parties, in July 1976 Chile informed Peru that it would seek assurances from Bolivia that the latter would comply with the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, while Peru confirmed that it had not identified in Chile’s proposal any “major problems with respect to the sea”. On 18 November 1976, Peru made a counter-proposal to Chile which contemplated a different territorial régime: cession by Chile to Bolivia of a sovereign corridor to the north of Arica; an area of shared Chilean-Peruvian-Bolivian sovereignty over territory between that corridor and the sea; and exclusive Bolivian sovereignty over the sea adjacent to the shared territory.

132. According to Chile, its negotiations with Bolivia proceeded on the explicit basis that the existing maritime boundary, following the latitu-
dinal parallel, would delimit the envisaged maritime zone of Bolivia vis-à-vis Peru. Chile submits that Peru was specifically consulted on this matter, and expressed no objection or reservation, but rather “acknowledged the existence and course of the Chile-Peru maritime boundary” at one of the sessions between the Parties in 1976. For its part, Peru stresses that neither its Note of January 1976 nor its alternative proposal of November 1976 mentioned a parallel of latitude or suggested any method of maritime delimitation for Bolivia’s prospective maritime zone. Peru further contends that Chile’s records of the 1976 discussions are unreliable and incomplete, and that its own position at the time was clearly that the territorial divisions in the area were still to be negotiated.

133. The Court does not find these negotiations significant for the issue of the extent of the maritime boundary between the Parties. While Chile’s proposal referred to the territorial sea, economic zone and continental shelf, Peru did not accept this proposal. Peru’s January 1976 acknowledgment did not mention any existing maritime boundary between the Parties, while its counter-proposal from November of that year did not indicate the extent or nature of the maritime area proposed to be accorded to Bolivia.

H. Positions of the Parties at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

134. The Parties also directed the Court to certain statements made by their representatives during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. First, both referred to a joint declaration on 28 April 1982 made by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, together with Colombia, which had joined the CPPS in 1979, wherein those States pointed out that:

“the universal recognition of the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the coastal State within the 200-mile limit provided for in the draft Convention is a fundamental achievement of the countries members of the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific, in accordance with its basic objectives stated in the Santiago Declaration of 1952”.

The Court notes that this statement did not mention delimitation, nor refer to any existing maritime boundaries between those States.

135. A second matter raised by the Parties is Peru’s involvement in the negotiations relating to maritime delimitation of States with adjacent or opposite coasts. The Peruvian position on that matter was expressed at various points during the negotiations; on 27 August 1980, the Head of the Peruvian Delegation stated it as follows:

“Where a specific agreement on the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts did not exist or where there were no special circumstances or historic rights recognized by the Parties, the
median line should as a general rule be used . . . since it was the most likely method of achieving an equitable solution.”

Peru contends that its “active participation” in the negotiations on this matter illustrates that it had yet to resolve its own delimitation issues. Given the conclusions reached above, however, the Court need not consider that matter. The statements by Peruvian representatives at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea relate to prospective maritime boundary agreements between States (and provisional arrangements to be made pending such agreements); they do not shed light on the extent of the existing maritime boundary between Peru and Chile.

I. The 1986 Bákula Memorandum

136. It is convenient to consider at this point a memorandum sent by Peruvian Ambassador Bákula to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 May 1986, following his audience with the Chilean Foreign Minister earlier that day (“the Bákula Memorandum”). Peru contends that in that Memorandum it “invites Chile to agree an international maritime boundary”. Chile, to the contrary, submits that the Bákula Memorandum was an attempt to renegotiate the existing maritime boundary.

137. According to the Memorandum, Ambassador Bákula had handed the Chilean Minister a personal message from his Peruvian counterpart. The strengthening of the ties of friendship between the two countries “must be complemented by the timely and direct solution of problems which are the result of new circumstances, with a view to enhancing the climate of reciprocal confidence which underlies every constructive policy.

One of the cases that merits immediate attention is the formal and definitive delimitation of the marine spaces, which complement the geographical vicinity of Peru and Chile and have served as scenario of a long and fruitful joint action.”

At that time, the Memorandum continued, the special zone established by the 1954 Agreement “is not adequate to satisfy the requirements of safety nor for the better attention to the administration of marine resources, with the aggravating circumstance that an extensive interpretation could generate a notorious situation of inequity and risk, to the detriment of the legitimate interests of Peru, that would come forth as seriously damaged”.

It referred to the various zones recognized in UNCLOS and said this:

“The current ‘200-mile maritime zone’ — as defined at the Meeting of the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific in 1954 — is,
without doubt, a space which is different from any of the abovementioned ones in respect of which domestic legislation is practically non-existent as regards international delimitation. The one exception might be, in the case of Peru, the Petroleum Law (No. 11780 of 12 March 1952), which established as an external limit for the exercise of the competences of the State over the continental shelf ‘an imaginary line drawn seaward at a constant distance of 200 miles’. This law is in force and it should be noted that it was issued five months prior to the Declaration of Santiago.

There is no need to underline the convenience of preventing the difficulties which would arise in the absence of an express and appropriate maritime demarcation, or as the result of some deficiency therein which could affect the amicable conduct of relations between Chile and Peru.”

138. On 13 June 1986, in an official communiqué, the Chilean Foreign Ministry said that:

“ Ambassador Bákula expressed the interest of the Peruvian Government to start future conversations between the two countries on their points of view regarding maritime delimitation.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking into consideration the good relations existing between both countries, took note of the above stating that studies on this matter shall be carried out in due time.”

139. Peru contends that the Bákula Memorandum is perfectly clear. In it Peru spelled out the need for “the formal and definitive delimitation” of their maritime spaces, distinguishing it from the ad hoc arrangements for specific purposes, such as the 1954 fisheries policing tolerance zone. It called for negotiations, not “renegotiations”. And, Peru continues, Chile did not respond by saying that there was no need for such a delimitation because there was already such a boundary in existence. Rather “studies...are to be carried out”. Peru, based on the Memorandum and this response, also contends that the practice after that date which Chile invokes cannot be significant.

140. Chile, in addition to submitting that the Bákula Memorandum called for a renegotiation of an existing boundary, said that it did that on the (wrong) assumption that the maritime zones newly recognized in UNCLOS called for the existing delimitation to be revisited. As well, Peru did not renew its request to negotiate. Chile submits that the fact that Peru was seeking a renegotiation was reflected in contemporaneous comments by the Peruvian Foreign Minister, reported in the Chilean and Peruvian press.

* * *

141. The Court does not read the Bákula Memorandum as a request for a renegotiation of an existing maritime boundary. Rather, it calls for
“the formal and definitive delimitation of the marine spaces”. While Peru does recognize the existence of the special zone, in its view that zone did not satisfy the requirements of safety nor did it allow an appropriate administration of marine resources; further, an extensive interpretation of the Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement would negatively affect Peru’s legitimate interests. In the Court’s view, the terms used in that Memorandum do acknowledge that there is a maritime boundary, without giving precise information about its extent. The Court does not see the newspaper accounts as helpful. They do not purport to report the speech of the Peruvian Minister in full.

142. There is force in the Chilean contention about Peru’s failure to follow up on the issues raised in the Bákula Memorandum in a timely manner: according to the record before the Court, Peru did not take the matter up with Chile at the diplomatic level again until 20 October 2000, before repeating its position in a Note to the United Nations Secretary-General in January 2001 and to Chile again in July 2004. However, the Court considers that the visit by Ambassador Bákula and his Memorandum do reduce in a major way the significance of the practice of the Parties after that date. The Court recalls as well that its primary concern is with the practice of an earlier time, that of the 1950s, as indicating the extent of the maritime boundary at the time the Parties acknowledged that it existed.

J. Practice after 1986

143. The Court has already considered the Parties’ legislative practice from the 1950s and 1960s (see paragraphs 119 to 122 above). Chile also relies on two pieces of legislation from 1987: a Peruvian Supreme Decree adopted on 11 June 1987 and a Chilean Supreme Decree adopted on 26 October of that year. Chile sees these instruments as evidence that, in defining the areas of sovereign control by their navies, the Parties respected the maritime boundary.

144. The Court notes that these Decrees define the limits of the Parties’ internal maritime districts. However, as Peru points out in respect of its own Decree, while these instruments define the northern and southern limits of districts with some specificity (by reference to parallels of latitude), that is not the case for those limits abutting international boundaries between Ecuador and Peru, Peru and Chile, or Chile and Argentina. These Decrees define the internal limits of the jurisdiction of certain domestic authorities within Chile and within Peru; they do not purport to define the international limits of either State. In view also of the temporal considerations mentioned above, the Court does not see these Decrees as significant.

145. Peru in addition referred the Court to a Chilean Decree of 1998 defining benthonic areas of the Chilean coast; the northern limit ran to
the south-west. But, as Chile says, the Decree was concerned only with the harvesting of living resources on and under the sea-bed within its “territorial seas”. The Court does not see this Decree as significant for present purposes.

146. The Court returns to evidence of enforcement measures between the Parties. The next capture recorded in the case file after May 1986 is from 1989: the Peruvian interception and capture of two Chilean fishing vessels within Peruvian waters, 9.5 nautical miles from land and 1.5 nautical miles north of the parallel.

147. Chile also provided information, plotted on a chart, of Peruvian vessels captured in 1984 and from 1994 in the waters which, in Chile's view, are on its side of the maritime boundary. The information relating to 1984 records 14 vessels but all were captured within 20 nautical miles of the coast; in 1994 and 1995, 15, all within 40 nautical miles; and it is only starting in 1996 that arrests frequently occurred beyond 60 nautical miles. Those incidents all occurred long after the 1950s and even after 1986. The Court notes, however, that Chile’s arrests of Peruvian vessels south of the parallel, whether they took place within the special zone or further south, provide some support to Chile’s position, although only to the extent that such arrests were met without protest by Peru. This is the case even with respect to arrests taking place after 1986.

148. Given its date, the Court does not consider as significant a sketch-map said to be part of the Chilean Navy's Rules of Engagement in the early 1990s and which depicts a Special Maritime Frontier Zone stretching out to the 200-nautical-mile limit, or information provided by Chile in respect of reports to the Peruvian authorities by foreign commercial vessels between 2005 and 2010 and to the Chilean authorities by Peruvian fishing vessels across the parallel.

K. The extent of the agreed maritime boundary: conclusion

149. The tentative conclusion that the Court reached above was that the evidence at its disposal does not allow it to conclude that the maritime boundary, the existence of which the Parties acknowledged at that time, extended beyond 80 nautical miles along the parallel from its starting-point. The later practice which it has reviewed does not lead the Court to change that position. The Court has also had regard to the consideration that the acknowledgment, without more, in 1954 that a “maritime boundary” exists is too weak a basis for holding that it extended far beyond the Parties' extractive and enforcement capacity at that time.
150. Broader considerations relating to the positions of the three States parties to the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, particularly the two Parties in this case, in the early 1950s demonstrates that the primary concern of the States parties regarding the more distant waters, demonstrated in 1947, in 1952, in 1954 (in their enforcement activities at sea as well as in their own negotiations), in 1955 and throughout the United Nations process which led to the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, was with presenting a position of solidarity, in particular, in respect of the major third countries involved in long distance fisheries. The States parties were concerned, as they greatly increased their fishing capacity, that the stock was not depleted by those foreign fleets.

The seizure of the Onassis whaling fleet, undertaken by Peru in defence of the claims made by the three signatories to the 1952 Santiago Declaration (see paragraph 75 above), was indicative of these concerns. This action occurred 126 nautical miles off of the Peruvian coast. Prior to its seizure, the fleet unsuccessfully sought permission from Peru that it be allowed to hunt between 15 and 100 nautical miles from the Peruvian coast.

151. The material before the Court concerning the Parties' focus on solidarity in respect of long distance fisheries does not provide it with precise information as to the exact extent of the maritime boundary which existed between the Parties. This issue could be expected to have been resolved by the Parties in the context of their tacit agreement and reflected in the treaty which acknowledges that tacit agreement, namely the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement. This did not happen. This left some uncertainty as to the precise length of the agreed maritime boundary. However, based on an assessment of the entirety of the relevant evidence presented to it, the Court concludes that the agreed maritime boundary between the Parties extended to a distance of 80 nautical miles along the parallel from its starting-point.

V. THE STARTING-POINT OF THE AGREED MARITIME BOUNDARY

152. Having concluded that there exists a maritime boundary between the Parties, the Court must now identify the location of the starting-point of that boundary.

153. Both Parties agree that the land boundary between them was settled and delimited more than 80 years ago in accordance with Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima (see paragraph 18) which specifies that “the frontier between the territories of Chile and Peru . . . shall start from a point on the coast to be named ‘Concordia’, ten kilometres to the north of the bridge over the river Lluta”. Article 3 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima stipulates that the frontier is subject to demarcation by a Mixed Commission consisting of one member appointed by each Party.
154. According to Peru, the delegates of the Parties to the Mixed Commission could not agree on the exact location of Point Concordia. Peru recalls that this was resolved through instructions issued by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each State to their delegates in April 1930 (hereinafter the “Joint Instructions”), specifying to the delegates that Point Concordia was to be the point of intersection between the Pacific Ocean and an arc with a radius of 10 km having its centre on the bridge over the River Lluta, with the land frontier thus approaching the sea as an arc tending southward. Peru notes that the Joint Instructions also provided that “[a] boundary marker shall be placed at any point of the arc, as close to the sea as allows preventing it from being destroyed by the ocean waters”.

155. Peru recalls that the Final Act of the Commission of Limits Containing the Description of Placed Boundary Markers dated 21 July 1930 (hereinafter the “Final Act”), agreed by the Parties, records that “[t]he demarcated boundary line starts from the Pacific Ocean at a point on the seashore ten kilometres north-west from the first bridge over the River Lluta of the Arica-La Paz railway” (emphasis added). Peru argues that the Final Act then indicates that the first marker along the physical demarcation of the land boundary is Boundary Marker No. 1 (Hito No. 1), located some distance from the low-water line so as to prevent its destruction by ocean waters at 18° 21’ 03” S, 70° 22’ 56” W. Peru thus considers that the Final Act distinguishes between a “point” as an abstract concept representing the geographical location of the starting-point of the land boundary (i.e., Point Concordia) and “markers” which are actual physical structures along the land boundary. In Peru’s view, as the Final Act refers to both the point derived from Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and Boundary Marker No. 1, these two locations must be distinct. Thus, relying on both the Joint Instructions and the Final Act, Peru maintains that Boundary Marker No. 1 was not intended to mark the start of the agreed land boundary but was simply intended to mark, in a practical way, a point on the arc constituting such boundary. Peru moreover refers to contemporaneous sketch-maps which are said to clearly demonstrate that the land boundary does not start at Boundary Marker No. 1. Peru further contends that the reference in the Final Act to Boundary Marker No. 1 as being located on the “seashore” is a mere general description, with this being consistent with the general manner in which other boundary markers are described in the same document. Finally, Peru clarifies that the Final Act agrees to give Boundary Marker No. 9, located near the railway line, the name of “Concordia” for symbolic reasons, an explanation with which Chile agrees.

156. In Chile’s view, the outcome of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and 1930 demarcation process was that the Parties agreed that Boundary Marker No. 1 was placed on the seashore with astronomical co-ordinates 18° 21’ 03” S, 70° 22’ 56” W and that the land boundary started from this Marker. Chile characterizes the Joint Instructions as indicating that there would be a starting-point on the coast of the land boundary, instructing
the delegates to ensure the placement of a marker to indicate such starting-point. Chile relies on an Act of Plenipotentiaries dated 5 August 1930 signed by the Ambassador of Chile to Peru and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, claiming that it records the “definitive location and characteristics” of each boundary marker and acknowledges that the boundary markers, beginning in order from the Pacific Ocean, demarcate the Peruvian-Chilean land boundary.

157. Peru considers that Chile’s claim that Boundary Marker No. 1 is the starting-point of the land boundary faces two insurmountable problems. For Peru, the first such problem is that it means that an area of the land boundary of approximately 200 metres in length has not been delimited, which is not the intention of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Final Act. The second problem, according to Peru, is that a maritime boundary cannot start on dry land some 200 metres inland from the coast, referring to what it claims to be a “cardinal principle” of maritime entitlement that the “land dominates the sea”. Alternatively, Peru notes that Chile’s interpretation requires that the maritime boundary starts where the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 reaches the sea, with this being inconsistent with the 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Joint Instructions which clearly refer to the land boundary as following an arc southward from Boundary Marker No. 1. Peru argues that, at least until the 1990s, Chile’s own cartographic and other practice clearly acknowledges the starting-point of the land boundary as being Point Concordia, a point recognized as distinct from Boundary Marker No. 1.

158. Chile argues that the lighthouse arrangements of 1968-1969 are also relevant in that they involved a joint verification of the exact physical location of Boundary Marker No. 1. According to Chile, the 1952 Santiago Declaration did not identify the parallel running through the point where the land frontier reaches the sea. The observance and identification of such parallel by mariners gave rise to practical difficulties between the Parties, as a result of which they agreed to signal such parallel with two lighthouses aligned through Boundary Marker No. 1. Chile refers to a document dated 26 April 1968, signed by both Parties, which it claims represents an agreement that it is the parallel of the maritime frontier which would be marked by the lighthouses. Thus, Chile claims that “[t]he 1968-1969 arrangements and the signalling process as a whole confirmed Hito No. 1 as the reference point for the parallel of latitude constituting the maritime boundary between the Parties”, further contending that the Parties have also used the parallel passing through this point as the maritime boundary for the capture and prosecution of foreign vessels. Chile further argues that there is corresponding Peruvian practice between 1982 and 2001 treating the parallel running through Boundary Marker No. 1 as the southernmost point of Peruvian territory.
159. Peru recalls that when it proposed to Chile, in 1968, to conclude the lighthouse arrangements, it suggested that it could be “convenient, for both countries, to proceed to build posts or signs of considerable dimensions and visible at a great distance, at the point at which the common border reaches the sea, near boundary marker number one”, with Peru submitting that the language of “near Boundary Marker No. 1” clearly indicates that this point was distinct from the seaward terminus of the land boundary at Point Concordia. Peru then continues to explain that the placement of the Peruvian lighthouse at Boundary Marker No. 1 was motivated by practical purposes, arguing that as the purpose of the arrangement was to provide general orientation to artisanal fishermen operating near the coast, not to delimit a maritime boundary, aligning the lights along Boundary Marker No. 1 proved sufficient.

160. The Peruvian Maritime Domain Baselines Law, Law No. 28621 dated 3 November 2005, identifies the co-ordinates of Point Concordia as 18° 21´ 00˝ S, 70° 22´ 39˝ W, as measured on the WGS 84 datum. The law sets out 266 geographical co-ordinates used to measure Peru’s baselines, culminating in so-called “Point 266”, which Peru claims coincides with Point Concordia.

161. Peru contends that Chile has sought, in recent years, to unsettle what it claims to be the Parties’ previous agreement that the starting-point of the land boundary is Point Concordia, referring in this regard to an incident in early 2001 in which Chile is alleged to have placed a surveillance booth between Boundary Marker No. 1 and the seashore, an action which elicited an immediate protest from Peru, with this booth being subsequently removed. Chile claims that its decision to remove this booth was motivated by the proposals of the armies of both Parties that no surveillance patrols occur within 100 metres of the international land boundary, with Chile claiming that it duly reserved its position regarding the course of the land boundary. Peru refers also in this regard to Chilean attempts to pass internal legislation in 2006-2007 referring to the starting-point of the land boundary as the intersection with the seashore of the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1, rather than Point Concordia. Chile considers that its failure to pass the relevant legislation in its originally proposed form was not connected to the substance of the aforementioned reference.

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162. The Court notes that on 20 October 2000, Peru communicated to Chile that the Parties disagreed concerning the status of the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 as a maritime boundary. On 9 January 2001, Peru informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it did not agree with Chile’s understanding that a parallel constituted the maritime boundary between them at 18° 21´ 00˝ S. On 19 July 2004,
Peru described the situation as being one in which exchanges between the Parties had revealed “totally dissenting and opposed juridical positions about the maritime delimitation which, in accordance with international law, evidence a juridical dispute”. In such circumstances, the Court will not consider the arguments of the Parties concerning an incident involving a surveillance booth in 2001, the Peruvian Maritime Domain Baselines Law dated 3 November 2005 or the Chilean legislative initiatives in 2006-2007, as such events occurred after it had become evident that a dispute concerning this issue had arisen and thus these actions could be perceived as motivated by the Parties’ positions in relation thereto.

163. The Court observes that a considerable number of the arguments presented by the Parties concern an issue which is clearly not before it, namely, the location of the starting-point of the land boundary identified as “Concordia” in Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima. The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the Parties have agreed to any starting-point of their maritime boundary. The jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the issue of the maritime boundary is not contested.

164. The Court notes that during the early preparations for the lighthouse arrangements in April 1968 (discussed at paragraph 96 above) delegates of both Parties understood that they were preparing for the materialization of the parallel running through Boundary Marker No. 1, which the delegates understood to be the maritime frontier, and that the delegates communicated such understanding to their respective Governments.

165. The Governments of both Parties then confirmed this understanding. The Note of 5 August 1968 from the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the chargé d’affaires of Chile states:

“I am pleased to inform Your Honour that the Government of Peru approves in their entirety the terms of the document signed on the Peruvian-Chilean border on 26 April 1968 by the representatives of both countries in relation to the installation of leading marks to materialise the parallel of the maritime frontier.

As soon as Your Honour informs me that the Government of Chile is in agreement, we will be pleased to enter into the necessary discussions in order to determine the date on which the Joint Commission may meet in order to verify the position of Boundary Marker No. 1 and indicate the definitive location of the towers or leading marks . . . .”

The Court notes Peru’s approval of the entirety of the document dated 26 April 1968.

166. The Chilean response of 29 August 1968 from the Embassy of Chile to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru is in the following terms:
“The Embassy of Chile presents its compliments to the Honourable Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to the Meeting of the Joint Chilean-Peruvian Commission held on 25 and 26 April 1968 in relation to the study of the installation of the leading marks visible from the sea to materialise the parallel of the maritime frontier originating at Boundary Marker No. 1.

On this point, the Embassy of Chile is pleased to accept on behalf of the Government of Chile the proposals which the technical representatives of both countries included in the Act which they signed on 28 [sic] April 1968 with a view to taking the measures for the above-mentioned signalling in order to act as a warning to fishing vessels that normally navigate in the maritime frontier zone.

Given that the parallel which it is intended to materialise is the one which corresponds to the geographical situation indicated by Boundary Marker No. 1 as referred to in the Act signed in Lima on 1 August 1930, the Chilean Government agrees that an *ad hoc* Joint Commission should be constituted as soon as possible for the purpose of verifying the position of this pyramid and that, in addition, the said Commission should determine the position of the sites where the leading marks are to be installed.”

167. The Act of the Chile-Peru Mixed Commission in Charge of Verifying the Location of Boundary Marker No. 1 and Signalling the Maritime Boundary of 22 August 1969 (hereinafter the “1969 Act”), signed by the delegates of both Parties, introduces its task using the following language:

> “The undersigned Representatives of Chile and of Peru, appointed by their respective Governments for the purposes of verifying the original geographical position of the concrete-made Boundary Marker number one (No. 1) of the common frontier and for determining the points of location of the Alignment Marks that both countries have agreed to install *in order to signal the maritime boundary and physically to give effect to the parallel that passes through the aforementioned Boundary Marker number one . . . .*” (Emphasis added.)

168. The 1969 Act recommends the rebuilding of the damaged Boundary Marker No. 1 on its original location, which remained visible. The 1969 Act also includes a section entitled Joint Report signed by the Heads of each Party’s Delegation, describing their task as follows:

> “The undersigned Heads of Delegations of Chile and of Peru submit to their respective Governments the present Report on the state of repair of the boundary markers in the section of the Chile-Peru frontier which they have had the opportunity to inspect on the occasion of the works which they have been instructed to conduct in order to verify the location of Boundary Marker number one and to signal the maritime boundary.”
169. The Court observes that both Parties thus clearly refer to their understanding that the task which they are jointly undertaking involves the materialization of the parallel of the existing maritime frontier, with such parallel understood to run through Boundary Marker No. 1.

170. In order to determine the starting-point of the maritime boundary, the Court has considered certain cartographic evidence presented by the Parties. The Court observes that Peru presents a number of official maps of Arica, dated 1965 and 1966, and of Chile, dated 1955, 1961 and 1963, published by the Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile, as well as an excerpt from Chilean Nautical Chart 101 of 1989. However, these materials largely focus on the location of the point “Concordia” on the coast and do not purport to depict any maritime boundary.

171. The Court similarly notes that a number of instances of Peruvian practice subsequent to 1968 relied upon by Chile are not relevant as they address the issue of the location of the Peru-Chile land boundary.

172. The only Chilean map referred to by Peru which appears to depict the maritime boundary along a parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 is an excerpt from Chilean Nautical Chart 1111 of 1998. This map, however, confirms the agreement between the Parties of 1968-1969. The Court considers that it is unable to draw any inference from the 30-year delay in such cartographic depiction by Chile.

173. The evidence presented in relation to fishing and other maritime practice in the region does not contain sufficient detail to be useful in the present circumstances where the starting-points of the maritime boundary claimed by each of the Parties are separated by a mere eight seconds of latitude, nor is this evidence legally significant.

174. The Court considers that the maritime boundary which the Parties intended to signal with the lighthouse arrangements was constituted by the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1. Both Parties subsequently implemented the recommendations of the 1969 Act by building the lighthouses as agreed, thus signalling the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1. The 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements therefore serve as compelling evidence that the agreed maritime boundary follows the parallel that passes through Boundary Marker No. 1.

175. The Court is not called upon to take a position as to the location of Point Concordia, where the land frontier between the Parties starts. It notes that it could be possible for the aforementioned point not to coincide with the starting-point of the maritime boundary, as it was just defined. The Court observes, however, that such a situation would be the consequence of the agreements reached between the Parties.

176. The Court thus concludes that the starting-point of the maritime boundary between the Parties is the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line.
VI. THE COURSE OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY FROM POINT A

177. Having concluded that an agreed single maritime boundary exists between the Parties, and that that boundary starts at the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line, and continues for 80 nautical miles along that parallel, the Court will now determine the course of the maritime boundary from that point on.

178. While Chile has signed and ratified UNCLOS, Peru is not a party to this instrument. Both Parties claim 200-nautical-mile maritime entitlements. Neither Party claims an extended continental shelf in the area with which this case is concerned. Chile’s claim consists of a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extending to 200 nautical miles from the coast. Peru claims a 200-nautical-mile “maritime domain”. Peru’s Agent formally declared on behalf of his Government that “[t]he term ‘maritime domain’ used in [Peru’s] Constitution is applied in a manner consistent with the maritime zones set out in the 1982 Convention”. The Court takes note of this declaration which expresses a formal undertaking by Peru.

179. The Court proceeds on the basis of the provisions of Articles 74, paragraph 1, and 83, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS which, as the Court has recognized, reflect customary international law (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91, para. 167; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 674, para. 139). The texts of these provisions are identical, the only difference being that Article 74 refers to the exclusive economic zone and Article 83 to the continental shelf. They read as follows:

“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf] between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”

180. The methodology which the Court usually employs in seeking an equitable solution involves three stages. In the first, it constructs a provisional equidistance line unless there are compelling reasons preventing that. At the second stage, it considers whether there are relevant circumstances which may call for an adjustment of that line to achieve an equitable result. At the third stage, the Court conducts a disproportionality test in which it assesses whether the effect of the line, as adjusted, is such that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant area are markedly disproportionate to the lengths of their relevant coasts (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 101-103, paras. 115-122; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 695-696, paras. 190-193).

181. In the present case, Peru proposed that the three-step approach be followed in the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two
States. Peru makes the three following points. First, the relevant coasts and the relevant area within which the delimitation is to be effected are circumscribed by the coasts of each Party lying within 200 nautical miles of the starting-point of their land boundary. The construction of a provisional equidistance line within that area is a straightforward exercise. Secondly, there are no special circumstances calling for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line and it therefore represents an equitable maritime delimitation: the resulting line effects an equal division of the Parties’ overlapping maritime entitlements and does not result in any undue encroachment on the projections of their respective coasts or any cut-off effect. Thirdly, the application of the element of proportionality as an *ex post facto* test confirms the equitable nature of the equidistance line.

182. Chile advanced no arguments on this matter. Its position throughout the proceedings was that the Parties had already delimited the whole maritime area in dispute, by agreement, in 1952, and that, accordingly, no maritime delimitation should be performed by the Court.

183. In the present case, the delimitation of the maritime area must begin at the endpoint of the agreed maritime boundary which the Court has determined is 80 nautical miles long (Point A). In practice, a number of delimitations begin not at the low-water line but at a point further seaward, as a result of a pre-existing agreement between the parties (*Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America)*, Judgment, *I.C.J. Reports* 1984, pp. 332-333, para. 212; *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)*, Judgment, *I.C.J. Reports* 2002, pp. 431-432, paras. 268-269; *Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine)*, Judgment, *I.C.J. Reports* 2009, p. 130, para. 218). The situation the Court faces is, however, unusual in that the starting-point for the delimitation in this case is much further from the coast: 80 nautical miles from the closest point on the Chilean coast and about 45 nautical miles from the closest point on the Peruvian coast.

184. The usual methodology applied by the Court has the aim of achieving an equitable solution. In terms of that methodology, the Court now proceeds to the construction of a provisional equidistance line which starts at the endpoint of the existing maritime boundary (Point A).

185. In order to construct such a line, the Court first selects appropriate base points. In view of the location of Point A at a distance of 80 nautical miles from the coast along the parallel, the nearest initial base point on the Chilean coast will be situated near the starting-point of the maritime boundary between Chile and Peru, and on the Peruvian coast at a point where the arc of a circle with an 80-nautical-mile radius from Point A intersects with the Peruvian coast. For the purpose of constructing a provisional equidistance line, only those points on the Peruvian coast which are more than 80 nautical miles from Point A can be matched with points at an equivalent distance on the Chilean coast. The arc of a circle indicated
on sketch-map No. 3 is used to identify the first Peruvian base point. Further base points for the construction of the provisional equidistance line have been selected as the most seaward coastal points “situated nearest to the area to be delimited” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 117). These base points are situated to the north-west of the initial base point on the Peruvian coast and south of the initial base point on the Chilean coast. No points on the Peruvian coast which lie to the south-east of that initial point on that coast can be matched with points on the Chilean coast, as they are all situated less than 80 nautical miles from Point A (see sketch-map No. 3: Construction of the provisional equidistance line, p. 68).

186. The provisional equidistance line thus constructed runs in a general south-west direction, almost in a straight line, reflecting the smooth character of the two coasts, until it reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines (Point B). Seaward of this point the 200-nautical-mile projections of the Parties’ coasts no longer overlap.

187. Before continuing the application of the usual methodology, the Court recalls that, in its second submission, Peru requested the Court to adjudge and declare that, beyond the point where the common maritime boundary ends, Peru is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over a maritime area lying out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from its baselines (see paragraphs 14 to 15 above). This claim is in relation to the area in a darker shade of blue in sketch-map No. 2 (see paragraph 22 above).

188. Peru contends that, in the maritime area beyond 200 nautical miles from the Chilean coast but within 200 nautical miles of its own coast, it has the rights which are accorded to a coastal State by general international law and that Chile has no such rights.

Chile in response contends that the 1952 Santiago Declaration establishes a single lateral limit for all maritime areas of its States parties whether actual or prospective, invoking the reference in paragraph II of the Declaration to “a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles”.

189. Since the Court has already concluded that the agreed boundary line along the parallel of latitude ends at 80 nautical miles from the coast, the foundation for the Chilean argument does not exist. Moreover, since the Court has decided that it will proceed with the delimitation of the overlapping maritime entitlements of the Parties by drawing an equidistance line, Peru’s second submission has become moot and the Court need not rule on it.

190. After Point B (see paragraph 186 above), the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties’ maritime entitlements delimited on the basis of equidistance no longer overlap. The Court observes that, from Point B, the 200-nautical-mile limit of Chile’s maritime entitlement runs in a generally southward direction. The final segment of the maritime boundary therefore proceeds from Point B to Point C, where the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties’ maritime entitlements intersect.
Agreed maritime boundary

80 nautical miles from Point A
Arc of a circle with a radius of 200 nautical miles from Chile’s coast

Construction of the provisional equidistance line

This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes only.

Sketch-map No. 3: Mercator Projection (18° 20' S) WGS 84

200 nautical miles from Peru’s coast

200 nautical miles from Chile’s coast

Accord exists with radius of 200 nautical miles from A.
Accord exists with radius of 200 nautical miles from B.

PACIFIC OCEAN

PERU

BOLIVIA

CHILE

Ilo

Tacna

Arica

PACIFIC
191. The Court must now determine whether there are any relevant circumstances calling for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line, with the purpose, it must always be recalled, of achieving an equitable result. In this case, the equidistance line avoids any excessive amputation of either State’s maritime projections. No relevant circumstances appear in the record before the Court. There is accordingly no basis for adjusting the provisional equidistance line.

192. The next step is to determine whether the provisional equidistance line drawn from Point A produces a result which is significantly disproportionate in terms of the lengths of the relevant coasts and the division of the relevant area. The purpose is to assess the equitable nature of the result.

193. As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 183 above), the existence of an agreed line running for 80 nautical miles along the parallel of latitude presents it with an unusual situation. The existence of that line would make difficult, if not impossible, the calculation of the length of the relevant coasts and of the extent of the relevant area, were the usual mathematical calculation of the proportions to be undertaken. The Court recalls that in some instances in the past, because of the practical difficulties arising from the particular circumstances of the case, it has not undertaken that calculation. Having made that point in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 53, para. 74), it continued in these terms:

“if the Court turns its attention to the extent of the areas of shelf lying on each side of the line, it is possible for it to make a broad assessment of the equitableness of the result, without seeking to define the equities in arithmetical terms” (ibid., p. 55, para. 75).

More recently, the Court observed that, in this final phase of the delimitation process, the calculation does not purport to be precise and is approximate; “[t]he object of delimitation is to achieve a delimitation that is equitable, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 100, para. 111; see similarly Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp. 66-67, para. 64, and p. 68, para. 67, referring to difficulties, as in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) case, in defining with sufficient precision which coasts and which areas were to be treated as relevant; and Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 433-448, paras. 272-307, where although the Court referred to the relevant coastlines and the relevant area, it made no precise calculation of them). In such cases, the Court engages in a broad assessment of disproportionality.

194. Given the unusual circumstances of this case, the Court follows the same approach here and concludes that no significant disproportion is
Sketch-map No. 4:
Course of the maritime boundary

This sketch-map has been prepared for illustrative purposes only.

Mercator Projection (18° 20' S)
WGS 84

200 nautical miles from Peru's coast

200 nautical miles from Chile's coast

A: endpoint of the agreed maritime boundary
B: endpoint of the maritime boundary along the equidistance line
C: endpoint of the maritime boundary (intersection of the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties)
evident, such as would call into question the equitable nature of the provisional equidistance line.

195. The Court accordingly concludes that the maritime boundary between the two Parties from Point A runs along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C (see sketch-map No. 4: Course of the maritime boundary, p. 70).

VII. Conclusion

196. The Court concludes that the maritime boundary between the Parties starts at the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line, and extends for 80 nautical miles along that parallel of latitude to Point A. From this point, the maritime boundary runs along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C.

197. In view of the circumstances of the present case, the Court has defined the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties without determining the precise geographical co-ordinates. Moreover, the Court has not been asked to do so in the Parties’ final submissions. The Court expects that the Parties will determine these co-ordinates in accordance with the present Judgment, in the spirit of good neighbourliness.

198. For these reasons,

THE COURT,

(1) By fifteen votes to one,

Decides that the starting-point of the single maritime boundary delimiting the respective maritime areas between the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile is the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line;

IN FAVOUR: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judges ad hoc Guillaume, Orrego Vicuña;

AGAINST: Judge Gaja;

(2) By fifteen votes to one,

Decides that the initial segment of the single maritime boundary follows the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 westward;
(3) By ten votes to six,

**Decides** that this initial segment runs up to a point (Point A) situated at a distance of 80 nautical miles from the starting-point of the single maritime boundary;

**IN FAVOUR:** President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Guillaume, Orrego Vicuña;

**AGAINST:** Judge Sebutinde;

(4) By ten votes to six,

**Decides** that from Point A, the single maritime boundary shall continue south-westward along the line equidistant from the coasts of the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile, as measured from that point, until its intersection (at Point B) with the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Republic of Chile is measured. From Point B, the single maritime boundary shall continue southward along that limit until it reaches the point of intersection (Point C) of the 200-nautical-mile limits measured from the baselines from which the territorial seas of the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile, respectively, are measured;

**IN FAVOUR:** Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Donoghue; Judge ad hoc Guillaume;

**AGAINST:** President Tomka; Judges Xue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Orrego Vicuña;

(5) By fifteen votes to one,

**Decides** that, for the reasons given in paragraph 189 above, it does not need to rule on the second final submission of the Republic of Peru.

**IN FAVOUR:** President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Guillaume;

**AGAINST:** Judge ad hoc Orrego Vicuña.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of January, two thousand and fourteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of the Republic of Chile, respectively.

(Signed) Peter Tomka,
President.

(Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
Registrar.

President Tomka and Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor append declarations to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Owada appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Skotnikov appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judges Xue, Gaja, Bhandari and Judge ad hoc Orrego Vicuña append a joint dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges Donoghue and Gaja append declarations to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Sebutinde appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc Guillaume appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc Orrego Vicuña appends a separate, partly concurring and partly dissenting, opinion to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) P.T.
(Initialled) Ph.C.